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Caption: U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Kiska 
(WPB 1336) in waters off Hawaii. In 
March 2002, Coast Guard officers from 
Kiska and FBI agents took PRC national 
Shi Lei off the Seychelles-registered, Tai-
wan-owned fishing vessel Full Means II 
in international waters and arrested him 
for murder. Shi was tried, convicted, and 
sentenced to prison in the United States. 
This remains the only instance of U.S. 
assertion of jurisdiction and prosecution 
under the implementing legislation for 
the 1988 SUA Convention, subsequently 
updated. In “Effective Implementation of 
the 2005 Convention on the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation,” James Kraska ex-
plains that many states have not acceded 
to the 2005 treaty, and most of those that 
have done so have not taken the steps 
required to implement it effectively, even 
though the need to do so is perhaps even 
greater today. USCG photo by CPO Sara 
Mooers.
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FROM THE EDITORS
It is well to be reminded that the global maritime domain is a vast, largely un-
governed realm where good order particularly requires effective international 
coordination under well-understood legal regimes. In “Effective Implementation 
of the 2005 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation,” James Kraska uses the opportunity of the tenth anniver-
sary of the signing of the SUA Convention (as it is generally called) to review the 
status of this important international agreement, which was designed to combat 
both maritime terrorism and transnational criminal activity. He concludes that 
the international community has been remiss in developing appropriate pro-
cedures to implement the agreement, and suggests a way forward for remedy-
ing this (surprising and dismaying) state of affairs. James Kraska is Howard S. 
Levie Professor in the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the 
Naval War College. Rick Button, in “International Law and Search and Rescue,” 
provides a comparable overview of the current status of international maritime 
law relating to search and rescue of vessels and persons in distress. Here again, 
considerable progress has been made in codifying the legal parameters and best 
practices that apply in this area, but much additional work remains to be done, 
particularly in clarifying the very difficult issues involving the handling of large 
numbers of seaborne migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. 
Rick Button is a senior official in U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, 
DC.
As John Hanley reminds us, war gaming has been a hallmark of the Naval War 
College since the late nineteenth century, and played a particularly important 
role during the interwar years in preparing senior officers of the U.S. Navy to 
prosecute the Pacific War to its successful conclusion. In “Changing DoD’s Anal-
ysis Paradigm: The Science of War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation,” 
Hanley provides an authoritative account of the evolution of military operations 
analysis in the American defense community over the last half-century. He ar-
gues that recent advances in chaos and complexity theory call for a rethinking 
of the now-dominant “analysis paradigm” that relies on  large-scale computer 
modeling, in favor of a return to a more traditional approach to operations re-
search and gaming. John Hanley is a former U.S. naval officer who has served 
6844_FromTheEditors.indd   3 12/16/16   9:45 AM
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in a number of capacities in the U�S� government, most recently as director for 
strategy in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence�
In “A Himalayan Challenge: India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role 
of Special Operations Forces along the Sino-Indian Border,” Iskander Rehman 
offers an authoritative and timely account of the Indian government’s growing 
appreciation of the potential importance of special operations forces (SOFs) in 
strengthening the deterrent value of its regular armed forces in the face of the 
continuing modernization and expansion of the Chinese military presence along 
the two countries’ vast and inhospitable shared frontier� The situation on the 
China-India border has been overshadowed completely in recent years by China’s 
aggressive actions in the South and East China Seas, but it is well to remember 
that this land border never has been demarcated to the satisfaction of the parties 
(and indeed occasioned a short war between them in 1962); and China’s so-far-
successful recourse to so-called gray-zone tactics on its maritime frontier may 
embolden it under certain circumstances to undertake a similar campaign in 
the Himalayas� As Rehman also notes, India’s very recent use of SOFs in surgical 
cross-border operations against Pakistan in Kashmir seems to reflect a significant 
reevaluation of the utility of such forces in the (historically very conventionally 
minded) Indian military� Iskander Rehman is a senior fellow at the Pell Center for 
International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University�
Finally, Shang-su Wu, in “The Development of Vietnam’s Sea-Denial Strategy,” 
provides important insight into the reaction of another neighbor to China’s rise 
as a major regional military power� Vietnam, like India, has been the victim of a 
Chinese border incursion in the not-very-distant past, and also has clashed with 
China in a shooting incident in the South China Sea (see Toshi Yoshihara, “The 
1974 Paracels Sea Battle: A Campaign Appraisal,” in our Spring 2016 issue)� The 
author concludes that the Vietnamese have made intelligent use of their limited 
resources to build a maritime force that poses a credible sea-denial threat to the 
People’s Republic, should current frictions in that area escalate again to open 
military operations� Shang-su Wu is a research fellow at the S� Rajaratnam School 
of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309)� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236)�
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College. He attended the Uni-
versity of Minnesota, graduating with a bachelor of 
arts in political science, and received master of arts 
degrees from the Naval War College and the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 
Additionally, he served as a military fellow at the 
Council on Foreign Relations in New York and is a 
member of the council.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer 
whose sea-duty assignments have included com-
mand of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 
9, and Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet. Addition-
ally, he has served as Director, White House Situa-
tion Room; Vice Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy 
(J5) at U.S. Central Command; President, Board of 
Inspection and Survey; and, most recently, Assistant 
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
IN MY FORUM in the Autumn 2016 issue of the Review I high-
lighted a three-pronged agenda for the coming years, designed 
to focus our collective efforts to operationalize, navalize, and futurize the Col-
lege’s endeavors. In the paragraphs that follow, I’d like to address several initia-
tives that are helping us to be of more value to the operating forces.
The Naval War College (NWC) plays a key role in helping our military and 
civilian leaders make informed decisions about issues of global importance. 
Since good decisions must be based on accurate knowledge and reasonable as-
sumptions, we have expanded and reenergized the important work of our highly 
regarded China Maritime Studies Institute, and launched a new academic and 
research center with a focus on Russia’s ongoing advances in its maritime forces.
In the late summer of 2015, as civil war raged in Syria and President Bashar 
al-Assad’s government crumbled, Russian military forces began arriving in the 
region in an effort to stabilize the regime and roll back the opposition. Among 
the combat platforms sent to Syria were warships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, 
which took up station in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and have remained there 
since. That October, Russian Buyan-M missile corvettes from the Caspian Flotilla 
fired advanced Kalibr cruise missiles to strike targets in Syria from over nine 
hundred miles away. Since then, Russian navy vessels have been key enablers of 
Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war. These are dramatic advances for a 
navy that, fifteen years earlier, could muster barely a week of at-sea duty time for 
its individual surface ships.
The Syria deployment is emblematic of Russia’s return to the sea. The last 
decade has seen Russia surmount many of its post–Cold War challenges and 
reassert itself in regions it considers strategically vital, including the Black Sea, 
Meeting Operational Needs
6853_President'sForum.indd   7 12/20/16   10:34 AM
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the Baltic Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Arctic� To better understand 
and evaluate the implications of Russia’s return to the sea, NWC established the 
Russia Maritime Studies Institute (RMSI) in August 2016�
RMSI’s mission is to conduct research into a range of Russian maritime issues� 
These include Russian naval developments, but RMSI’s analytical scope also 
encompasses shipbuilding, maritime law, energy issues, and technological de-
velopment, among other topics� It is a truly collaborative enterprise, drawing on 
expertise from across the College to execute a research agenda that is responsive 
to the needs of our Navy�
RMSI’s faculty members have been very busy in the institute’s short existence� 
In addition to initiating a handful of research projects, they have traveled to U�S� 
Naval Forces Europe and Sixth Fleet headquarters, where they met with fleet 
leadership, supported staff planning efforts, and provided a series of educational 
briefings to the staff� RMSI faculty also traveled to the headquarters of the U�S� 
Pacific Fleet, where they provided leadership with an overview of Russian mari-
time issues and consulted with planners�
There is still much to be done as RMSI gets its sea legs� In the next year, there 
will be staff to hire, research to complete, and relationships to build� While the 
institute’s operating bandwidth is currently limited, my intention is to grow RMSI 
into a world-class research institute that puts the best traditions of scholarly re-
search at the service of the Navy�
As another way we can deliver value to the fleet, we are taking steps to ensure 
that we are providing the best possible gaming and analysis support to our op-
erating forces� In his “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” the Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO) charged the Navy with testing and refining naval 
power concepts “through focused wargaming, modeling, and simulations” that 
will connect directly to fleet exercises and training� Implicit in this charge is the 
challenge that operations research and analysis across the Navy enterprise must 
be conducted in a cohesive or holistic manner that is sufficient for USN leader-
ship to make fully informed decisions� To that end, the College is committed to 
increasing the connections among experimentation, campaign analysis, and war 
gaming�
In November 2016, we hosted a Navy Operations Research and Analysis 
Workshop in Newport as a forum for leaders from across the Navy enterprise to 
share existing gaming, experimentation, and analytical processes so as to identify 
beneficial connections and opportunities to provide better analytical products 
for Navy decision makers� Representatives from OPNAV N3/5, N81, U�S� Fleet 
Forces Command, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Navy Warfare Develop-
ment Command, and the Naval War College participated in the two-day event� 
Attendees presented their current processes for conducting, integrating, and 
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   8 12/15/16   1:53 PM
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P R E S I D E N T ’ S  F O RU M  9
disseminating research results� This was followed by a structured discussion to 
capture the key elements, both formal and informal, that connect those processes 
and results across the spectrum of Navy operations and research� We expect that 
the postworkshop report will be a comprehensive integration map that includes 
recommendations for ways in which the Navy enterprise can be linked more ef-
fectively to provide innovative support for the CNO’s goal of strengthening naval 
power at and from the sea� We anticipate that this event will be just the first step 
in helping all our institutions and organizations keep connected, with the result 
being increased impact from research, gaming, and experimentation that will 
keep our maritime forces ahead of the curve�
The Naval War College remains committed to aggressively delivering products 
and concepts that will help ensure the nation’s continued maritime superiority� 
Watch this space for future updates!
JEFFREY A� HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   9 12/15/16   1:53 PM
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James Kraska is Howard S. Levie Professor in the 
Stockton Center for the Study of International Law 
at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. 
He is also a distinguished fellow at the Law of the Sea 
Institute, University of California, Berkeley, School 
of Law, and senior fellow at the Center for Oceans 
Law and Policy at the University of Virginia School 
of Law. He is a lifetime member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations and a senior fellow at the Foreign 
Policy Research Institute. He is the author or editor 
of seven books, including Maritime Power and the 
Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World 
Politics (Oxford, 2011).
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James Kraska
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2005 
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF  
UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY  
OF MARITIME NAVIGATION
n 2005, the 167 member states of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
adopted the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)� The resulting 2005 SUA 
Convention is a comprehensive treaty on maritime security that streamlines and 
integrates efforts to prevent and disrupt maritime terrorism� In the decade since 
its adoption, however, many states have not acceded to the new treaty, and most 
of those that have done so have not taken the steps the treaty requires to imple-
ment it effectively, even though the need to do so is perhaps even greater today� 
This article provides a road map for implementation of the 2005 SUA Convention 
to realize the vision for an effective global regime to combat maritime terrorism�
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the fear was palpable that there would be 
follow-on catastrophic attacks in the maritime domain� Suddenly states worried 
about the global marine transportation system, especially its vulnerability to ter-
rorism� Ships could be used to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or persons, 
conduct attacks on port infrastructure or bridges to paralyze commerce, or attack 
oil and liquefied natural gas tankers to attempt to produce large secondary explo-
sions� The most recent manifestation of this heightened risk is from the Islamic 
State, which has examined the feasibility of mass-casualty attacks against cruise 
ships�1
In response, the member states and secretariat of the IMO developed a slate 
of initiatives to counter these threats, including amendments to the International 
I
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Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) that emerged as the 2002 Inter-
national Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code�2 The ISPS Code attempted 
to develop a culture of threat-based security throughout the maritime cargo sup-
ply chain on which the global economy depends�3
The ISPS Code is a government-industry partnership designed to make the 
commercial shipping industry a less attractive, or at least a more difficult, target 
for maritime crime� The code entered into force in 2004� Simultaneously, states 
took action to facilitate prevention or disruption of terrorist attacks against 
ships and fixed platforms on the continental shelf� In November 2001, the IMO 
Assembly adopted Resolution A�924(22) as a response to UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001), which decided that states shall take the necessary steps 
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts�4
Resolution A�924(22) called for a review of maritime security architecture 
and prevention of maritime terrorism�5 The resolution requested that the IMO 
Legal Committee undertake a study to determine appropriate updates to the 
IMO Circular on Passenger Ferry Security as well as the SUA and its Protocol for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located 
on the Continental Shelf�6 Thereafter, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1540 (2004), which recognized the urgent need to take more effective measures to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their 
means of delivery�7
The IMO study mandated by A�924(22) unfolded over six sessions plus several 
intersessional meetings from 2002 to 2005, and culminated in two draft protocols 
that were adopted at a diplomatic conference at IMO in October 2005� The 2005 
Protocol built a comprehensive regime for counterterrorism at sea and maritime 
security, and the new instrument that includes the 1988 Convention as amended 
by the 2005 Protocol is referred to as the 2005 SUA Convention�
The 2005 SUA Convention entered into force in 2010� Now that more than ten 
years have passed since its adoption and more than five years since its entry into 
force, it may be beneficial to assess how far we have come and, more importantly, 
to consider how emerging threats stack up against the existing regimes� In par-
ticular, implementation of the 2005 SUA Convention has been lackadaisical, and 
it is unclear how well the treaty will contend with current trends and emerging 
threats, which include unmanned systems, lasers, and maritime cyber attacks� 
The remainder of this article assesses these issues and provides a way forward 
for states�
This article first looks at how threats from unmanned aerial, surface, and 
subsurface systems fall within the scope of the 2005 SUA Convention� The 
convention was crafted with the realization that the shipping industry would be 
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confronted with a proliferation of unmanned systems and a profusion of com-
mercial, off-the-shelf technologies that could be used to endanger vessels and 
life at sea�
Second, the convention covers dual-use materials: those that may have civilian 
or commercial applications, but also may be misdirected for unlawful purposes�
Third, the convention covers asymmetric criminal activities, such as seizure of 
a ship by force or the use or attempted use of ships as weapons� States party to the 
convention will have to examine and adjust their national laws to ensure they are 
committed to criminal prosecution of these almost unique offenses�
Fourth, the convention requires states party to designate a “competent author-
ity” to receive and respond to requests for decisions or assistance from other 
states� So far, however, most states party have not done so—leaving a gaping hole 
in implementation� There already exists a similar contact list for senior officials 
who coordinate law-enforcement counterdrug operations� This article concludes 
that states party to the 2005 SUA Convention should develop and publish a simi-
lar list that will facilitate implementation of their treaty obligations�
UNMANNED SYSTEMS—ARTICLE 1(1)
It has become commonplace for civil aircraft to encounter unmanned drones, es-
pecially near airports� We may expect that the regularity of drone flights and the 
controversy over issues of safety, privacy, and security will expand from airspace 
to the water� The barrier to entry for making unmanned systems has fallen, and 
terrorist groups and criminal organizations can develop and employ unmanned 
systems using commercial, off-the-shelf components�8 Underwater and surface 
vehicles provide ample standoff distance from the target, may be used to sequence 
attacks over time, and can be operated in swarms to overwhelm ship defenses�9
One of the most interesting features of the 2005 Protocol is that article 1(1) of 
the SUA, as revised, defines a ship as “a vessel of any type whatsoever not perma-
nently attached to the sea-bed�” The definition includes “dynamically supported 
craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft�” This definition appears to include 
an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) or unmanned surface vehicle (USV) 
under “a vessel of any type whatsoever�” Similarly, the U�S� Rules of Construction 
Act, which dates to 1873, defines a “vessel” as any “description of water-craft or 
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of trans-
portation on the water�”10 In the case of Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat, the 
U�S� federal court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held that a vessel is defined 
as a “navigable structure, capable of being used for transportation, regardless of 
intent or actual use�”11 Thus, the use of either a UUV or a USV in the commission 
of an offense, as well as acts committed against them, would be covered under 
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the 2005 SUA Convention� In this respect, the 2005 SUA Convention is well po-
sitioned to address threats to or posed by unmanned vessels�
DUAL-USE ITEMS AND MATERIALS—ARTICLE 3BIS
The structure of the 2005 SUA Convention criminalizes acts that by their nature 
or purpose are conducted to intimidate a population or to compel a government 
or an international organization with high explosives or biological, chemical, or 
nuclear devices; the discharge of natural gas or other hazardous substances; or the 
use of a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage� The legal 
standard for “serious injury or damage” includes not only serious bodily injury or 
death but “extensive destruc-
tion” of a public place that 
results in “major economic 
loss,” and “substantial damage 
to the environment�”12
The 2005 SUA Protocol is 
unique among counterterror-
ism conventions in that it covers the misuse of dual-use materials—the transport 
on board a ship of legitimate items, products, and materials intended to cause or 
in a threat to cause death, serious injury, or damage�13 The proscription includes 
explosive and radioactive materials and equipment designed to process special 
fissionable material, when intended for use in a nuclear explosive activity that is 
not part of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safe-
guards agreement� Finally, the 2005 Protocol covers “any equipment, materials or 
software or related technology that significantly contributes to the design, manu-
facture or delivery of a BCN [biological, chemical, and nuclear] weapon, with the 
intention that it will be used for such purpose�”14 This provision is exceptional 
because it provides a means to criminalize civilian, commercial, off-the-shelf and 
dual-use items on the basis of their intended use and purpose�
As noted, BCN weapons are those that include biological, chemical, or nuclear 
devices� Biological weapons are “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins�” 
Chemical weapons are “toxic chemicals and their precursors,” excluding those 
intended for “(A) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical 
or other peaceful purposes; (B) or protective purposes, namely those purposes 
directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against 
chemical weapons�” Law-enforcement chemicals, such as riot-control agents, 
and those used for military purposes are not included within the definition of 
chemical weapons�15
The treaty is integrated with other international security regimes in several 
ways� First, the list of proscribed items includes toxic chemicals and precursor 
[I]mplementation of the 2005 SUA Conven-
tion has been lackadaisical, and it is unclear 
how well the treaty will contend with . . .  
unmanned systems, lasers, and maritime cy-
ber attacks.
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chemicals, as those terms are defined in the Biological Weapons Convention 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)� The SUA also covers nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices, although radiological weapons are not 
mentioned specifically� Radiological “dirty bombs” are a more likely threat than 
nuclear bombs� Furthermore, amended article 1 also covers toxic chemical and 
precursor by adopting the definitions contained in the CWC� Toxic chemical 
means a substance that through “chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals�” A 
precursor chemical reacts at any stage in the production of a toxic chemical�16
The terms place of public use, state or government facility, infrastructure facility, 
and public transportation system are drawn from the Terrorist Bombing Conven-
tion�17 Similarly, the terms source material and special fissionable material have 
the same meanings in article 1(2)(b) of the SUA as they have in the statute of the 
IAEA (1956)�18
In its construction of criminal offenses, the 2005 Protocol also leverages the 
offenses in the major multilateral terrorism conventions�19 This approach at-
tempts to weave a tighter, more-integrated legal structure to counter terrorism 
vertically throughout the spectrum of land, sea, and air, as well as horizontally 
along the continuum of crime and violence from planning and conspiracy to car-
rying out a violent attack�
ASYMMETRIC MARITIME CRIME—ARTICLE 3BIS
The 2005 SUA Convention avoids the thorny issue of defining “terrorism,” in-
stead simply creating three separate groups of offenses� The first category com-
prises unlawful and intentional acts of violence against ships or persons on board 
ships� This category includes seizure of a ship or exercise of control over a ship 
by force or threat of force, acts of violence that endanger the safe navigation of a 
ship, destruction of a ship or its cargo, emplacement of a weapon on board a ship, 
destruction of navigational facilities, or communication of false information that 
endangers a ship�20
The second category encompasses acts of transport of certain dangerous ma-
terials or weapons on board a ship for the purpose of intimidating a population, 
government, or international organization�21 This category includes transporting 
aboard a ship explosive devices or radioactive material, with the intent to cause 
death or serious injury or damage; a BCN weapon; fissionable material; or dual-
use material�22
The third category includes acts of commission through a conspiracy, acts as an 
accomplice, or attempts to commit crimes included in the prior two categories�23
The stable of new offenses offers a flexible definition focused on the intention 
of the act or the conduct of violence, rather than murky political motivations� The 
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offenses were designed broadly to cover emerging and new threats, and it bears 
consideration whether the use of a laser against a ship imperils the vessel or its 
crew to the extent that it falls under articles 3, 3bis, and 3quater� However, it is 
unclear where the line is drawn for certain new or emerging acts of intimidation 
such as a cyber attack against a ship’s navigation or communications systems or 
the aforementioned direct action against a vessel using a laser�
In the case of a cyber attack, article 3(1)(e) proscribes any unlawful and in-
tentional act that “seriously interferes with” maritime “navigational facilities” 
and that is “likely to endanger the safe navigation” of a ship� Consequently, cyber 
crimes that endanger a ship are included within the scope of criminal conduct in 
the 2005 SUA Convention�
It is less certain, however, whether other asymmetric attacks are included in 
the definition� In particular, does the use of a laser against the pilothouse of a ves-
sel constitute an “act of violence” against a person on board a ship that is “likely 
to endanger the safe navigation” of the ship?24 This issue turns on the definition 
of what constitutes an “act of violence�” Violence in the law generally is consid-
ered to be “moving, acting, or [conduct] characterized by physical force, espe-
cially by extreme and sudden or by unjust and improper force�”25 This focus on 
“reproaches produced or effected by physical force” raises the question whether 
use of a laser against a ship constitutes an “act of violence�” The Israeli Penal Act 
of 1977 is more circumspect; it defines an “act of violence or terror” as “a crime 
that causes harm to a person’s body or that endangers him for death or for severe 
injury�”26 The use of lasers opens a lacuna in the definition of what constitutes 
an “act of violence” that states should address in implementing legislation� The 
IMO may serve as a fusion point for governments’ views on this issue to facilitate 
uniformity�
COMPETENT AUTHORITY—ARTICLE 8BIS
Article 8bis of the 2005 SUA includes a comprehensive framework to facilitate 
boarding of suspect vessels at sea� In particular, the new provision seeks to en-
sure better coordination during incidents at sea between a warship attempting to 
board a suspicious vessel and the flag state that exercises jurisdiction over that 
vessel� Generally, the flag state has exclusive authority to authorize boarding of 
one of its ships, but in the past states have not always responded to such requests 
in a timely fashion� Article 8bis requires states party to “co-operate to the fullest 
extent possible to prevent and suppress unlawful acts covered by this Conven-
tion � � � and � � � respond to [boarding] requests � � � as expeditiously as possible�”27
The boarding regime does not change the existing international law of the sea 
or infringe on exclusive flag-state control or traditional rights and freedoms of 
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navigation. The boarding regime provides a framework for expedited decision 
making that states party may adopt to facilitate coordination.
The 2005 SUA Convention sets forth a process for cooperation and procedures 
for boarding a ship flying the flag of another state party when the requesting 
party has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the ship or a person on board the 
ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in the commission of an offense under 
the convention.
States have a general obligation to cooperate “to the fullest extent possible” 
among the states party and to respond to requests from other states party “as 
expeditiously as possible.”28 
Requests for boarding should 
be accompanied by, inter alia, 
the name of the vessel, its 
IMO ship identification num-
ber, and its port of registry.29 
Article 8bis(3) is a reminder that it is often impossible to conduct a thorough 
inspection of either a small craft or a large commercial vessel at sea, and often 
the best course of action is to bring the ship into port to facilitate the inspection. 
This provision requires the boarding state to consider the particular “dangers and 
difficulties” involved in boarding a ship under way.
Article 8bis(4) provides a mechanism whereby a state party with reasonable 
grounds to suspect that an offense delineated in article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed “involving a ship flying its flag” may 
request the assistance of other states party.30 The requesting party that encounters 
beyond the territorial sea a ship of another country that is suspected of an offense 
under article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater must follow the steps set forth in the new 
article. The flag state should confirm the nationality of the vessel, and if national-
ity is confirmed the flag state has four options: (1) it may authorize the requesting 
state authority to board; (2) it may conduct a boarding and search with its own 
forces; (3) it may conduct a boarding with its forces working in tandem with the 
boarding forces of the requesting state; or (4) it may decline the requesting state 
permission to board.31
When the requesting party boards a foreign-flagged ship and finds evidence 
of offenses under article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater, the flag state may authorize the 
requesting party temporarily to detain the ship, cargo, and persons on board, 
pending receipt of further instructions from the flag state. In any case, the re-
questing party must inform the flag state of the results of the boarding, search, 
and detention, including discovery of evidence of a violation of article 3, 3bis, 
3ter, or 3quater or illegal conduct that is not a subject of the convention.32
The provision is exceptional because it pro-
vides a means to criminalize civilian, com-
mercial, off-the-shelf and dual-use items on 
the basis of their intended use and purpose.
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These interactions between the flag state and the requesting state are facili-
tated through the designated “competent authority” of the flag state, and the suc-
cess of cooperation hinges on responsive and iterative engagement� States party 
agree to designate within one month of becoming a party an official authority (or 
authorities) to serve as a liaison with other nations on time-sensitive issues aris-
ing under the treaty, such as receiving and responding to requests for assistance, 
confirmation of vessel nationality, and seeking authorization to take appropriate 
law-enforcement measures�33
Each state is to make the designation to the IMO secretary-general, who pro-
mulgates it among member states�34 However, out of forty states, such notification 
has been made by only four: Latvia, San Marino, Sweden, and the United States� 
Latvia has designated the Naval Forces Coast Guard Service as the appropriate 
authority to receive requests for assistance, and the Security Police and Prosecu-
tor General’s Office as the points of contact for confirmation of nationality and 
authorization to take appropriate measures� Similarly, Sweden has designated the 
Swedish Coastguard Regional Command as the authority to receive and respond 
to requests for confirmation of ship nationality, and the Ministry of Justice as au-
thority for requests to take measures against Swedish vessels� San Marino and the 
United States have a single point of contact each, the Civil Aviation and Maritime 
Navigation Authority and the U�S� Coast Guard Liaison Office to the U�S� State 
Department, respectively� This low rate of compliance for designation of a com-
petent authority risks atrophy of the 2005 SUA Convention, and remedial action 
by states party is required�35
The Vienna Drug Convention offers a clear model for effective coordination 
of maritime interdiction and boarding at sea or in port� Under article 17 of the 
convention, states party are obligated to cooperate to suppress illicit drug traf-
ficking by sea� States party that have reasonable grounds to suspect a vessel fly-
ing a foreign flag is engaged in illicit traffic may notify the flag state and request 
confirmation of registry and authorization to take appropriate measures against 
the suspect ship� In such a case, the flag state may authorize boarding, search, and 
seizure of evidence in accordance with agreements or arrangements between the 
two states� States party “shall respond expeditiously” to inquiries, and states that 
take action against a foreign-flag ship shall “promptly inform the flag State�”36
To facilitate these interactions and ensure efficient and effective communi-
cations and decision making, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) has produced a Directory of Competent National Authorities�37 The 
directory provides points of contact and decision-making authorities for requests 
for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and cooperation against illicit traffic by 
sea, including the smuggling of migrants and firearms�38 The IMO and member 
states should develop a similar directory of competent authorities to facilitate 
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requests made pursuant to the 2005 SUA Convention, with the goal of perhaps 
combining the points of contact for maritime interdiction under article 17 of the 
UNODC directory with the IMO directory to render a comprehensive volume on 
government points of contact and decision making for maritime matters�
After the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 2005 
SUA Convention has the potential to become one of the most important instru-
ments for maritime security, 
on the order of SOLAS� How-
ever, there is no question that, 
for now, it is woefully under-
subscribed and underutilized� 
The slow implementation of 
the 2005 SUA Convention is 
reminiscent of that for the 
1988 Convention, which, 
while widely accepted (with some 150 states party), has been used only once (as 
far as I know) to assert jurisdiction over a suspected criminal�
In that case, United States v. Shi, the U�S� government asserted jurisdiction over 
the defendant, whom U�S� Coast Guard officers picked up sixty nautical miles off 
the coast of Hilo, Hawaii, from the F/V Full Means No. 2, a Taiwan ship registered 
in the Seychelles�39 Shi was a Chinese crew member who killed the captain and 
first mate of the ship after they beat him severely and demoted him from cook 
to deckhand� Subsequently, Shi was overpowered by the crew and held captive 
until turned over to the Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation� 
Shi’s conviction by the federal district court in Hawaii was upheld by the U�S� 
Ninth Circuit�40
The United States asserted jurisdiction over Shi under 18 U�S�C� § 2280(b)(1)
(C), the U�S� implementing legislation for the 1988 SUA Convention�41 That legis-
lation was adopted to assert U�S� jurisdiction in accordance with the convention, 
which requires states party to extradite or prosecute offenders regardless of where 
the offenders’ acts occurred� Title 18 U�S�C� § 2280 authorizes federal jurisdiction 
over any offender “later found” in the United States, and the district court found 
that it had jurisdiction over Shi�42 Congress’s authority to establish jurisdiction 
by statute is granted in the “offense clause” of the Constitution, which empow-
ers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations�”43
The Shi case is remarkable and important today for two reasons� First, the 
United States used its implementing legislation for the 1988 SUA Convention 
to establish jurisdiction over Shi, and this action did not require any liaison or 
The 2005 Protocol attempts to weave a tighter, 
more-integrated legal structure to counter 
terrorism vertically throughout the spectrum 
of land, sea, and air, as well as horizontally 
along the continuum of crime and violence 
from planning and conspiracy to carrying out 
a violent attack.
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correspondence with other nations involved: neither the flag state of the ship nor 
the authorities of Shi’s nationality (China) nor those of the nationalities of his 
two victims (Taiwan and Chinese)� The successful prosecution underscores the 
successful operation of implementing legislation to prosecute crimes committed 
under the 1988 Convention� Second, the Shi case is the only known example of a 
criminal prosecution under the 1988 Convention, underscoring the gulf that lies 
between what legal realists might say is “law on the books” and “law in action�”44
In crafting and adopting the 2005 SUA Convention, the member states of the 
IMO and the IMO secretariat have advanced the program of the rule of law in 
the oceans and furthered the goal of greater maritime security� The convention is 
a cornerstone instrument for bringing the rule of law to the oceans, but it is only 
a first step� As with much of international law, the success of the 2005 conven-
tion lies in its implementation, not merely its adoption at the international level� 
States must integrate their IMO commitments into effective national action that 
includes domestic rules, interagency resources and authorities, and mechanisms 
for real-time collaboration� Toward this end, states might explore how to ap-
proach new threats and define new crimes based on unmanned systems, dual-use 
materials, and asymmetric attacks on ships, as well as ensure they have built out 
“backroom” procedural and logistical mechanisms, such as designation of com-
petent authorities to facilitate international collaboration to enforce maritime 
security measures�
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Rick Button
Treasury Department
Office of the Secretary
Washington, D.C.
November 15, 1897
Sir: The best information obtainable gives the assurance of truth to the reports 
that a fleet of eight whaling vessels are icebound in the Arctic Ocean, somewhere 
in the vicinity of Point Barrow, and that the 265 persons who were, at last ac-
counts, on board these vessels are in all probability in dire distress. These condi-
tions call for prompt and energetic action, looking to the relief of the imprisoned 
whalemen. It therefore has been determined to send an expedition to the rescue.
Believing that your long experience in arctic work, your familiarity with the region 
of Arctic Alaska from Point Barrow, south, and the coast line washed by the Ber-
ing Sea, from which you but recently returned, your known ability and reputation 
as an able and competent officer, all especially fit you for the trust, you have been 
selected to command the relief expedition. Your ship, the Bear, will be officered by 
a competent body of men and manned by a crew of your own selection. The ship 
will be fully equipped, fitted, and provisioned for the perilous work in view, for 
such it must be under the most favorable conditions. . . .
You are hereby given full authority and the largest possible latitude to act in every 
emergency that may arise, and while impossibilities are not expected, it is expect-
ed that you, with your gallant officers and crew, will leave no avenue of possible 
success untried to render successful the expedition which you command. . . .
Mindful of the arduous and perilous expedition upon which you are about to 
enter, I bid you, your officers and men, Godspeed upon your errand of mercy, and 
wish you a successful voyage and safe return.1
 The search for and rescue of persons in distress is a centuries-old, time- honored tradition� The above instructions provided to Captain Francis Tut-
tle of the U�S� Revenue Cutter Service over a century ago, as he prepared his crew 
to rescue whalers trapped in ice in the Arctic Ocean, epitomize the dedicated 
efforts of mariners and coastal states in saving lives at sea�
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SEARCH AND RESCUE
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This lifesaving tradition continues unabated today, albeit with new challenges� 
The long-standing challenges provided by harsh weather and sea conditions, 
long distances, and limited available search-and-rescue (SAR) resources remain 
the same� However, since Captain Tuttle’s successful rescue, international and 
national SAR organizations, practices, procedures, capabilities, and technologies 
have continued to improve� There is now a greater commitment and resolve by 
the international community to work together to save lives at sea�
Owing to the unique hazards encountered by ships as they ply the world’s 
oceans and by aircraft on transoceanic flights, as well as the challenges to coordi-
nating and conducting maritime lifesaving operations, coastal states implement-
ed national SAR systems and SAR organizations to search for and rescue those 
in distress at sea� However, prior to the 1970s there was no standardized system 
globally for organization, coordination, and conduct of SAR operations� Seeking 
to harmonize these organizations and procedures, the international community, 
through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), established in 1979 the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention)� 
The SAR Convention provides an internationally standardized foundation and 
framework for coastal states to work together in implementing a global maritime 
SAR system�2 The IMO describes how the SAR Convention was developed to 
provide a plan for and implementation of a system to save the lives of persons in 
distress at sea more effectively: 
The 1979 Convention � � � was aimed at developing an international SAR plan, so that, 
no matter where an accident occurs, the rescue of persons in distress at sea will be 
co-ordinated by a SAR organization and, when necessary, by co-operation between 
neighbouring SAR organizations�
Although the obligation of ships to go to the assistance of vessels in distress was 
enshrined both in tradition and in international treaties � � � there was, until the 
adoption of the SAR Convention, no international system covering search and rescue 
operations� In some areas there was a well-established organization able to provide 
assistance promptly and efficiently, in others there was nothing at all�3 
Under the internationally recognized foundation provided through the SAR 
Convention, each coastal state organizes its maritime SAR authorities and orga-
nization on the basis of its available SAR resources, unique geographic challenges, 
political considerations, cultural influences, available funding, and domestic SAR 
legal framework� Each country’s national and agency-specific SAR organiza-
tions then develop policies, procedures, tactics, and training to implement their 
respective national SAR system, which then becomes an integral component of 
the global SAR system� Through this internationally standardized and organized 
framework, coastal states work together in responding to and rescuing those 
imperiled at sea�
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This article pursues several objectives� First, it seeks to provide a broad over-
view of the global SAR system’s international framework and organization as set 
forth in the annex to the SAR Convention and implemented by coastal states� 
Despite that implementation over the past forty-five years, many people remain 
unaware of the existence of a standardized, global, maritime SAR system� While 
not perfect, the global SAR system provides an important basis on which coastal 
states can build cooperative relationships to enable them to conduct this impor-
tant lifesaving mission more effectively�
Second, the article focuses on the specific SAR responsibilities and interna-
tional legal requirements placed on shipmasters and coastal states as they work 
together in coordinating and conducting maritime SAR operations; both are im-
portant lifesaving partners� Passenger ships, cargo ships, and warships of all types 
transit across the world’s oceans every day� In many instances, one of these ships 
may be the only available SAR resource in the vicinity of a person in distress, and 
could make the difference between life and death� The coastal state is responsible 
for coordinating the SAR operation and supporting the responding shipmaster� 
The article discusses several international conventions that form the legal basis 
for this important lifesaving relationship� The responsibilities of a warship in 
rendering assistance to persons in distress also are considered�
This section also will discuss the tragic issue of mixed migration by sea from 
a SAR perspective� The question that needs to be considered is whether these 
mixed-migration incidents—in which thousands of persons are taking to the 
sea, in many instances fleeing for their lives—and the ensuing response actions 
should even be considered SAR operations conducted under the SAR Conven-
tion, or instead law-enforcement / national border security incidents�
Third, this article will address two additional situations that SAR legal advisers 
and policy makers should consider and for which they should develop policy and 
prepare SAR responders�
First, under international law the responsibilities and requirements of a ship or 
aircraft when conducting a rescue operation within another coastal state’s territo-
rial sea will be considered� The shipmaster’s duty to render assistance to persons 
in distress does not stop at a coastal state’s territorial sea boundary� When such a 
situation occurs, can a ship at sea, on being notified of persons in distress, enter 
a coastal state’s territorial sea to render assistance? Can an aircraft enter into a 
coastal state’s airspace over its territorial sea to assist in a rescue operation? Seven 
different scenarios will be presented to highlight the distinctions and limitations 
of rescue operations within a coastal state’s territorial sea�
Second, this article will address the issue of forcibly evacuating a person from 
a vessel when doing so is, in the judgment of the SAR responders on scene, the 
only way to save the person’s life� May the SAR responder use force to compel a 
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person to abandon his vessel? What type of force should be considered? SAR au-
thorities should develop policies and procedures in preparation for the day when 
a person in distress does not want to leave his vessel even in a life-threatening 
situation�
This article does not provide exhaustive legal analyses of these various issues� 
Its purposes are to provide a synopsis of the international law addressing these 
subjects, and to address questions that SAR authorities and responders should 
consider in developing future SAR policies and procedures� It is my hope that this 
article will provide the reader with a better understanding of the legal framework 
for the global SAR system and serve as an impetus for further discussion of these 
important topics�
OVERVIEW: GLOBAL SEARCH-AND-RESCUE SYSTEM
The thing I constantly think about—we were so, so very lucky. The 
difference between our ship and the Titanic is we weren’t caught in 
the middle of the ocean. . . . If we had been caught in the middle of the 
ocean, most of these people wouldn’t have survived.
MIKE KAJIAN, PASSENGER ON BOARD COSTA CONCORDIA
The world’s oceans constitute a dangerous environment that covers approxi-
mately 70 percent of the earth’s surface�4 The centuries-old duty of the mariner 
transiting the world’s oceans to render assistance to those in distress at sea was 
implemented formally through several international conventions�5 However, 
large-scale disasters at sea in the early twentieth century, many involving signifi-
cant loss of life, continued to plague the shipping community� The continued loss 
of life made it apparent that, alone, this duty to render assistance was insufficient; 
an international SAR system for organizing, coordinating, and conducting res-
cues at sea was required�
Before the adoption of the SAR Convention, there was no overarching inter-
national plan for coordinating the conduct of maritime lifesaving operations� 
Some maritime regions did have coastal states that implemented robust, effec-
tive, national SAR systems, while others had very limited or no SAR resources 
or coordinating structures to render assistance to persons in distress� There was 
no internationally recognized system to coordinate and conduct SAR opera-
tions, because there was no governing international regime to standardize SAR 
processes and procedures�
The adoption of the SAR Convention filled this gap by instituting a frame-
work under which coastal states could implement their respective national SAR 
systems,6 including the establishment of rescue coordination centers (RCCs) and 
rescue sub-centers (RSCs) to coordinate operations within a coastal state’s SAR 
region�7
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Soon after the IMO’s SAR Convention came into force in 1985, it became ap-
parent that additional guidance was required� To assist states in meeting their 
SAR obligations under the SAR Convention, as well as the comparable require-
ments the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) mandated in the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago Convention”),8 both 
organizations jointly developed the three-volume International Aeronautical 
and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR manual)�9 This reference 
provides guidelines and procedures to assist states in developing and harmoniz-
ing their respective aeronautical and maritime SAR organizations, planning, and 
operations, as well as providing the basis for coordinating and conducting SAR 
operations among states�
Developed for the SAR manager, the IAMSAR manual, volume 1 (Organiza-
tion and Management), “attempts to ensure that managers understand the basic 
concepts and principles involved in SAR, and to provide practical information 
and guidance to help managers establish and support SAR services�”10 Volume 2 
(Mission Co-ordination) provides guidance and information to personnel who 
plan and coordinate SAR operations�11 Volume 3 (Mobile Facilities) was devel-
oped for carriage on board vessels and aircraft that may be called on to assist in 
a SAR operation�
Volume 1 explains the IMO and ICAO’s purpose for developing the IAMSAR 
manual:
ICAO and IMO jointly developed this Manual to foster co-operation between them-
selves, between neighbouring States, and between aeronautical and maritime authori-
ties� The goal of the Manual is to assist State authorities to economically establish 
effective SAR services, to promote harmonization of aeronautical and maritime SAR 
services, and to ensure that persons in distress will be assisted without regard to their 
locations, nationality, or circumstances� State authorities are encouraged to promote, 
where possible[,] harmonization of aeronautical and maritime SAR services�12
Within the global SAR system, roles and responsibilities also have been de-
veloped to provide for the efficient organization and implementation of a coastal 
state’s national SAR system� There are three primary levels of coordination: (1) 
the SAR coordinator (SC) is that person or agency with the responsibility for the 
management and oversight of a coastal state’s SAR organization;13 (2) the SAR 
mission coordinator (SMC) is the official temporarily assigned to coordinate, 
direct, and supervise a SAR operation;14 and (3) an on-scene coordinator (OSC) 
may be assigned by the SMC to coordinate SAR operations on scene when mul-
tiple resources are working together within a specified area�15 Additionally, an 
aircraft coordinator (ACO) can be assigned by the SMC or OSC in a SAR opera-
tion if the response involves multiple aircraft� The ACO would be responsible for 
flight safety and for ensuring effective use of the aircraft in the conduct of the 
operation�16
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Search-and-Rescue Regions
Implementation of the international SAR framework mandated by the SAR 
Convention necessitated the division of the world’s oceans into a patchwork quilt 
of maritime SAR regions in which each coastal state assumed responsibility for 
coordinating and conducting SAR operations�17 It is commonly assumed that 
coastal states establish their SAR regions unilaterally� However, SAR region lines 
of delimitation are only provisional; the SAR Convention mandates that coastal 
states with adjacent SAR regions enter into cooperative agreements to establish 
their respective SAR regions formally�18 These SAR agreements not only delimit 
the SAR regions but ideally serve as the basis for cooperation and coordination 
between coastal states in the conduct of SAR operations�19
One practical benefit in developing a global SAR system is that with the world-
wide assignment of maritime SAR regions, states are not required to provide SAR 
services for their own citizens wherever they travel� Coastal states provide SAR 
services to anyone in distress within a SAR region, without regard to the person’s 
nationality, status, or circumstances�20
Two other important factors need to be understood regarding coastal states’ 
implementation of SAR services within their maritime SAR regions�21 First, a 
maritime SAR region is not an extension of a coastal state’s national “bound aries” 
but rather a geographic area in which the coastal state accepts responsibility to 
coordinate SAR operations�22 This is an especially important concept to under-
stand, since a coastal state may extend a large portion of its maritime SAR region 
into the high seas�23 Second, the SAR Convention does not mandate that a coastal 
state must have all the SAR resources necessary to respond to a distress within 
its entire maritime SAR region� As previously stated, SAR regions only define a 
geographic area in which a coastal state is responsible for “coordinating” SAR op-
erations�24 The requirements of the SAR Convention build on the time-honored 
tradition of shared responsibility for coordinating and conducting lifesaving op-
erations at sea� All available resources should be used to save lives: local, regional, 
national, and international; volunteer; commercial and shipping; aircraft; etc�25 
The circumstances of a particular distress incident should dictate what available 
resources can and should be used most effectively�
Rescue Coordination Center / Rescue Sub-center
The coastal state’s RCCs and RSCs are the backbone of the global SAR system� 
They are responsible for the organization of SAR services and the coordination 
and conduct of SAR operations within maritime SAR regions�26 The annex to the 
SAR Convention requires assignment of one RCC or RSC to each maritime SAR 
region�27 The RCC should be located where it can perform its coordination func-
tion most effectively, have twenty-four-hour availability, be staffed with trained 
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   30 12/15/16   1:53 PM
36
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11
 B U T T O N  3 1
personnel, have the ability to receive distress alerts, and maintain plans of opera-
tion for different types of distress scenarios�28
In situations in which an RCC may not be able to coordinate SAR services 
effectively over a specific geographic area within its SAR region, a coastal state’s 
SAR authority can establish an RSC to exercise responsibility for coordinating 
SAR operations within a designated search-and-rescue subregion (SRS)�29 The 
RSC, which can be just as capable as an RCC, may be delegated authority to coor-
dinate SAR operations independently within its SRS� However, an RSC generally 
has fewer responsibilities than its associated RCC�30
The global SAR system, while not perfect, continues to improve every year as 
nations work together to save lives at sea� SAR authorities worldwide understand 
their responsibilities under the SAR Convention� Lessons learned from SAR cases 
are developed and shared among international SAR authorities and organiza-
tions� Coastal states in many regions of the world are realizing that effective SAR 
services cannot be provided independently� In these regions, coastal states are 
working together to develop regional SAR plans and cooperative arrangements 
to implement regional SAR systems based on the framework mandated in the 
SAR Convention� There is still plenty of work to be accomplished, but through 
the IMO and ICAO positive improvements to the global SAR system continue 
to be made�
OBLIGATIONS OF THE SHIPMASTER AND THE COASTAL STATE: 
PERSONS RESCUED AT SEA
In May 2014, a U.S. rescue coordination center was notified that a passenger ship, 
transiting on the high seas, had come across what appeared to be a dilapidated ves-
sel with a large number of persons on board in the vicinity of a coastal state. On the 
basis of the size and condition of the vessel and the presence of thirty-nine persons 
on board, the passenger ship embarked the persons, consistent with its international 
obligation to render assistance to those in distress at sea.
Even though the passenger ship was in the vicinity of this coastal state, the res-
cue of the thirty-nine survivors occurred in the maritime SAR region of a second 
coastal state. After the thirty-nine survivors were safely on board, the passenger ship 
resumed its transit to the second coastal state, its next port of call. During its transit, 
the shipmaster notified the authorities of the rescue and that his ship had embarked 
the thirty-nine survivors. However, upon arrival, the authorities made no effort to 
coordinate the disembarkation of the survivors in their country or to another place 
of safety, as required by the SAR Convention. As a result, the passenger ship was 
forced to retain the thirty-nine survivors on board when it departed for its next port 
of call, in the United States.
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Because of the coastal state’s failure to meet its obligation to coordinate the dis-
embarkation of the survivors to a place of safety as required by the SAR Convention, 
the passenger ship was forced to continue to bear the burden of caring for the thirty-
nine survivors upon departure. Subsequently, the U.S. Coast Guard was notified of 
the situation, contacted the passenger ship, and arranged for a rendezvous at sea 
between the passenger ship and a Coast Guard cutter. As planned, the passenger 
ship met with the cutter, which facilitated the at-sea transfer of the thirty-nine sur-
vivors without incident.
In effect, the United States, in particular the U.S. Coast Guard, was forced to 
assume the responsibility to coordinate the disembarkation and disposition of the 
survivors rescued by the passenger ship on behalf of the coastal state. Once the trans-
fer was complete, the passenger ship was released from its obligations and continued 
its transit to the United States.31
This actual incident illustrates what is required of ships transiting the world’s 
oceans and of coastal states implementing the global SAR system� In this inci-
dent, the shipmaster fulfilled his duty to render assistance to persons rescued at 
sea� However, the coastal state refused to assist in coordinating the disembarka-
tion of the survivors or to relieve the shipmaster of his obligation to care for the 
survivors� As a result, in this instance the global SAR system failed� It cannot be 
stressed enough that both the shipmaster and the coastal state must be active 
participants in the global SAR system—both must be committed to saving lives 
at sea�
What follows is a description of the duties and obligations of shipmasters 
and coastal states in ensuring the success of maritime lifesaving operations� It is 
important for both to be cognizant of their responsibilities, as well as for each to 
develop processes and procedures to implement the global SAR system�
Shipmaster
Ships at sea are the eyes and ears of the global SAR system� In many instances, it 
is ships that receive notification of persons in distress, and they can be the first 
SAR resources available to render assistance� Ships conduct lifesaving operations 
every day in the world’s oceans, and generally welcome the opportunity to save 
lives�
Three international conventions formally enshrine in international law the 
important duty of the shipmaster to render assistance to persons in distress at 
sea�32 Compliance with this duty is essential to preserving the integrity of the 
global SAR system�
First, the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention of 1974 is one of the most 
important treaties concerning merchant ship safety�33 Chapter V, regulation 33, 
states:
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The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on 
receiving information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to 
proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possible informing them or the search 
and rescue service that the ship is doing so� This obligation to provide assistance 
applies regardless of the nationality or status of such persons or the circumstances in 
which they are found� If the ship receiving the distress alert is unable or, in the special 
circumstances of the case, considers it unreasonable or unnecessary to proceed 
to their assistance, the master must enter in the log-book the reason for failing to 
proceed to the assistance of the persons in distress, taking into account the recom-
mendation of the Organization to inform the appropriate search and rescue service 
accordingly�34
Second, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in 
article 98, provides that shipmasters have a duty to render assistance to persons 
in distress:
 1� Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do 
so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
   (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;
   (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if 
informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be 
expected of him;
   (c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its pas-
sengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, 
its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will call�35
Note that article 98 is addressed to the flag state; it is the flag state that must 
ensure that any ship flying its flag renders assistance to persons in distress at sea� 
The shipmaster has the duty to render assistance “so far as he can do so without 
serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers�”36
Third, the Salvage Convention in article 10 states:
 1� Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel 
and persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at 
sea�
 2� The States Parties shall adopt the measures necessary to enforce the duty set out in 
paragraph 1�
 3� The owner of the vessel shall incur no liability for a breach of the duty of the mas-
ter under paragraph 1�37
Notably, there are circumstances in which a shipmaster would not be duty 
bound to aid persons in distress� For example, a shipmaster is not required to 
place his ship and crew in undue peril in order to attempt to render assistance�38 
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In addition, there is no duty to attempt to render assistance in instances where 
doing so would be impracticable or futile�39
All three conventions affirm the shipmaster’s duty to render assistance to 
persons in distress at sea and to treat any rescued survivors humanely while on 
board the ship�40 Most shipmasters realize that, if the situation were reversed and 
they themselves were in distress, they would want another ship to provide the 
same assistance�41
Does the same treaty law concerning the shipmaster’s duty to render assis-
tance to persons in distress apply to warships?42 The complex nature of military 
operations at sea means that diverting a warship to assist in a SAR operation and 
embark survivors can pose a challenge, especially when attempting to coordinate 
survivor disembarkation with a coastal state’s SMC� And while conducting a 
maritime SAR operation can be difficult for a warship during peacetime, it can 
be even more complicated during armed conflict�
Interestingly, the SOLAS (chapter V, regulation 33) and Salvage (article 10) 
Conventions do not apply to warships and other noncommercial, state-owned 
vessels; the conventions do not mandate that these classes of vessels render assis-
tance to persons in distress�43 However, it remains customary international law44 
for states to ensure their warships act in a manner consistent with this require-
ment�45 By comparison, UNCLOS does impose this obligation on the flag state 
to require masters to comply with article 98� The SAR Convention, as previously 
stated, provides the framework for coastal states to implement the global SAR 
system; however, it does not “carve out” an exemption for certain classes of vessels 
from complying with its requirements� A party to the SAR Convention is obligat-
ed to ensure that all ships under its flag render assistance to persons in distress�46
Under the SAR Convention, a coastal state may receive notification of a person 
in distress, assume the role of SMC, and have its RCC contact a warship in the 
vicinity of a distress incident to divert and render assistance� If the warship is 
in a position and is able to render the assistance, the commanding officer (CO) 
should do so when the SMC so requests� If it is the CO who becomes aware of 
persons in distress, he should contact the coastal state whose SAR region the 
ship is transiting and relay any information concerning the distress incident� 
The coastal state would assume SMC and coordinate the response with the CO, 
including the disposition of any survivors once embarked on the warship�
Can the CO of a warship at sea decide not to render assistance to persons in 
distress, even if the warship is in a position to do so and could provide timely 
assistance, but—owing to other “operational commitments”—is considered “not 
available”? Who would decide, in a particular instance, whether the CO of a 
warship can be relieved of his duty to render assistance to persons in distress? 
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While this may be considered a difficult situation, the overall answer is no� For 
example, under U�S� Navy and Coast Guard policy, the CO always retains the duty 
to render assistance to persons in distress at sea if able to do so�47 It also can be 
argued that, with this historical and universal principle enshrined in the SOLAS 
Convention, the Salvage Convention, and UNCLOS, the CO’s duty to render 
assistance to persons in distress constitutes customary international law as well� 
This is especially relevant during peacetime when, considering the circumstances 
of the distress incident, a warship may be the only available resource capable of 
conducting a lifesaving operation� The circumstances on scene and the CO’s co-
ordination with the SMC and his operational chain of command should dictate 
the best course of action to ensure that persons in distress are rescued�
The Coastal State
Under the SAR Convention, a state has the responsibility to implement the global 
SAR system�48 To fulfill this mandate, the coastal state establishes a national SAR 
system that effectively coordinates SAR operations to render assistance when 
notified of persons in distress�49 If the most effective SAR resource available for 
a particular SAR operation is a merchant ship (or any other vessel best suited to 
render the assistance), the SMC should divert the ship to save lives�
As the shipmaster fulfills this duty to render assistance to persons in distress, 
he has an expectation that the coastal state will fulfill its own obligation to as-
sist in coordinating the disembarkation of survivors rescued at sea to a place of 
safety and to minimize the impact on his ship� For example, the SMC should do 
everything possible to limit the deviation of a ship from its intended course to 
assist persons in distress� Granted, there are times when a particular ship is the 
only SAR resource available� However, diversion of a merchant ship in particular 
should be limited, if at all possible� Additionally, the SMC should reconsider 
ever diverting a merchant ship from its intended port of call to a different port 
to disembark rescued survivors� Such a diversion can cause significant logistical 
and liability challenges for the ship, shipping company, and shipping agent, and 
should be avoided�50 While these types of SAR cases may be challenging for the 
SMC, who very well may be required to coordinate survivor disembarkation and 
disposition with another coastal state, the global SAR system will benefit when 
the shipmaster knows the SMC will minimize the impact on his ship’s intended 
voyage when he renders assistance to persons in distress�51
This relationship between the shipmaster and the coastal state is crucial to 
the effectiveness of the global SAR system� While the shipmaster has the duty to 
render assistance to persons in distress, the coastal state is obligated to coordinate 
the SAR operation effectively and efficiently in support of the responding ship-
master� Without a cooperative relationship, a ship has limited incentive to render 
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aid to a distressed vessel, as opposed to passing by so as to meet its arrival time at 
its next port of call� Coastal-state support of ships saving lives at sea is a critical 
component of the global SAR system, and is enshrined in the SAR Convention:52
Parties shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing 
assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations 
with minimum further deviation from the ships’ intended voyage, provided that 
releasing the master of the ship from these obligations does not further endanger the 
safety of life at sea� The Party responsible for the search and rescue region in which 
such assistance is rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-
ordination and co-operation occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from 
the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety� � � � In these cases, the relevant 
Parties shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effected as soon as reasonably 
practicable�53
As mentioned above, a “place of safety” is an important concept in the global 
SAR system for both the coastal state and the shipmaster� The IAMSAR manual, 
volume 1, describes a “place of safety” as
[a] location where rescue operations are considered to terminate; where the survi-
vors’ safety of life is no longer threatened and where their basic human needs (such 
as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met; and, a place from which transporta-
tion arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next or final destination� A place of 
safety may be on land, or it may be on board a rescue unit or other suitable vessel or 
facility at sea that can serve as a place of safety until the survivors are disembarked at 
their final destination�54
Identifying a place of safety should be coordinated between the shipmaster 
and the coastal-state SMC responsible for coordinating the SAR operation� The 
priority always should be to minimize the impact on the ship that conducted the 
rescue and has survivors on board�55 A place of safety may not be necessarily a 
location that is most advantageous to the survivors� However, it should be a lo-
cation where all the criteria defining a place of safety can be achieved� It cannot 
be overemphasized that the SMC has the primary responsibility for determining 
the place of safety, in coordination with the ship that rendered the assistance�56
Additionally, the coastal state’s SMC, in coordinating a SAR operation, must 
remember that under the SAR Convention a ship diverted to render assistance57 
is considered a SAR facility, not a SAR unit, and should not be considered neces-
sarily a place of safety simply because the survivors are no longer in distress�58 
Unlike a SAR unit, which has the equipment and trained personnel to conduct 
SAR operations, a ship diverted to render assistance to persons in distress may 
not have the resources on board to care for what may be large numbers of sur-
vivors properly, nor to meet the criteria for a place of safety�59 When a ship is 
diverted to render assistance, the coastal state, in coordinating disembarkation, 
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should take into consideration the number of survivors rescued, the ship’s esti-
mated time of arrival at its next port of call, the survivors’ condition, and other 
critical factors�60 Normally, the SMC would coordinate survivor disembarkation 
at the ship’s next port of call or with another coastal state61 to limit complications 
and minimize the impact on the ship that conducted the rescue�62
If either the coastal state or the shipmaster fails to fulfill the obligations under 
international law, the global SAR system becomes ineffective� If a shipmaster 
ignores persons in distress because of the potential time delay and logistical 
challenges associated with rescuing the survivors, or if the coastal state does not 
fulfill its obligation to coordinate SAR operations within its maritime SAR region 
as well as to disembark rescued survivors, the system is threatened—and lives 
imperiled on the world’s oceans can be lost� Both the shipmaster and the coastal 
state are responsible for saving lives at sea�
Mixed Migration by Sea
Mixed migration by sea is a difficult problem that afflicts many regions of the 
world�63 Tragically, lives are lost every year when overloaded boats are overturned 
and hundreds, if not thousands, of people perish; others perish in extremely poor 
and hazardous conditions in overloaded boats unfit to make an ocean voyage� 
People engage in at-sea migrations for many reasons; these include desperate 
pursuit of a better life, if not survival� Regional problems and challenges have re-
sulted in these mass migrations; proposing solutions goes well beyond the scope 
of this article� However, the sheer number of “persons in distress” has stretched 
the limits of the global SAR system� Merchant ships, other vessels, and coastal-
state resources are tasked to render assistance� Many are not equipped or manned 
to support dozens, if not hundreds, of persons who may remain on board an 
assistance-rendering vessel for several days�
In March 2015, a meeting to address unsafe mixed migration at sea took 
place at IMO headquarters on Albert Embankment, London, United Kingdom�64 
Participants at the meeting included representatives of the IMO member states, 
intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as 
senior representatives from the IMO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and several oth-
er UN agencies� Challenges concerning mixed migration at sea were discussed� 
In his opening address, Koji Sekimizu, IMO secretary-general, succinctly stated 
the problem: “The issue of mixed migration by sea, including irregular migra-
tion, has been a serious concern for decades—if not longer� But, in recent years, 
it has reached epidemic proportions, to the extent where the whole system for 
coping with such migrants is being stretched up to, and sometimes beyond, its 
breaking point�”65
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Several statistics presented at the meeting highlight the critical nature of this 
problem:
• “The conflict in Syria, which enters its fifth year in March 2015, has caused 
the largest displacement crisis of our time� There are now more than 3�2 mil-
lion Syrian refugees, a number that is growing by 100,000 every month�”66
• In 2014, over two hundred thousand people were rescued and over three 
thousand deaths were reported in the Mediterranean Sea alone as a result of 
unsafe, irregular, and illegal sea passages�67
• In the first six months of 2015, 137,000 refugees and migrants crossed the 
Mediterranean Sea�68 This compares with 75,000 in the same period in 2014, 
marking an 83 percent increase over 2014�69
• More than 1,800 migrants have perished in at-sea migration attempts so far 
in the first six months of 2015�70
• In mid-April 2015, eight hundred people died in the largest maritime refugee 
disaster on record, highlighting the significant increase in migrants dying or 
missing at sea�71
• There are reports of dozens of migrants dying from hypothermia after being 
recovered by SAR resources, demonstrating the dangerous nature of these 
unsafe maritime transits in dilapidated vessels�72
• In the first three months of 2015, over seven hundred merchant vessels were 
diverted from their routes to recover and rescue migrants making unsafe pas-
sages just in the Mediterranean Sea alone�73
The interplay between mixed migration by sea and SAR presents an extremely 
difficult challenge because of the complex humanitarian nature of these opera-
tions� Many coastal states consider each mass migrant incident a SAR case that 
should be conducted under the SAR Convention and coordinated by a coastal-
state SMC, through the RCC� However, this is not the case�74 Some incidents 
may include persons in distress; however, many more appropriately could be 
considered law-enforcement or border security events�75 In addition, care must 
be taken to ensure that migrants are not refugees�76 Refugees should be afforded 
the protections required under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
1951 (Refugee Convention)�77
The condition of the vessel, the weather on scene, and the persons on board 
as well as the judgment of the SAR unit or facility on scene and the SMC should 
dictate whether a migrant incident triggers the rendering of assistance to persons 
in distress under the SAR Convention or its treatment as a national border / 
law-enforcement action� Determining whether large numbers of persons in a 
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mass-migration scenario are in distress can be particularly challenging for the 
SMC� The global SAR system is activated when a person declares he is in distress 
or when SAR authorities are notified of a person in distress� However, in many re-
cent mixed-migration-at-sea operations, migrant vessels have been declaring that 
they are “in distress” so that their “survivors” will be transferred to a merchant 
ship or other SAR unit and transported to a place of safety� This continues to be 
an ongoing, difficult problem in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular�
Another difficulty is that, while the shipmaster is required to embark persons 
assisted, the coastal state has no specific international mandate to receive the 
survivors from the ship�78 The RCC is required to coordinate the disembarkation 
of rescued survivors; however, some coastal states refuse to assist the ship and 
receive the migrants� Unfortunately, the SAR Convention does not impose a duty 
for a coastal state to accept migrants from a merchant ship, even if the incident 
occurred within the coastal state’s SAR region�79 Kathleen Newland provides a 
good summary of this problem:
The intersection of maritime law and refugee law thus leaves ship owners, masters, 
and crews in a quandary� They must pick up refugees and asylum seekers whose lives 
are in danger, but no state is required to take them in�
The ship itself cannot be considered a “place of safety”—indeed, carrying a large 
number of unscheduled passengers may endanger the crew and passengers them-
selves, owing to overcrowding, inadequate provisioning, and the tensions of life in 
close quarters� The inability to disembark rescued passengers in a timely fashion and 
return to scheduled ports of call creates a profound disincentive for the maritime 
industry to engage actively in search and rescue missions�80
The IMO may want to consider developing an international convention to 
provide the international community with a basis for coordinating and conduct-
ing these challenging mixed-migration-at-sea operations�81
ASSISTANCE ENTRY
The United States Coast Guard received notification that a vessel was hard aground 
on rocks in a coastal state’s territorial sea, with three persons on board. The Coast 
Guard diverted a Coast Guard cutter that was available to render assistance. The 
Coast Guard notified the coastal state’s authorities of the incident. The Coast Guard 
cutter arrived, remained outside the territorial sea, and established communica-
tions with the vessel aground. Those on the vessel communicated their concern 
regarding the deteriorating condition of the vessel and adverse weather conditions. 
The vessel stated that the coastal state’s authorities were on scene but were not pro-
viding any assistance. The coastal state’s authorities notified the Coast Guard that 
the on-scene Coast Guard cutter was not authorized to enter the state’s territorial 
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sea to conduct a rescue operation, and indicated that the vessel in distress should 
arrange for local commercial salvage.
Because of the deteriorating on-scene conditions, in which the vessel was listing 
sixty degrees and taking on water; the adverse weather; the lack of support from 
the coastal state’s authorities on scene in assisting the vessel; and the presence on 
board of a sixty-five-year-old crewmember who began to experience symptoms of a 
heart attack, the Coast Guard cutter made the decision to enter the territorial sea 
to conduct a rescue operation. The Coast Guard cutter rescued the three persons on 
board and their personal property.82
The incident described above highlights the complex challenges, from an 
international law and policy perspective, facing any shipmaster or aircraft com-
mander attempting to fulfill his duty to render assistance to persons in distress, 
particularly in another coastal state’s territorial sea�83 Does the shipmaster have 
a duty to rescue persons in distress even in another coastal state’s territorial sea? 
Are aircraft also obliged to conduct these types of rescue operations? What are 
the implications for a warship or military aircraft conducting a rescue operation 
in a coastal state’s territorial sea?84 The problem is that these rescue operations 
can cause unintended concern for the coastal state if the ship’s or aircraft’s pur-
pose for entering its territorial sea is misconstrued�
While not specifically defined, the principle of assistance entry (AE) is estab-
lished through international conventions85 and customary international law�86 
In support of this mandate to rescue persons in distress anywhere on the seas, 
the U�S� Coast Guard developed policy for the conduct of AE rescue operations 
within a coastal state’s territorial sea by Coast Guard ships and aircraft�87 To 
ensure compliance with international conventions, AE rescue operations policy 
should respect three principles: (1) the sovereign right of a state to control and 
regulate entry into its territorial sea; (2) the humanitarian need to assist persons 
in distress quickly and effectively without regard to nationality or circumstances; 
and (3) that entry into a coastal state’s territorial sea does not require seeking or 
receiving permission from the coastal state to conduct the rescue operation in its 
territorial sea�88
What follows is seven different AE scenarios that SAR authorities and legal 
advisers should consider in developing national and agency-specific AE policies, 
accompanied in each case by an overview of the applicable international legal and 
policy concerns� It is important to work through the issues and prepare positions 
that can be provided to the shipmaster and the aircraft commander for guidance� 
When persons are in distress and a government ship or aircraft is in a position 
to render assistance, valuable time should not be wasted seeking guidance and 
legal advice before rendering the necessary assistance�89 These discussions should 
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occur; however, legal positions and policies should be developed before any of 
these scenarios are encountered�
Scenario A
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast and 
diverts to render assistance to a person in distress in a coastal state’s territorial 
sea� Does the ship need to obtain the coastal state’s consent to enter its territorial 
sea to render assistance to the person in distress?
In this scenario, the government ship would not be required to obtain consent 
from the coastal state before rendering assistance to persons in distress in the 
coastal state’s territorial sea� However, the shipmaster should notify the coastal 
state of his intention to render the assistance, the approximate distress location, 
and the ship’s intention to transit into the state’s territorial sea to conduct the res-
cue operation� UNCLOS and the SOLAS and Salvage Conventions mandate that 
the shipmaster has the duty to render assistance to persons in distress throughout 
the oceans�90
While the coastal state exercises sovereignty over its territorial sea, that sover-
eignty is not unlimited� In the case of AE, the coastal state has limited ability to 
interfere with the entry of a ship conducting a rescue operation�91 Likewise, the 
assisting ship is also limited in its operations within a coastal state’s territorial sea� 
For example, (1) there must be persons in distress before a government ship may 
enter into a coastal state’s territorial sea to render assistance, and (2) there is a lim-
itation on what activities the ship may conduct during an AE rescue operation� 
Specifically, the government ship is limited to rescuing persons in distress only�
There are conditions that should be met for a ship to conduct AE� For example, 
U�S� Coast Guard policy affirms that a Coast Guard SAR unit may conduct AE 
into a coastal state’s territorial sea to render assistance to a person in distress if, in 
the judgment of the CO, the on-scene situation meets the following three criteria: 
(1) there is reasonable certainty (on the basis of the best available information, 
regardless of source) that a person is in distress; (2) the distress location is reason-
ably well known; and (3) the SAR unit (or SAR facility) is in position to render 
timely and effective assistance�92
Additionally, because of the urgency to take immediate action to rescue per-
sons in distress, AE should not be delayed while the coastal state is notified of 
the government ship’s intention to render assistance in its territorial sea� Even if 
the assistance to a person in distress already is being coordinated by the coastal 
state’s RCC, as envisioned in the SAR Convention, the government ship’s duty to 
render timely assistance remains�93
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Scenario B
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast and 
diverts to render assistance to a person in distress in a coastal state’s territorial 
sea� Can the ship use its embarked helicopter and small boat to assist in the res-
cue operation? Can a military aircraft transiting in oceanic airspace also divert 
and enter a coastal state’s airspace to assist in the rescue operation, or must the 
aircraft first obtain permission from the coastal state? Can a military aircraft 
enter a coastal state’s territorial sea even if no surface unit is participating in the 
rescue operation?
There is no international instrument that expressly prevents a government 
ship from using its embarked aircraft or small boat in rendering assistance to a 
person in distress� Embarked aircraft and small boats should be considered an 
extension of the ship;94 all available resources necessary to the lifesaving opera-
tion should be used, even if the location of the distress incident is in a coastal 
state’s territorial sea�95
In addition to a ship using an embarked aircraft for an AE rescue operation, 
any other available aircraft made aware of a distress can and should divert to 
render assistance in a coastal state’s territorial sea�96 The use of an aircraft for an 
AE rescue operation would be governed by the same criteria placed on use of a 
surface rescue unit�97
The legal justification for the use of an aircraft in the conduct of an AE rescue 
operation cannot rest solely on UNCLOS; both articles 18 and 98 are silent on 
whether aircraft can assist persons in distress in a coastal state’s territorial sea�98 
However, the SAR Convention does consider the use of aircraft in the conduct 
of SAR operations�99 This makes sense, since the purpose of the SAR Conven-
tion is to implement the global SAR system, which provides the international 
framework for organizing and standardizing SAR processes and procedures in 
the coordination and conduct of lifesaving operations� To carry out this purpose, 
the SAR Convention supports the use of any and all rescue capabilities that can 
be used during a SAR operation, including rescue operations within any coastal 
state’s territorial sea�100
Scenario C
Can a government ship “rescue” property while rendering assistance to a vessel 
in distress (e�g�, personal property on board the vessel, floating in the water, etc�) 
in a coastal state’s territorial sea, in addition to rendering assistance to persons in 
distress? To render the necessary assistance, can the ship tow the imperiled vessel 
into safe waters? After the ship brings any survivors on board, can it “rescue” the 
vessel and property, if they are still salvageable?101
The international conventions mandating a shipmaster’s duty to render as-
sistance to persons in distress do not contemplate the “rescue” or “recovery” of 
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property in an AE rescue operation in a coastal state’s territorial sea�102 It is a 
person in distress who is assisted, not property� Therefore, the requirements for 
the conduct of an AE rescue operation should not be applied to the recovery of 
property� However, it can be argued that the recovery of property incidental to 
the conduct of an AE rescue operation is appropriate� This may include, for ex-
ample, the recovery of critical medicine a survivor may require, towing a vessel 
that would facilitate the rescue of the persons in distress, and towing a disabled 
vessel�
Unless other arrangements are made between the shipmaster and the coastal 
state, the government ship contemplating the recovery of property not incidental 
to the AE rescue operation and within the coastal state’s territorial sea should (1) 
complete the AE rescue operation, (2) depart the coastal state’s territorial sea, 
and (3) seek permission to reenter the territorial sea to recover or salvage the 
property� This also would include the recovery of illegal contraband that could 
be used for any prosecution of the survivors if they were conducting a smuggling 
operation (e�g�, narcotics)�
Scenario D
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast and 
enters a coastal state’s territorial sea to render assistance to a person in distress� 
After a reasonable amount of time, it cannot locate the distress incident location� 
Can the ship conduct a search in an attempt to locate the person in distress?
While no international instrument permits a coastal state to refuse entry of a 
government ship into its territorial sea to conduct an AE rescue operation, the 
SAR Convention does require authorization from the coastal state to conduct a 
search for persons in distress� If the ship conducting the AE rescue operation is 
unable to locate the persons in distress in a reasonable amount of time, then the 
proper course of action would be (1) to depart the coastal state’s territorial sea 
and (2) to seek permission to conduct a search coordinated by the coastal state’s 
SMC through the RCC responsible for the SAR region in which the person in 
distress is (presumably) located�103
Scenario E
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast from 
a vessel taking on water in a coastal state’s territorial sea� The shipmaster notifies 
his command authority that he is diverting to render assistance� The command 
authority coordinates notifying the coastal state that the ship is entering its ter-
ritorial sea to render assistance to the vessel� The coastal state notifies the com-
mand authority that its SAR facility is en route to provide assistance and advises 
the ship that its assistance is not required� What should the shipmaster do? What 
should the ship’s command authority do?
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A government ship’s duty to conduct an AE rescue operation is not nullified 
because the coastal state reports it has dispatched SAR facilities or units to rescue 
a person in distress� If, in the judgment of the shipmaster, the coastal state’s as-
sistance is inadequate or not timely, then the distress still may be ongoing, and 
his duty would continue regardless of the coastal state’s assertions or intent� This 
decision must rest with the shipmaster on scene, who has the duty to render the 
assistance�104 However, if the coastal state’s SAR unit is able to arrive on scene and 
conduct the rescue, the shipmaster’s duty to render assistance is fulfilled�
Scenario F
Do the same requirements for a government ship to render assistance in a coastal 
state’s territorial sea apply in international straits while transiting?105
The shipmaster’s duty to render assistance to persons in distress applies 
throughout the ocean, whether in the territorial sea, in straits used for interna-
tional navigation, in archipelagic waters, in the exclusive economic zone, or on 
the high seas�106
Scenario G
A government ship transiting on the high seas receives a distress broadcast from 
a vessel under attack by armed robbers while transiting through a coastal state’s 
territorial sea� The government ship diverts to render assistance� Would this in-
cident be considered an AE rescue operation?
This scenario should not be considered AE; UNCLOS (article 98), as well 
as the SOLAS (chapter V, regulation 33) and Salvage (article 10) Conventions, 
would not apply� Additionally, if the incident is not considered a rescue opera-
tion, then the SAR Convention also would not apply�107 The issue is whether a 
vessel under attack should be considered to be “in distress” (from a SAR per-
spective), with any response to be coordinated under the requirements of the 
SAR Convention� Interestingly and appropriately, there is no formal definition 
of distress in the SAR Convention or any other international convention�108 This 
gives a person in extremis wide latitude in determining whether to declare dis-
tress and seek assistance� However, a vessel under attack should not be considered 
in distress, with any response to be coordinated under the SAR Convention; it 
would be more appropriate to consider this type of incident a law-enforcement 
or military operation�109
This does not mean, however, that a coastal state’s RCC cannot coordinate a 
response in support of law-enforcement authorities or military resources that 
may be used to assist the ship under attack� The coordination and conduct of this 
type of operation would be implemented through a coastal state’s national poli-
cies and procedures� In addition, if persons are injured during the response, the 
operation could include the medical transport of injured persons, which would 
be considered a SAR operation�
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This position—that a vessel under attack is not considered “in distress”—
was affirmed in a 2015 legal ruling in the U�S� Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit� The case highlighted the important distinction among antipiracy, 
law-enforcement, and military actions and SAR operations� The court’s rul-
ing provides an important distinction that warrants consideration by law- 
enforcement, military, and SAR authorities; in some coastal states, the coordina-
tion, policies, processes, procedures, and resources used to conduct these types of 
actions very well may not be the same as those used to conduct SAR operations�110
In 2011, during NATO-conducted antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden 
and the Indian Ocean, a U�S� warship engaged Jin Chun Tsai 68 (JCT 68), a fishing 
vessel from Taiwan that pirates had hijacked more than a year earlier and were 
using as a mother ship for pirate operations� On board JCT 68 were pirates and 
three hostages; the latter consisted of the original shipmaster, Wu Lai-Yu, and 
two Chinese crewmembers� During the engagement, the warship used disabling 
fire to stop the vessel� After the pirates surrendered, the warship’s boarding team 
went on board JCT 68� Three of the pirates and Wu had been killed during the 
warship’s use of disabling fire� Subsequently, the pirates and the two remaining 
Chinese crewmembers were removed from the vessel� The following day, JCT 68 
was sunk intentionally—with Wu’s body still on board, as the NATO task force 
commander directed�
Wu’s widow subsequently initiated legal action against the United States in the 
District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking damages for her husband’s 
death and the loss of JCT 68. The court granted the government’s motion to 
dismiss the legal action, reasoning that the complaint was not a legal issue to be 
decided in a court of law� Wu’s widow appealed the ruling in the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit; the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision 
to grant the government’s motion� In determining whether a vessel under attack 
is considered “in distress,” any response to which would fall under the require-
ments of the SAR Convention, the court of appeals affirmed an important dis-
tinction concerning the action the warship in question conducted:
Plaintiff is likewise mistaken in categorizing the USS Groves’s engagement with the 
Jin Chun Tsai 68 as a “Good Samaritan” action, or a “rescue operation” analogous to 
the rescue by the U�S� Coast Guard of distressed mariners� � � � The focus of the USS 
Groves’s operation was to stop the depredations of the pirates, in part by depriv-
ing the pirates of their stolen mother ship� Sinking the Jin Chun Tsai 68 was part of 
the course of action worked out by the military commanders to further maritime 
security� The district court correctly recognized that because the Jin Chun Tsai 68 was 
sunk under direct NATO orders, the court could not adjudicate plaintiff ’s claim that 
the decision to sink the vessel was negligent or unlawful�111
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This distinction is important when considering the conduct of SAR opera-
tions under the SAR Convention. Some coastal states may train and equip SAR 
units that would be responsible for conducting SAR operations only, not law- 
enforcement or military actions. Additionally, SAR authorities may rely on 
volunteer SAR organizations or seek the assistance of Good Samaritans in the 
vicinity of a vessel or persons in distress to assist in a particular SAR operation. 
The global SAR system was never envisioned to support other types of actions.112
In summary, any ship or aircraft conducting an AE rescue operation must 
notify the coastal state of the intended course of action. Because of the perceived 
imminence of the distress and the urgency to take immediate action, the ship-
master or aircraft commander is not required to seek permission from the coastal 
state to fulfill his duty to render assistance and save lives. Even if the coastal state 
notifies the ship or aircraft rendering assistance that it has dispatched a SAR 
unit, if the shipmaster or aircraft commander believes the coastal-state SAR unit 
will not arrive in a timely manner, the duty to render assistance remains, and the 
shipmaster or aircraft commander must continue the rescue operation. The SAR 
Convention was never intended to limit or restrict a ship or aircraft that is avail-
able to render assistance to persons in distress. However, it would be appropriate 
for the shipmaster to coordinate the AE rescue operation with the coastal state’s 
RCC, which should assume SMC of the SAR case. The shipmaster or aircraft 
commander, in communicating his actions to the coastal state, must ensure there 
is no misunderstanding about the craft’s intent to conduct an AE rescue opera-
tion. Saving lives is the priority, even in a coastal state’s territorial sea.
FORCIBLE EVACUATION FOR SAR
In 2011, the U.S. Coast Guard was notified that a twenty-four-foot sailboat regis-
tered in the United States and with one person on board was possibly in distress. 
The reporting source had received a voice mail from the person’s satellite phone late 
in the evening stating, “Emergency, emergency,” and nothing more. The last report 
received placed the sailboat seventy miles south of the United States and thirty miles 
offshore. The Coast Guard assumed SMC for the SAR operation and launched a 
Coast Guard aircraft and diverted a Coast Guard cutter to render assistance.
The aircraft located the sailboat, was able to see the person moving on deck, but 
was unable to hail him on the radio. It did appear to the aircraft that the sailboat’s 
boom was damaged. The Coast Guard cutter arrived on scene and sent a boarding 
team to the sailboat to assess the situation. The boarding team confirmed the boom 
was destroyed and the sailboat’s only outboard engine had fallen off the vessel.
The boarding team advised the person that he should evacuate the vessel for 
his own safety, but he refused. However, the Coast Guard cutter and its boarding 
team on the sailboat realized that due to the condition of the sailboat the person’s 
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life was in jeopardy. In consultation with the Coast Guard SAR chain of command, 
the Coast Guard cutter compelled the person to depart the sailboat with the cutter’s 
boarding team. The cutter determined that the sailboat was in such a dilapidated 
state that it was unsalvageable; the sailboat was marked and abandoned at sea. 
The survivor was transferred to the Coast Guard cutter and returned to the United 
States.113
Finally, this article considers the challenge of compelling a person to abandon 
his vessel to save his life� Thankfully, SAR authorities encounter such situations 
only infrequently; a person in distress who requests assistance normally wants 
to leave his vessel if the SAR responders on scene believe it necessary for his 
safety�114
The international conventions do not address specifically the use of force to 
compel a person to abandon his vessel in a life-threatening situation� The intent 
here is to provide a very brief overview and discussion of this issue, in order for 
coastal states and SAR authorities to consider whether national and agency-
specific SAR policies are adequate and well understood by all levels in the SAR 
chain of command� As can be seen in the scenario related above and in the fishing 
vessel Northern Voyager SAR case described below (which resulted in a lawsuit 
against the U�S� Coast Guard), these incidents can and do occur�
SAR authorities should consider several questions:
• What if an SMC is notified that a vessel is in distress and dispatches a SAR 
unit to render assistance, but the vessel’s captain refuses to disembark, even 
though in the judgment of the SAR unit on scene he will perish if he does 
not abandon the vessel?
• What if a merchant ship is diverted to render assistance, but the vessel’s  
captain refuses to abandon the vessel? The ship’s crewmen most likely would 
not be trained in the use of force; they are merely fulfilling their duty to as-
sist in the lifesaving operation� What advice should the SMC give to the  
shipmaster?
• What if the crew or passengers wish to evacuate a vessel in distress, but the 
vessel’s captain refuses to allow them to depart? What should the SAR unit 
or SAR facility on scene do? Should the use of force be contemplated to allow 
passengers and crewmembers to disembark the vessel in distress?
• If necessary, should force be used to compel the person in distress to leave 
his vessel? Does it matter whether the SAR unit is trained in the use of force? 
What type of force and extent of use should be contemplated?
• What are the legal implications of compelling a person against his will to 
abandon his vessel in what is perceived to be a life-threatening situation?
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• What if the forcible evacuation of a person is being contemplated on a vessel 
of a different flag state?115 How does that complicate the proposed use of 
force?
These are difficult questions applied to challenging, life-threatening situations 
—and SAR authorities should address them before this type of incident occurs� 
Forcibly compelling a person to abandon his vessel presents the SAR responder 
on scene who is attempting to provide the lifesaving assistance with a difficult 
situation, and may result in controversy, property loss, and litigation�
In the United States, there is only one lawsuit that primarily discusses a SAR 
unit compelling a person in distress to abandon his vessel to save his life� In 
Thames Shipyard and Repair Company v. United States, the owner and insurer 
of the U�S�-documented fishing vessel Northern Voyager sued the United States, 
alleging that the disabled vessel sank, in part, because the U�S� Coast Guard com-
pelled the vessel’s captain to leave against his will�116
In November 1997, after losing its starboard rudder off the northeastern 
coast of the United States, the 144-foot Northern Voyager experienced significant 
flooding in the steering compartment, which was threatening to flood the ves-
sel’s engineering compartment as well� Northern Voyager’s captain notified the 
Coast Guard of the situation, which assumed SMC and dispatched two SAR units 
to provide additional pumps and render any other assistance Northern Voyager 
might require� Despite the crew’s attempts to curtail the progressive flooding, the 
fishing vessel developed a port list, settled further in the water, and was threaten-
ing to capsize and sink without warning with the crewmembers and Coast Guard 
personnel on board� The SAR units on scene, in contact with the SMC at the RCC 
coordinating the response, decided the only course of action left was to evacu-
ate the remaining crewmembers before the vessel sank� When the Coast Guard 
personnel on Northern Voyager informed the captain that it was time to abandon 
ship, he refused to leave� The Coast Guard personnel informed him that if he did 
not cooperate, he would be compelled to depart, using force if necessary� As a 
result, the remaining members of Northern Voyager’s crew, the captain, and the 
assisting Coast Guard personnel evacuated the vessel� The fishing vessel sank a 
short while later�
Both the district court and the court of appeals held that U�S� law protected the 
Coast Guard’s decision to evacuate the captain forcibly from the life-threatening 
situation that occurred on Northern Voyager�117 The Supreme Court of the United 
States declined to review the case�118
In contemplation of both the operational and legal difficulties involved in 
forcibly evacuating a person from his vessel, even in a life-threatening situation, 
the Coast Guard does provide guidance to SAR units and the Coast Guard SAR 
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chain of command� Coast Guard policy provides that, if time permits, the SAR 
unit on scene should consult with the SMC; but that the SAR unit can evacuate 
a person forcibly from his vessel if it judges that (1) a true life-threatening situ-
ation exists, and (2) the vessel to be abandoned in fact does require immediate 
assistance�119 If time further permits, the decision to evacuate a person forcibly 
from his vessel should be made at the most competent operational and legal level 
in the SAR chain of command�120
In summary, SAR authorities should consider whether their current SAR 
policies and procedures provide adequate guidance for this challenging “forcible 
evacuation” scenario; if not, they should give further thought to developing new 
or improved policies and procedures for their SAR chain of command�
The global SAR system, while not perfect and in need of continuous improve-
ment, does provide a means of notification about and response to persons in 
distress at sea� As long as people continue to sail the world’s oceans, there will be 
a need to provide effective lifesaving services to those who need assistance�
International conventions provide the legal foundation for each coastal state 
to implement a national SAR organization� Coastal states must develop the SAR 
processes and procedures and provide the ships, boats, aircraft, and dedicated 
personnel that conduct lifesaving operations at sea� Ships plying the world’s 
oceans are important contributors to the global SAR system and normally are 
willing to come to the aid of those in distress� When ships render assistance in 
a SAR operation, the SMC must work with the shipmaster to coordinate the 
response and delivery of the survivors to a place of safety, thereby limiting the 
impact on the shipmaster�
This article considered the conduct of AE rescue operations in a coastal state’s 
territorial sea and some different AE scenarios that may be encountered� While 
AE rescue operations occur infrequently, SAR authorities nonetheless should 
develop national and agency-specific policies for ships and aircraft that may be 
required to conduct these operations and ensure their commanders understand 
them�
Finally, this article discussed the difficult situation of a person who refuses to 
abandon his vessel even when the SAR unit on scene believes that evacuation is 
the only option left to save lives� While SAR authorities encounter such situations 
very infrequently, national and agency-specific policies and guidelines should be 
developed to address this type of incident�
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N O T E S
 1� Lyman J� Gage, U�S� Secretary of the Treasury, 
to Captain Francis Tuttle, Revenue Cutter 
Service, “Letter of Instructions,” 15 November 
1897, in Report of the Cruise of the U.S. Rev-
enue Cutter Bear and the Overland Expedi-
tion for the Relief of the Whalers in the Arctic 
Ocean, from November 27, 1897, to September 
13, 1898 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1899), pp� 5–10, available at 
www�uscg�mil/�
 2� International Maritime Organization [here-
after IMO], International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, 2006 ed� 
(London: IMO, 2006)� Entered into force: 22 
June 1985; number of contracting states: 106�
 3� “International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue (SAR),” International 
Maritime Organization, www�imo�org/�
 4� Epigraph: Meg Jones, “A Year Later, Oshkosh 
Survivor of Cruise Ship Crash Still Cruising,” 
Milwaukee-Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, 14 
January 2013, available at www�jsonline�com/�
 5� These international conventions will be dis-
cussed in greater detail later in this article�
 6� The annex to the SAR Convention mandates 
(paragraph 2�1�2) that “Parties shall either 
individually or, if appropriate, in co-operation 
with other States, establish the following basic 
elements of a search and rescue service: 1) 
legal framework; 2) assignment of a respon-
sible authority; 3) organization of available 
resources; 4) communication facilities; 5) 
co-ordination and operational functions; and 
6) processes to improve the service including 
planning, domestic and international co-
operative relationships and training� Parties 
shall, as far as practicable, follow relevant 
minimum standards and guidelines devel-
oped by the Organization�”
 7� The annex to the SAR Convention provides 
(paragraphs 1�3�4, 1�3�5, and 1�3�6, respective-
ly) the following definitions: “Search and Res-
cue Region: An area of defined dimensions 
associated with a rescue co-ordination centre 
within which search and rescue services are 
provided”; “Rescue co-ordination centre: 
A unit responsible for promoting efficient 
organization of search and rescue services 
and for co-ordinating the conduct of search 
and rescue operations within a search and 
rescue region”; “Rescue sub-center: A unit 
subordinate to a rescue co-ordination center 
established to complement the latter accord-
ing to particular provisions of the responsible 
authorities�”
 8� Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
7 December 1944, 9th ed� 2006, ICAO doc� 
7300�
 9� IMO / International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, International Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue Manual [hereafter  
IAMSAR manual] (Croydon, U�K�: CPI 
Group, 2013)�
 10� The annex to the SAR Convention defines 
(paragraph 1�3�3) search and rescue service as 
“[t]he performance of distress monitoring, 
communication, co-ordination and search 
and rescue functions, including provision of 
medical advice, initial medical assistance,  
or medical evacuation, through the use of 
public and private resources including co-
operating aircraft, vessels and other craft and 
installations�”
 11� IAMSAR manual, vol� 1, p� v�
 12� Ibid�, p� 1-1 (paragraph 1�1�3)� It should also 
be noted (paragraph 1�3�1) that SAR services 
can be established by individual states or 
regionally: “These services can be provided 
by States individually establishing effective 
national SAR organizations, or by establishing 
a SAR organization jointly with one or more 
other States�”
 13� Ibid�, p� xiii� The SC is defined as “[o]ne  
or more persons or agencies within an 
Administration with overall responsibility 
for establishing and providing SAR services 
and ensuring that planning for those services 
is properly co-ordinated�” Volume 2 goes on 
to state (paragraph 1�2�2) that “SCs have the 
overall responsibility for establishing, staffing, 
equipping, and managing the SAR system, in-
cluding providing appropriate legal and fund-
ing support, establishing RCCs and rescue 
sub-centres (RSCs), providing or arranging 
for SAR facilities, co-ordinating SAR training, 
and developing SAR policies� SCs are the top 
level SAR managers; each State normally will 
have one or more persons or agencies for 
whom this designation may be appropriate�”
 14� Ibid�, vol� 1, p� xiii� The SMC is defined (para-
graph 1�2�3) as “[t]he official temporarily 
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  assigned to co-ordinate response to an actual 
or apparent distress situation�” See also ibid�, 
vol� 2, p� 1-2�
 15� Ibid�, vol� 1, p� xii� The OSC is defined (para-
graph 1�2�4) as “[a] person designated to co- 
ordinate search and rescue operations within 
a specified area�” See also ibid�, vol� 2, p� 1-3�
 16� Ibid�, vol� 1, p� xi� The ACO is defined (para-
graph 1�2�5) as “[a] person or team who co- 
ordinates the involvement of multiple aircraft 
in SAR operations in support of the SAR mis-
sion co-ordinator and on-scene co-ordinator�” 
See also ibid�, vol� 2, p� 1-3�
 17� Comparable to the annex to the SAR Conven-
tion, the Chicago Convention’s annex 12 
(Search and Rescue) provides the frame-
work for contracting states to implement an 
aeronautical global SAR system� The SAR 
system under the Chicago Convention also 
has aeronautical SAR regions worldwide, in 
which contracting states are responsible for 
coordinating SAR operations� This global 
aeronautical SAR system complements, or 
stands in parallel to, the maritime system�
 18� The annex to the SAR Convention states 
(paragraph 2�1�4): “Each search and rescue re-
gion shall be established by agreement among 
Parties concerned� The Secretary-General 
shall be notified of such agreements�”
 19� SAR agreements can be bilateral or multilat-
eral� For example, in 2011, the eight Arctic 
nations (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United 
States) concluded an agreement that delim-
ited the entire Arctic region into aeronautical 
(Chicago Convention) and maritime (SAR 
Convention) SAR regions between the par-
ties� It also formalized SAR cooperation and 
coordination among the eight states� Agree-
ment on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 12 
May 2011, available at oaarchive�arctic 
-council�org/�
 20� IAMSAR manual, vol� 1, p� 1-5 (paragraph 
1�6�3)�
 21� See note 10 for a definition of search and 
rescue service. The coastal state is responsible 
for the coordination and conduct of SAR 
operations within its SAR region�
 22� The annex to the SAR Convention (para-
graph 2�1�7) is very clear on this point: “The 
delimitation of search and rescue regions 
is not related to and shall not prejudice the 
delimitation of any boundary between States�” 
The IAMSAR manual, vol� 1, p� 2-8 (paragraph 
2�3�15[e]) goes on to state that “[a]n SRR [SAR 
region] is established solely to ensure that 
primary responsibility for co-ordinating SAR 
services for that geographic area is assumed by 
some State� SRR limits should not be viewed 
as barriers to assisting persons in distress� � � � 
In this respect co-operation between States, 
their RCCs and their SAR services should be 
as close as possible�”
 23� The High Seas Convention, article 1, defines 
high seas as “all parts of the sea that are 
not included in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State�” Convention on 
the High Seas, 29 April 1958, U�N�T�S� 450, p� 
11, available at treaties�un�org/� Entered into 
force: 30 September 1962; number of par-
ties: 77� UNCLOS, which replaced the High 
Seas Convention, states in article 86: “The 
provisions of this Part apply to all parts of 
the sea that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State, or in the archipe-
lagic waters of an archipelagic State�” United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 
December 1982 [hereafter UNCLOS], avail-
able at treaties�un�org/� Entered into force: 16 
November 1994; number of parties: 167�
 24� The annex to the SAR Convention (para-
graph 2�1�9) states: “Parties having accepted 
responsibility to provide search and rescue 
services for a specified area shall use search 
and rescue units and other available facilities 
for providing assistance to a person who is, 
or appears to be, in distress at sea�” (See note 
58 for the definition of SAR facilities and SAR 
units�) The annex to the SAR Convention al-
lows for the use of any resources to save lives 
at sea� The national administration must be 
able to coordinate the response to persons in 
distress though the RCC/RSC�
 25� The IAMSAR manual, vol� 1, paragraph 2�1�1, 
provides an excellent overview when describ-
ing SAR as an international system: “The SAR 
system, like any other system, has individual 
components but must work together to pro-
vide the overall service� Development of a 
SAR system typically involves establishment 
of one or more SRRs, along with capabili-
ties to receive alerts and to co-ordinate and 
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provide SAR services within each SRR� Each 
SRR is associated with an RCC� For aeronau-
tical purposes, SRRs often coincide with flight 
information regions (FIRs)� The goal of ICAO 
and IMO conventions relating to SAR is to 
establish a global SAR system� Operation-
ally, the global SAR system relies upon States 
to establish their national SAR systems and 
then integrate provision of their services with 
other States for world-wide coverage�”
 26� Ibid�, p� 2-3, paragraph 2�3�1�
 27� The annex to the SAR Convention (paragraph 
2�3�1) states: “Parties shall individually or in 
co-operation with other States establish res-
cue co-ordination centres for their search and 
rescue services and such rescue sub-centres as 
they consider appropriate�” It should be noted 
that under the Chicago Convention’s annex 
12, the global aeronautical SAR system also 
requires contracting states to make provision 
for an aeronautical RCC (ARCC); one ARCC 
is assigned for each aeronautical SAR region� 
By comparison, under the global maritime 
SAR system, a maritime RCC (MRCC) 
coordinates maritime SAR operations in 
a designated maritime SAR region� When 
nations implement a national SAR system 
in which a particular RCC coordinates both 
aeronautical and maritime SAR, it is known 
as a joint RCC� Where a coastal state has in-
stituted both ARCCs and MRCCs, aeronauti-
cal and maritime SAR authorities must work 
closely together to ensure the various types of 
SAR operations with overlapping aeronauti-
cal and maritime SAR regions are effectively 
coordinated� When considering the coordina-
tion between aeronautical and maritime SAR 
services, the annex to the SAR Convention 
(paragraph 2�4�1) states: “Parties shall ensure 
the closest practicable co-ordination between 
maritime and aeronautical services so as to 
provide for the most effective and efficient 
search and rescue services in and over their 
search and rescue regions�” This same impera-
tive is established as a recommendation in the 
Chicago Convention’s annex 12, paragraph 
3�2�2�
 28� IAMSAR manual, vol� 1, pp� 2-4–2-5�
 29� Ibid�, p� xiv� Search-and-rescue subregion is 
defined as “[a] specified area within a search 
and rescue region associated with a rescue 
sub-centre�” For example, the U�S� Coast 
Guard maintains two RSCs (RSC San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, and RSC Guam) that coordinate 
SAR operations with their respective SRSs�
 30� Ibid�, p� 2-9�
 31� The facts portrayed in this vignette are known 
by the author, who attests to their accuracy� 
The vignette is presented for consideration of 
the legal and policy issues involved�
 32� Oxford Dictionary, s�v� “international law,” 
www�oxforddictionaries�com/: “A body of 
rules established by custom or treaty and 
recognized by nations as binding in their 
relations with one another�” The Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
further describes international law as “that 
body of rules that nations consider binding in 
their relations with one another� International 
law derives from the practice of nations in 
the international arena and from interna-
tional agreements� International law provides 
stability in international relations and an 
expectation that certain acts or omissions will 
effect predictable consequences� If one nation 
violates the law, it may expect that others will 
reciprocate� Consequently, failure to comply 
with international law ordinarily involves 
greater political and economic costs than 
does observance� In short, nations comply 
with international law because it is in their 
interest to do so� Like most rules of conduct, 
international law is in a continual state of 
development and change�” U�S� Navy / Marine 
Corps / Coast Guard, The Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
(2007) [hereafter Commander’s Handbook], p� 
20, available at www�jag�navy�mil/�
 33� The IMO website explains that “[t]he SOLAS 
Convention in its successive forms is gener-
ally regarded as the most important of all 
international treaties concerning the safety of 
merchant ships� The first version was adopted 
in 1914, in response to the Titanic disaster, 
the second in 1929, the third in 1948, and the 
fourth in 1960� The 1974 version includes the 
tacit acceptance procedure—which provides 
that an amendment shall enter into force on a 
specified date unless, before that date, objec-
tions to the amendment are received from an 
agreed number of Parties� As a result the 1974 
Convention has been updated and amended 
on numerous occasions� The Convention in 
force today is sometimes referred to as  
SOLAS, 1974, as amended�” “International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   52 12/15/16   1:53 PM
58
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11
 B U T T O N  5 3
(SOLAS), 1974,” International Maritime Orga-
nization, www�imo�org/�
 34� IMO, SOLAS, Consolidated Edition, 2009 
(London: IMO, 2009), p� 268� The SOLAS 
Convention applies to vessels on international 
voyages, commercial vessels in particular� 
SOLAS allows exceptions for warships (and 
others) but encourages these ships to act 
in a manner consistent with its provisions� 
Entered into force: 25 May 1980; number of 
contracting states: 162�
 35� UNCLOS, article 98�
 36� Commander’s Handbook, p� 1-1, states: 
“Although the United States is not a party to 
the 1982 LOS Convention, it considers the 
navigation and overflight provisions therein 
reflective of customary international law and 
thus acts in accordance with the 1982 LOS 
Convention, except for the deep seabed min-
ing provisions�” Additionally, the duty for U�S� 
shipmasters to render assistance is stipulated 
in the United States Code (USC); 46 USC 
§ 2304(a)(1) states: “A master or individual 
in charge of a vessel shall render assistance 
to any individual found at sea in danger of 
being lost, so far as the master or individual 
in charge can do so without serious danger to 
the master’s or individual’s vessel or individu-
als on board�” Additionally, “A master or indi-
vidual violating this section shall be fined not 
more than $1,000, imprisoned for not more 
than 2 years, or both�” However, as further 
stated in 46 USC § 2304, this obligation does 
not apply to U�S� warships�
 37� International Convention on Salvage, 28 April 
1989, available at www�imo�org/� Entered into 
force: 14 July 1996; number of contracting 
states: 67�
 38� E�g�, the Salvage Convention, article 10, 
requires a shipmaster to render assistance 
“so far as he can without serious danger to 
his vessel, her crew and her passengers�” This 
is also stipulated in the SOLAS Convention, 
chapter V, regulation 33, paragraph 1, quoted 
in the text above, where the shipmaster must 
make a determination about whether he can 
render assistance to a person in distress�
 39� E�g�, the annex to the SAR Convention 
(paragraph 4�8�1) states: “Search and rescue 
operations shall continue, when practicable, 
until all reasonable hope of rescuing survivors 
has passed” (emphasis added)� According 
to paragraph 4�8�4, “If a search and rescue 
operation on-scene becomes impracticable 
and the rescue co-ordination centre or rescue 
sub-centre concludes that survivors might 
still be alive, the centre may temporarily sus-
pend the on-scene activities pending further 
developments, and shall promptly so inform 
any authority, facility or service which has 
been activated or notified” (emphasis added)�
 40� SOLAS Convention, chapter V, regulation 
33, paragraph 6, states: “Masters of ships who 
have embarked persons in distress shall treat 
them with humanity, within the capabilities 
and limitations of the ship�”
 41� IMO Resolution MSC�167(78), Guidelines 
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea 
(adopted 20 May 2004), provides general 
guidance (paragraph 5�1) for shipmasters� 
“SAR services throughout the world depend 
on ships at sea to assist persons in distress� 
It is impossible to arrange SAR services that 
depend totally upon dedicated shore-based 
rescue units to provide timely assistance to all 
persons in distress at sea� Shipmasters have 
certain duties that must be carried out in or-
der to provide for safety of life at sea, preserve 
the integrity of global SAR services of which 
they are part, and to comply with humanitar-
ian and legal obligations” (emphasis added)�
 42� UNCLOS, article 29, defines warship as “a 
ship belonging to the armed forces of a State 
bearing the external marks distinguishing 
such ships of its nationality, under the com-
mand of an officer duly commissioned by 
the government of the State and whose name 
appears in the appropriate service list or its 
equivalent, and manned by a crew which is 
under regular armed forces discipline�” See 
also Commander’s Handbook, p� 2-1�
 43� The SOLAS Convention, chapter I, regulation 
3, lists the following classes of ships that are 
exempted from complying with the regula-
tions unless specifically stated in a particular 
regulation: (1) ships of war and troopships; 
(2) cargo ships of less than five hundred gross 
tons; (3) ships not propelled by mechanical 
means; (4) wooden ships of primitive build; 
(5) pleasure yachts not engaged in trade; and 
(6) fishing vessels� Additionally, the Salvage 
Convention, article 4, details the nonappli-
cability of the convention to “State-owned 
vessels”: “1� Without prejudice to article 5, 
this Convention shall not apply to warships 
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or other non-commercial vessels owned or 
operated by a State and entitled, at the time 
of salvage operations, to sovereign immunity 
under generally recognized principles of 
international law unless that State decides 
otherwise� 
  “2� Where a State Party decides to apply the 
Convention to its warships or other vessels 
described in paragraph 1, it shall notify the 
Secretary-General thereof specifying the 
terms and conditions of such application�”
 44� In Hasan v. United States of America (2010), 
the U�S� District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, in its opinion and order, 
provided an overview of customary interna-
tional law: “[the] body of rules that nations 
in the international community universally 
abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal 
obligation and mutual concern�” Available at 
www�unicri�it/� In addition, the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, article 38(1)
(b), describes customary international law as 
“a general practice accepted as law�” Available 
at www�icj-cij�org/� This understanding of 
customary international law is further af-
firmed in the Commander’s Handbook, which 
states (p� 20): “The general and consistent 
practice among nations with respect to a par-
ticular subject, which over time is accepted by 
them generally as a legal obligation, is known 
as customary international law� Customary 
international law is the principal source of 
international law and is binding upon all  
nations�”
 45� For example, in the United States, the require-
ment for COs of warships to render assistance 
to persons in distress at sea is mandated in 
U.S. Navy Regulations (1990), article 0925 
(Assistance to Persons, Ships and Aircraft in 
Distress): “1� Insofar as can be done without 
serious danger to the ship or crew, the com-
manding officer or the senior officer present 
as appropriate shall: a) proceed with all pos-
sible speed to the rescue of persons in distress 
if informed of their need for assistance, 
insofar as such action may reasonably be 
expected of him or her; b) render assistance 
to any person found at sea in danger of being 
lost; c) afford all reasonable assistance to 
distressed ships and aircraft; and d) render as-
sistance to the other ship, after a collision, to 
her crew and passengers and, where possible, 
inform the other ship of his or her identity�” 
U.S. Coast Guard Regulations (1992), article 
4�2-5 (Assistance), provides a similar mandate 
for the COs of U�S� Coast Guard ships to 
render assistance to persons in distress� These 
respective regulations make no distinction 
between peacetime and wartime operational 
requirements� (Note: rendering assistance to 
persons in distress under the law of armed 
conflict is not considered within the scope of 
this article�)
 46� The annex to the SAR Convention applies 
to its contracting states� It is the contracting 
state that is obligated to ensure its ships com-
ply with their obligation to render assistance 
at sea� See also paragraph 2�1�10�
 47� The disembarkation of survivors can be 
conducted in several ways: (1) by the warship 
transferring survivors at sea to another craft 
to ensure it can resume normal operations; 
(2) by the SMC coordinating disembarkation 
with the coastal state that would be the war-
ship’s next port of call; or (3) in any other way 
that would relieve the warship of its burden 
to care for the survivors� As stated previ-
ously, the SMC should strive to minimize the 
impact on the warship (SAR Convention, 
paragraph 3�1�9)�
 48� The annex to the SAR Convention (para-
graph 2�1�1) states: “Parties shall, as they are 
able to do so individually or in co-operation 
with other States and, as appropriate, with 
the Organization, participate in the develop-
ment of search and rescue services to ensure 
that assistance is rendered to any person in 
distress at sea�”
 49� Additionally, the coastal state must coordi-
nate the SAR response regardless of who the 
persons in distress are� The annex to the SAR 
Convention (paragraph 2�1�10) makes this 
requirement very clear: “Parties shall ensure 
that assistance be provided to any person in 
distress at sea� They shall do so regardless 
of the nationality or status of such a person 
or the circumstances in which that person is 
found�”
 50� A more appropriate course of action than 
diverting a ship from its next port of call 
would be to have the ship rendezvous with 
and transfer SAR survivors to a SAR unit for 
further transport to a place of safety�
 51� IMO Resolution MSC�167(78) provides the 
priorities for rendering assistance to persons 
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rescued at sea� Paragraph 3�1 states in part: 
“When ships assist persons in distress at 
sea, co-ordination will be needed among all 
concerned to ensure that all of the following 
priorities are met in a manner that takes due 
account of border control, sovereignty and se-
curity concerns consistent with international 
law: 1) Lifesaving: All persons in distress at 
sea should be assisted without delay; 2) Pres-
ervation of the integrity and effectiveness of 
SAR services: Prompt assistance provided by 
ships at sea is an essential element of global 
SAR services; therefore it must remain a top 
priority for shipmasters, shipping companies 
and flag States; and 3) Relieving masters 
of obligations after assisting persons: Flag 
and coastal States should have effective 
arrangements in place for timely assistance 
to shipmasters in relieving them of persons 
recovered by ships at sea” (emphasis added)�
 52� The SAR Convention is the means by which 
parties have agreed to fulfill their duty to ren-
der assistance in most circumstances� How-
ever, the duty to render assistance continues 
to exist for every mariner� If it appears that 
the process agreed to in the SAR Convention 
will not result in timely and effective assis-
tance in a particular situation, a shipmaster is 
still under obligation to come to the aid of the 
person in distress�
 53� Annex to the SAR Convention, paragraph 
3�1�9�
 54� IAMSAR manual, vol� 1, p� xiii�
 55� A place of safety very well may be the ship’s 
next port of call� The goal of the SAR Con-
vention is to minimize the impact on the ship� 
However, a life raft, even with ample rations, 
is not considered a place of safety� According 
to the SOLAS Convention, a life raft is con-
sidered a lifesaving appliance and does not 
meet the requirements for or the definition 
of a place of safety� The SOLAS Conven-
tion, chapter III, regulation 3, explains that a 
lifeboat or life raft is a survival craft, “capable 
of sustaining lives of persons in distress from 
the time of abandoning the ship�” Persons 
afloat in a life raft must still be considered 
“in distress” until appropriate assistance is 
rendered and the persons are delivered to a 
place of safety�
 56� The Convention on Facilitation of Interna-
tional Maritime Traffic of 1965 mandates 
that it is states that must coordinate the 
disembarkation of persons rescued at sea� 
Section 7�C (Emergency Assistance) affirms 
this important requirement, stating in part, 
“7�8 Standard� Public authorities shall facili-
tate the arrival and departure of ships en-
gaged in: � � � the rescue of persons in distress 
at sea in order to provide a place of safety for 
such persons�” In addition, standard 7�9 states, 
“Public authorities shall, to the greatest extent 
possible, facilitate the entry and clearance 
of persons, cargo, material and equipment 
required to deal with situations described in 
Standard 7�8�” Convention on Facilitation of 
International Maritime Traffic, 9 April 1965, 
available at www�ifrc�org/� Entered into force: 
5 March 1967; number of contracting states: 
115�
 57� Or any other vessel that diverts to render as-
sistance to persons in distress�
 58� The annex to the SAR Convention (para-
graph 1�3�7) defines search and rescue 
facility as “[a]ny mobile resource, including 
designated search and rescue units, used to 
conduct search and rescue operations�” By 
comparison, search and rescue unit is defined 
(paragraph 1�3�8) as “[a] unit composed of 
trained personnel and provided with equip-
ment suitable for the expeditious conduct of 
search and rescue operations�” The IAMSAR 
manual, vol� 1, goes on to state (p� 2-10, para-
graph 2�5�3) that SAR units “may be under 
the direct jurisdiction of the SAR service or 
other State authorities or may belong to non-
Governmental or voluntary organizations�”
 59� IMO Resolution MSC�167(78) stipulates 
(paragraph 6�13) that “[a]n assisting ship 
should not be considered a place of safety 
based solely on the fact that the survivors 
are no longer in immediate danger once 
aboard the ship� An assisting ship may not 
have appropriate facilities and equipment to 
sustain additional persons on board without 
endangering its own safety or to properly care 
for the survivors� Even if the ship is capable of 
safely accommodating the survivors and may 
serve as a temporary place of safety, it should 
be relieved of this responsibility as soon as 
alternative arrangements can be made�”
 60� IMO Resolution MSC�167(78) further 
explains (paragraph 6�15) this important 
aspect of coordinating the disembarkation 
of any persons rescued at sea: “The Conven-
tions, as amended, indicate that delivery to a 
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place of safety should take into account the 
particular circumstances of the case� These 
circumstances may include factors such as 
the situation on board the assisting ship, on 
scene conditions, medical needs, and avail-
ability of transportation or other rescue units� 
Each case is unique, and selection of a place 
of safety may need to account for a variety of 
important factors�”
 61� On 10–11 December 2014, the U�S� Coast 
Guard participated in the annual Dialogue on 
Protection Challenges, in Geneva, Switzer-
land, on the theme “Protection at Sea�” The 
meeting, sponsored by the UNHCR, focused 
on mixed migration at sea� During the meet-
ing, an International Chamber of Shipping 
(ICS) representative made an excellent point: 
It is the shipmaster who must determine 
whether to deviate from his intended voyage 
and transit to the “nearest port of call” or 
to continue to the ship’s “next port of call�” 
Coastal states need to understand and sup-
port the shipmaster’s decision, which will take 
into account important on-scene conditions 
as well as other logistical and risk factors� 
The “nearest port” may not be a viable option 
for the shipmaster� The coastal state needs to 
respect the shipmaster’s decision and coordi-
nate disembarkation of survivors accordingly� 
“Shipping Industry Calls on Governments to 
Address Migrants at Sea Crisis,” International 
Chamber of Shipping, www�ics-shipping�org/�
 62� In 2015 IMO/UNHCR/ICS jointly published  
an excellent resource: Rescue at Sea: A Guide 
to Principles and Practice as Applied to 
Refugees and Migrants (2015 Rescue at Sea 
Guide)� In discussing the action required by 
governments and RCCs in coordinating a 
merchant ship rendering assistance to per-
sons in distress, it states: “Governments have 
to coordinate and cooperate to ensure that 
Masters of ships providing assistance by em-
barking persons in distress at sea are released 
from their obligations with minimum further 
deviation from the ship’s intended voyage, 
and have to arrange disembarkation as soon 
as reasonably practicable�” It goes on to state 
(p� 12) that “the Government responsible for 
the SAR region in which the rescued persons 
were recovered is primarily responsible for 
providing a place of safety or ensuring that 
such a place of safety is provided�” Available at 
www�imo�org/�
 63� Judith Kumin, “The Challenge of Mixed 
Migration by Sea,” Forced Migration Review, 
no� 45 (February 2014), available at www 
�fmreview�org/, provides a good overview of 
what is considered mixed migration by sea: 
“Contemporary irregular migration is mostly 
‘mixed,’ meaning that it consists of flows 
of people who are on the move for differ-
ent reasons but who share the same routes, 
modes of travel and vessels� They cross 
land and sea borders without authorisation, 
frequently with the help of people smugglers� 
IOM and UNHCR point out that mixed flows 
can include refugees, asylum seekers and 
others with specific needs, such as trafficked 
persons, stateless persons and unaccom-
panied or separated children, as well as 
other irregular migrants� The groups are not 
mutually exclusive, however, as people often 
have more than one reason for leaving home� 
Also, the term ‘other irregular migrants’ fails 
to capture the extent to which mixed flows 
include people who have left home because 
they were directly affected or threatened by a 
humanitarian crisis—including one resulting 
from climate change—and need some type 
of protection, even if they do not qualify as 
refugees�”
 64� IMO Secretariat, “Outcome of the Inter-
agency High-Level Meeting to Address 
Unsafe Mixed Migration by Sea: Note by the 
Secretariat” (LEG 102/INF�3), Legal Commit-
tee 102nd Session (9 March 2015), pp� 1–2, 
available at www�imo�org/�
 65� Koji Sekimizu, IMO Secretary-General, 
opening comments (High-Level Meeting 
to Address Unsafe Mixed Migration by Sea, 
London, March 2015), p� 1, available at www 
�imo�org/�
 66� Glaucia Boyer, “Development Dimensions of 
Mixed Migration” (presentation, High-Level 
Meeting to Address Unsafe Mixed Migration 
by Sea, London, March 2015), p� 10, available 
at www�imo�org/� Mrs� Boyer added, “The 
scale and protracted nature of the crisis is 
challenging the ability of the international 
community to meet the continuing need for 
essential, life-saving humanitarian aid�”
 67� Sekimizu, opening comments, p� 1�
 68� United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees [hereafter UNHCR], The Sea Route 
to Europe: The Mediterranean Passage in the 
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Age of Refugees (1 July 2015), p� 2, available at 
www�unhcr�org/�
 69� “Unsafe Mixed Migration by Sea,” Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, www�imo�org/�
 70� Ibid�
 71� UNHCR, The Sea Route to Europe, p� 2�
 72� IMO Secretariat, “Outcome of the Inter- 
agency High-Level Meeting,” p� 2�
 73� Ibid�
 74� The summary conclusions from an 8–10 
November 2011 UNHCR experts meeting in 
Djibouti, “Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in 
Distress at Sea—How Best to Respond?,” state 
(paragraph B�7): “The specific legal frame-
work governing rescue at sea does not apply 
to interception operations that have no search 
and rescue component�” Available at www 
�unhcr�org/�
 75� Considering the level of concern for the safety 
of persons or craft that may be in danger, 
the SMC will determine in which emergency 
phase (uncertainty, alert, or distress) to clas-
sify the SAR incident� (IAMSAR manual, vol� 
2, paragraph 3�3�1�) In particular, the annex 
to the SAR Convention (paragraph 1�3�13) 
defines distress phase as “[a] situation wherein 
there is a reasonable certainty that a person, 
a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave 
and imminent danger and requires immedi-
ate assistance�” In many mixed-migration 
operations the SAR Convention would not 
apply necessarily because the circumstances 
of the incident may not meet the criteria for 
any of the three emergency phases�
 76� It is important to understand the differences 
among refugees, asylum seekers, and economic 
migrants� (1) The 2015 Rescue at Sea Guide 
provides a good description of the difference 
between a refugee and an asylum seeker. An 
asylum seeker is a person who “is seeking 
international protection and whose claim 
has not yet been finally decided� Not every 
asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized 
as a refugee� Refugee status is ‘declaratory’—
that is, determining refugee status does not 
make a person a refugee, but rather recog-
nizes that a person is a refugee�” The guide 
goes on to state that “[r]escued persons who 
do not meet the criteria of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention definition of a ‘refugee,’ but who 
fear torture or other serious human rights 
abuses or who are fleeing armed conflict may 
also be protected from return to a particular 
place (‘refoulement’) by other international or 
regional human rights or refugee law instru-
ments�” (2) There is also a difference between 
refugees and economic migrants� In its 
fiftieth-anniversary issue, “The Wall behind 
Which Refugees Can Shelter,” of its Refugees 
publication the UNHCR states: “An economic 
migrant normally leaves a country voluntarily 
to seek a better life� Should he or she elect to 
return home they would continue to receive 
the protection of their government� Refugees 
flee because of the threat of persecution and 
cannot return safely to their homes in the 
circumstances then prevailing�” “Most Fre-
quently Asked Questions about the Refugee 
Convention,” Refugees, no� 123 (2001), p� 16, 
available at www�unhcr�org/�
 77� The Refugee Convention, article 1A(2), 
defines refugee as a person who, “owing to 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group, or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country�” Available at www�unhcr�org/� 
Convention entered into force: 22 April 1954; 
number of parties: 145�
 78� Annex to the SAR Convention, paragraph 
3�1�9�
 79� Patricia Mallia, “The MV Salamis and the 
State of Disembarkation at International Law: 
The Undefinable Goal,” American Society of 
International Law Insights 18, no� 11 (15 May 
2014), www�asil�org/� Ms� Mallia adds that 
“the SAR Convention only lays down an ob-
ligation of coordination and cooperation and 
does not necessarily entail an explicit duty to 
allow disembarkation in a particular port�”
 80� Kathleen Newland, “Troubled Waters: Rescue 
of Asylum Seekers and Refugees at Sea,”  
Migration Information Source (1 January 
2003), www�migrationpolicy�org/� This was 
also affirmed in the report (paragraph C�10) 
from the previously mentioned UNHCR  
experts meeting in Djibouti in 2011: 
“Fundamentally, a core challenge in any 
particular rescue at sea operation involv-
ing asylum-seekers and refugees is often the 
timely identification of a place of safety for 
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disembarkation, as well as necessary follow-
up, including reception arrangements, access 
to appropriate processes and procedures, 
and outcomes� If a shipmaster is likely to 
face delay in disembarking rescued people, 
he/she may be less ready to come to the as-
sistance of those in distress at sea� Addressing 
these challenges and developing predictable 
responses requires strengthened coopera-
tion and coordination among all States and 
other stakeholders implicated in rescue at sea 
operations�”
 81� The IAMSAR manual, vol� 2, p� xviii, defines 
mass rescue operation (MRO) as “[s]earch 
and rescue services characterized by the need 
for immediate response to large numbers of 
persons in distress, such that the capabili-
ties normally available to search and rescue 
authorities are inadequate�” The question is 
whether a mixed-migration-at-sea incident 
would actually include “persons in distress”; 
and, if there are large numbers of persons 
involved, would the incident be classified as 
an MRO? In many instances, these incidents 
could be considered illegal trafficking in per-
sons; it would seem that the United Nations 
Convention on Transnational Organized 
Crime (TOC Convention)—in particular 
annex II, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children—would be more 
applicable than the SAR Convention� The 
TOC Convention and protocols are available 
at www�unodc�org/� Entered into force: 29 
September 2003; number of parties: 185� If 
mixed-migration-by-sea incidents do not 
primarily constitute the rescue of persons in 
distress, and are not adequately addressed in 
the TOC Convention, the international com-
munity may want to consider developing an 
international instrument that would serve as 
the basis for the coordination and conduct of 
these maritime operations�
 82� The facts portrayed in this vignette are known 
by the author, who attests to their accuracy� 
The vignette is presented for consideration of 
the legal and policy issues involved�
 83� In defining territorial sea, UNCLOS, article 
2, states: “1� The sovereignty of a coastal State 
extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic 
State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent 
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea� 2� 
This sovereignty extends to the air space over 
the territorial sea as well as to its bed and 
subsoil�” Article 3 continues, “Every State has 
the right to establish the breadth of its territo-
rial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical 
miles, measured from baselines determined 
in accordance with this Convention�”
 84� The Commander’s Handbook (paragraph 
2�4�1) defines military aircraft as “all aircraft 
operated by commissioned units of the armed 
forces of a nation bearing the military mark-
ings of that nation, commanded by a member 
of the armed forces, and manned by a crew 
subject to regular armed forces discipline�”
 85� For example, AE is envisioned in UNCLOS� 
In describing innocent passage, article 18 
provides for the assistance of persons in 
distress: “2� Passage shall be continuous and 
expeditious� However, passage includes stop-
ping and anchoring, but only in so far as the 
same are incidental to ordinary navigation 
or are rendered necessary by force majeure 
or distress or for the purpose of rendering 
assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in 
danger or distress” (emphasis in bold added)� 
 86� At the 1991 convening of IMO’s Sub- 
Committee on Lifesaving, Search and Rescue, 
the United States submitted to the subcom-
mittee a note, “SAR on or over Foreign Ter-
ritorial Seas” (LSR 22/8/4, 19 January 1991), 
which argued (paragraph 3) the U�S� position 
that “[t]he obligation to rescue persons in 
distress regardless of nationality is based on 
the principle and time-honored tradition that 
those at sea will, wherever they can without 
undue risk, assist others in danger or distress� 
� � � Thus, coastal state’s right to control activi-
ties in its territorial seas is balanced with the 
requirement to rescue those in distress from 
perils of the sea�” This U�S� paper was also 
discussed at the sixty-fifth session of IMO’s 
Legal Committee (1991) and duly recorded 
in its “Report of the Legal Committee on the 
Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session” (LEG 65/8, 
11 October 1991)� While several delega-
tions shared the U�S� position, the commit-
tee agreed “that there existed no right of 
assistance entry in public international law at 
present; this principle is neither embodied in 
any convention, nor established by custom-
ary law� Many delegations emphasized in 
this connection that it was important not to 
upset the delicate balance between the duty 
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to render assistance, on the one hand, and 
the sovereign right of coastal States to control 
entry into or operation in their waters on the 
other” (emphasis added)� Over the two de-
cades since the Legal Committee reached this 
conclusion, the concept of AE has continued 
to become established as a standard principle 
enshrined through international conventions 
and customary international law�
 87� This article uses the term “AE rescue opera-
tion,” not “SAR operation�” When a ship or 
aircraft enters a coastal state’s territorial sea 
to render assistance to persons in distress, the 
purpose is to rescue, not search for, survivors� 
Scenario D addresses this distinction further�
 88� United States Coast Guard Addendum to the 
United States Search and Rescue Supplement to 
the International Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue Manual, COMDTINST 
M16130�2F (January 2013) [hereafter USCG 
Addendum], p� 1-45, paragraphs 1�8�1�4 and 
1�8�1�5, available at www�uscg�mil/� See also 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
instruction Guidance for the Exercise of Right-
of-Assistance Entry, CJCSI 2410�01D (3 Sep-
tember 2013) [hereafter CJCSI], p� 2, available 
at www�dtic�mil/� Note: the U�S� Coast Guard 
uses the term “assistance entry” (AE), while 
the U�S� Department of Defense (DoD) uses 
the term “right of assistance entry” (RAE) 
when discussing the conduct of rescue opera-
tions in a coastal state’s territorial sea�
 89� The SOLAS Convention does not apply to 
warships� UNCLOS and the Salvage Conven-
tion do not limit what types of vessels can 
conduct an AE rescue operation in a coastal 
state’s territorial sea� However, the emphasis 
of this article is on AE rescue operations 
conducted by government ships (including 
warships)�
 90� UNCLOS, article 98(1)(a), specifically states 
that the shipmaster has a duty to “render as-
sistance to any person found at sea in danger 
of being lost” (emphasis added)� The SOLAS 
Convention, chapter V, regulation 33, requires 
“[t]he master of a ship at sea, which is in a 
position to be able to provide assistance, on 
receiving information from any source that 
persons are in distress at sea, � � � to proceed 
with all speed to their assistance” (emphasis 
added)� Similarly, the Salvage Convention, 
article 10, paragraph 1, requires “[e]very 
master � � � , so far as he can do so without 
serious danger to his vessel and persons 
thereon, to render assistance to any person in 
danger of being lost at sea” (emphasis added)� 
All three conventions make no geographical 
distinction concerning the obligation of the 
shipmaster to render assistance to persons in 
distress� The duty to render assistance should 
be considered to apply on the high seas and 
territorial sea of any coastal state�
 91� For example, UNCLOS, article 2, states: “The 
sovereignty over the territorial sea is exer-
cised subject to this Convention and other 
rules of international law” (emphasis added)�
 92� USCG Addendum, p� 1-46, paragraph 1�8�2�4� 
As will be discussed later in this section, U�S� 
Coast Guard and DoD SAR policy allows for 
both aircraft and surface units to conduct AE 
rescue operations�
 93� The SAR Convention was never intended to 
limit or restrict any available warship or other 
ship in the conduct of immediate lifesaving 
assistance to persons in distress, even in a 
coastal state’s territorial sea� The annex to the 
SAR Convention (paragraph 4�3) states: “Any 
search and rescue unit receiving information 
of a distress incident shall initially take im-
mediate action if in the position to assist and 
shall, in any case without delay, notify the res-
cue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre 
in whose area the incident has occurred�”
 94� CJCSI, paragraph 4�d�
 95� It should be emphasized that UNCLOS 
and the SOLAS and Salvage Conventions 
were never intended to restrict or hamper a 
ship’s use of its available SAR resources (e�g�, 
embarked aircraft or small boat) that could be 
used in a lifesaving operation�
 96� The use of U�S� military aircraft in the con-
duct of RAE operations is also contemplated� 
CJCSI, paragraph 6�c(2), states, “An opera-
tional commander may render immediate 
rescue assistance by deploying a U�S� military 
aircraft (including aircraft embarked aboard 
military ships conducting RAE operations) 
into the national airspace within U�S�- 
recognized foreign territorial seas or archi-
pelagic waters when all four of the following 
conditions are met: 
  “(a) A person, ship, or aircraft within the 
foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters 
is in danger or distress from perils of the sea 
and requires immediate rescue assistance; 
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  “(b) The location is reasonably well known; 
  “(c) The U�S� military aircraft is able to render 
timely and effective assistance; and, 
  “(d) Any delay in rendering assistance could 
be life-threatening�”
 97� For example, the USCG Addendum, para-
graph 1�8�2�5, states that “Coast Guard rescue 
aircraft may conduct an AE rescue opera-
tion in a coastal State’s territorial sea, when 
in the judgment of the aircraft commander: 
(a) There is reasonable certainty (based on 
the best available information regardless of 
source) that a person is in distress; (b) The 
distress location is reasonably well known; 
and (c) The SAR unit (or SAR facility) is in 
position to render timely and effective  
assistance�”
 98� Article 18(2) of UNCLOS concerns ships in 
the conduct of innocent passage in a coastal 
state’s territorial sea� See also note 83�
 99� The annex to the SAR Convention promotes 
using all available means for rendering as-
sistance to persons in distress� For example, 
in the conduct of search operations, para-
graph 3�1�3 states: “Unless otherwise agreed 
between the States concerned, the authorities 
of a Party which wishes its rescue units to 
enter into or over the territorial sea or terri-
tory of another Party solely for the purpose 
of searching for the position of maritime 
casualties and rescuing the survivors of such 
casualties, shall transmit a request, giving full 
details of the projected mission and the need 
for it, to the rescue co-ordination centre of 
that other Party, or to such other authority as 
has been designated by that Party” (empha-
sis added)� While paragraph 3�1�3 describes 
the requirement for aircraft entering into a 
coastal state’s territorial sea for the purpose of 
searching, the aircraft would not be required 
to seek permission for the conduct of an AE 
rescue operation� The criteria for the conduct 
of an AE rescue operation by an aircraft 
should be met prior to rendering any as-
sistance in a coastal state’s territorial sea (see 
notes 96 and 97)�
 100� The USCG Addendum does provide a note of 
caution on the use of aircraft and ships in the 
conduct of an AE rescue operation� Paragraph 
1�8�1�6 states: “Customary practice for aircraft 
conducting AE rescue operations in a coastal 
State’s territorial sea is not as fully developed 
as for vessels (e�g�, nations may recognize 
the right to conduct AE rescue operations 
more readily for vessels than for aircraft)� In 
addition, the conduct of AE rescue operations 
by nonmilitary vessels is apt to cause less 
coastal State concern than entry by military 
vessels� Therefore, safety of the rescue unit 
must be considered in light of the views of the 
coastal State whose territorial sea or overlying 
airspace is being entered�”
 101� The Salvage Convention, article 1(a), defines 
salvage as “any act or activity undertaken to 
assist a vessel or any other property in danger 
in navigable waters or in any other waters 
whatsoever�”
 102� It is at this point where U�S� Coast Guard and 
DoD AE policy set forth in CJCSI 2410�01D 
differ� The USCG Addendum states (para-
graph 1�8�2�6[b]) that Coast Guard rescue 
assets shall not conduct an AE rescue opera-
tion “[t]o rescue (or salvage) property (other 
than in limited cases, such as for the retrieval 
of medical supplies, or other property that 
may assist in the conduct of the lifesaving 
operation)�” In contrast, CJCSI 2410�01D al-
lows for the rescue of property: “RAE applies 
only to rescues in which the location of the 
persons or property in danger or distress is 
reasonably well known” (emphasis added)� 
As mentioned previously (note 88), another 
difference is that the Coast Guard uses the 
term “assistance entry,” while DoD uses “right 
of assistance entry�” The Coast Guard prefers 
AE, believing the term advances the service’s 
objectives in international engagements� 
Many nations view AE solely as a duty, not a 
right, even a limited one� While the distinc-
tion between a “duty” and “right” has legal 
significance, the practical distinctions are 
minimal, since international support exists 
for entry into a coastal state’s territorial sea to 
render assistance to those in distress�
 103� The annex to the SAR Convention (para-
graph 3�1�2) states: “Unless otherwise agreed 
between the States concerned, a Party should 
authorize � � � immediate entry into or over its 
territorial sea or territory of rescue units of 
other Parties solely for the purpose of search-
ing for the position of maritime casualties 
and rescuing the survivors of such casualties” 
(emphasis added)� As previously noted (note 
99), the annex continues (paragraph 3�1�3): 
“Unless otherwise agreed between the States 
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concerned, the authorities of a Party which 
wishes its rescue units to enter into or over 
the territorial sea or territory of another Party 
solely for the purpose of searching for the 
position of maritime casualties and rescuing 
survivors of such casualties, shall transmit 
a request, giving full details of the projected 
mission and the need for it, to the rescue 
co-ordination centre of that other Party, or to 
such authority as has been designated by that 
Party” (emphasis added)� In addition to Coast 
Guard policy not authorizing the conduct of 
an AE rescue operation to recover property 
or to search for persons in distress, the USCG 
Addendum also states (paragraph 1�8�2�6) that 
an AE rescue operation cannot be conducted 
(1) to assist persons not in distress, or (2) 
within a coastal state’s internal waters or over 
its landmass�
 104� The SOLAS Convention, chapter V, regula-
tion 33, requires the master of a ship at sea 
that is in a position to render assistance to 
persons in distress to provide that assistance� 
Stating that the master is required to render 
assistance demonstrates that it is the master 
who determines whether a person is in  
distress�
 105� The Commander’s Handbook, paragraph 
2�5�3�1, describes international straits as fol-
lows: “Straits that are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone and another 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone are subject to the legal regime of transit 
passage� Transit passage exists throughout 
the entire strait (shoreline-to-shoreline) and 
not just the area overlapped by the territorial 
sea of the coastal nation(s)� Under interna-
tional law, the ships and aircraft of all nations, 
including warships, auxiliary vessels, and 
military aircraft, enjoy the right of unimped-
ed transit passage through such straits and 
their approaches�” Transit passage is defined 
as “the exercise of the freedoms of navigation 
and overflight solely for the purpose of con-
tinuous and expeditious transit in the normal 
modes of operation utilized by ships and 
aircraft for such passage�” See also UNCLOS, 
part III (Straits Used for International  
Navigation)�
 106� Myron H� Nordquist, series ed�, Satya N�  
Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, general eds�, 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: A Commentary, vol� 3, Articles 86 to 132 
(The Hague, Neth�: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 
p� 177�
 107� While the annex to the SAR Convention 
does not explicitly state that law-enforcement 
actions are not coordinated and conducted 
within the framework of the global SAR 
system, the IAMSAR manual, vol� 2, does 
provide guidance for assistance in “other 
than SAR operations” (see note 112)� An-
other excellent guide for determining what 
generally would be considered a “SAR case” 
is paragraph 4�c of CJCSI 2410�01D, which 
states that RAE is conducted by U�S� military 
ships in support of “the time-honored mari-
ners’ duty under customary international law 
of rendering rapid and effective assistance to 
persons, ships, or aircraft in imminent peril 
at sea without regard to nationality or loca-
tion” (emphasis added)� The CJCSI goes on 
(paragraph 5�c) to define perils of the sea as 
“accidents and dangers peculiar to maritime 
activities including storms, waves, and wind; 
grounding; fire, smoke, and noxious fumes; 
flooding, sinking, and capsizing; loss of 
propulsion or steering; and other hazards of 
the sea�” This definition provides not only a 
good understanding of when U�S� military 
ships should conduct AE rescue operations, 
but also a broad characterization for when the 
SAR Convention would apply and when acti-
vation of the global SAR system is warranted�
 108� The annex to the SAR Convention does 
provide (paragraph 1�3�13) a definition of 
distress phase (see note 75)� The coastal-state 
SMC makes the determination of whether 
this definition applies considering the cir-
cumstance of a particular SAR operation� If a 
person declares that he is in distress, the SMC 
normally would activate the coastal state’s 
distress phase processes and procedures to 
provide the necessary assistance�
 109� George K� Walker, Definitions for the Law 
of the Sea: Terms Not Defined by the 1982 
Convention (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 
p� 169, provides a good overview of what 
should be considered a distress: “‘Distress,’ as 
used in UNCLOS Articles 18, 39, 98 and 109, 
and as incorporated by reference in UNCLOS 
Articles 45 and 54, means an event of grave 
necessity, such as severe weather or mechani-
cal failure in a ship or aircraft; or a human-
caused event, such as a collision with another 
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ship or aircraft� The necessity must be urgent 
and proceed from such a state of things as 
may be supposed to produce in the mind of 
a skillful mariner or aircraft commander a 
well-grounded apprehension of the loss of 
the vessel or aircraft and its cargo, or for the 
safety or lives of its crew or its passengers�”
 110� Wu Tien Li-Shou, plaintiff-appellant, v� 
United States of America, defendant-appellee, 
on appeal from the U�S� District Court for 
the District of Maryland, brief for the United 
States of America, appellee, No� 14-1206 (4th 
Cir�, 23 January 2015)�
 111� Ibid�, p� 38�
 112� The IAMSAR manual, vol� 2, also recognizes 
this important distinction� In paragraph 
7�4�2 it states: “In situations such as piracy or 
armed robbery against ships where the ship 
or crew is in grave and imminent danger, the 
master may authorize the broadcasting of a 
distress message, preceded by the appropriate 
distress alerts (MAYDAY, DSC, etc�), using 
all available radiocommunications systems� 
Also, ships subject to the SOLAS Convention 
are required to carry equipment called the 
Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) for send-
ing covert alerts to shore for vessel security 
incidents involving acts of violence against 
ships (i�e�, piracy, armed robbery against ships 
or any other security incident directed against 
a ship)� � � � National procedures can vary but 
the role of the RCC, if involved, is usually to 
receive the SSAS alert and inform the security 
forces authority that will be in charge of the 
response� Actions taken by the RCC upon re-
ceiving a covert SSAS alert include: � � � place 
SAR resources on standby, if appropriate, 
since it may become a SAR case” (empha-
sis added)� This section in vol� 2 is placed 
in chapter 7, which is titled “Emergency 
Assistance Other than Search and Rescue,” 
emphasizing that a law-enforcement action 
should not initially be considered a SAR 
operation as envisioned in the SAR Conven-
tion; however, a SAR case may arise out of a 
law-enforcement action�
 113� The facts portrayed in this vignette are known 
by the author, who attests to their accuracy� 
The vignette is presented for consideration of 
the legal and policy issues involved�
 114� This discussion is based on SAR cases that 
would be coordinated and conducted under 
the SAR Convention and would not normally 
apply to a mixed-migration-at-sea incident, 
which might or might not constitute a SAR 
case� The unique nature of mixed-migration-
at-sea operations would require development 
of unique processes and procedures to meet 
the requirements of those types of operations�
 115� The UN Convention on Conditions for 
Registration of Ships (not in force), article 2, 
defines flag State as “a State whose flag a ship 
flies and is entitled to fly�” Article 1 indicates 
that a flag state must “exercise effectively its 
jurisdiction and control over such ships with 
regard to identification and accountability 
of shipowners and operators as well as with 
regard to administrative, technical, economic 
and social matters�” Additionally, UNCLOS 
article 91 states: “1� Every State shall fix the 
conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships, for the registration of ships in its terri-
tory, and for the right to fly its flag� Ships have 
the nationality of the State whose flag they are 
entitled to fly� There must exist a genuine link 
between the State and the ship� 
  “2� Every State shall issue to ships to which it 
has granted the right to fly its flag documents 
to that effect�” Walker, Definitions for the Law 
of the Sea, pp� 193–95, provides a detailed 
explanation of the term flag State as used in 
UNCLOS�
 116� Thames Shipyard and Repair Company, 
plaintiff in cross-claim, appellant, v� United 
States, defendant, appellee; Northern Voyager 
Limited Partnership; OneBeacon America 
Insurance Company f/k/a Commercial Union 
Insurance Company, plaintiffs, appellants, v� 
United States, defendant, appellee, 350 F�3d 
247 (1st Cir�, 26 November 2003)�
 117� In particular, both the district court and the 
court of appeals held that the discretionary 
function exception to liability under 46 USC 
§ 742 (the Suits in Admiralty Act, which 
allows for a limited waiver of the U�S� federal 
government’s sovereign immunity from civil 
lawsuits) and 46 USC § 781 (the Public Ves-
sels Act, which allows for legal action against 
the United States for damages caused by a 
public vessel) protected from further judicial 
review the Coast Guard’s decision to evacuate 
the master forcibly from Northern Voyager�
 118� The court of appeals brief included the fol-
lowing comment: “The facts of this case lead 
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us to conclude that the Coast Guard reacted 
rationally, and that human life could reason-
ably have been deemed to be at serious risk 
had Captain Haggerty and his crew not been 
removed� The Northern Voyager, without 
steering, was rolling in six to eight foot ocean 
seas� Water was pouring in� She was develop-
ing an increasing port-side list� The fishing 
boat’s only access port was on the starboard 
side� The Coast Guardsmen on the vessel re-
ported progressive flooding, raising the pos-
sibility that the ship would capsize, trapping 
all on board� While arguments can perhaps 
be made in light of 20-20 hindsight tending to 
minimize the potential dangers had the mas-
ter and his fellows been allowed to remain, we 
see no basis to doubt the objective reason-
ableness of the Coast Guard’s on the scene 
decision to remove them�” However, Judge 
Torruella on the Court of Appeals concurred 
in part in and dissented in part from the 
majority’s recognition of the Coast Guard’s 
authority to compel the master forcibly to 
abandon his ship, thus preventing him from 
continuing efforts to save it� He wrote: “With 
due respect, there is no authority in law, prac-
tice, or maritime tradition that validates such 
action by the Coast Guard, nor am I aware 
of the government’s having claimed such 
extraordinary powers before the inception of 
the case�” He concluded that the discretionary 
function exception did not shield the United 
States from liability, because a decision can-
not be shielded from liability if the decision 
maker is acting without actual authority� In 
the judge’s view, “Such a momentous shift 
in policy and such an extraordinary grant of 
authority should not be undertaken absent 
a clear legislative mandate expressed both 
in the text of the statute and in its legislative 
history�” For those interested in this issue, this 
case is well worth reading�
 119� Coast Guard SAR policy states that a 
voluntary evacuation of a person should 
be considered the preferred alternative to 
removing the person forcibly from his vessel� 
The USCG Addendum (paragraph 4�2�2) 
states: “Although the Coast Guard does have 
the authority to compel a mariner to abandon 
their vessel in a life threatening situation, it is 
always preferable that a mariner voluntarily 
evacuate when necessary� Coast Guard per-
sonnel should endeavor to use all means, in-
cluding powers of persuasion, to encourage a 
mariner to evacuate, when appropriate� Forc-
ible and/or compelled evacuations should 
only be conducted when a life-threatening 
emergency exists, and there is an immediate 
need for assistance or aid�” Additionally, the 
decision to evacuate a person forcibly from 
his vessel to save his life should, if possible, 
be made in consultation with the SMC� The 
SMC, if time permits, should consult legal 
counsel� However, if time is of the essence 
and the situation is life threatening, then SAR 
policy should allow the SAR unit on scene to 
make the decision to remove a person forcibly 
from his vessel to save his life� Policies, pro-
cedures, and training must be developed and 
implemented to ensure that SAR units, SMCs, 
legal counsel, and the SAR organization chain 
of command can effectively manage this type 
of scenario�
 120� It should also be noted that from a U�S� legal 
perspective, a person who refuses to abandon 
his vessel at the request of the U�S� Coast 
Guard to save his own life has committed no 
crime, which makes the contemplated use of 
force even more difficult�
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The Science of War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation
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Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense 
Analyses. After serving as director for strategy at the 
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CHANGING DOD’S ANALYSIS PARADIGM
 War gaming and military modeling have a well-documented history cover-ing over two centuries, a period that coincides with the inception and 
evolution of formal professional development for military officers�1 The term war 
game used here refers to “a warfare model or simulation that does not involve the 
operations of actual forces, in which the flow of events affects and is affected by 
decisions made during the course of those events by players representing oppos-
ing sides�”2
Beginning with the early-nineteenth-century Prussian creation of war colleges 
to augment operational experience, professional 
military education involved a combination of the 
study of history and international law, the study of 
theorists who had written on the nature of war and 
strategy, practical exercises, and theoretical analy-
sis as the means for understanding and developing 
military art and science� Carl von Clausewitz’s On 
War and Antoine-Henri de Jomini’s The Art of 
War competed for attention� Whereas Clausewitz 
treated war as a social phenomenon, rooted in the 
age of reason, Jomini believed in the existence of 
immutable principles of warfare, akin to Newto-
nian mechanics�
As war gaming became a routine part of Prus-
sian military education, the Prussians attempted 
to create rigid rules for calculating the outcomes 
of engagements� Major powers around the world 
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CHANGING DOD’S ANALYSIS PARADIGM
believed that war gaming contributed notably to the Prussians’ success in 1866 
and 1870� However, as the popularity of war gaming spread following the Prus-
sian victories, semirigid and free-form adjudication based on the game director’s 
judgment became more popular�3
War colleges used war gaming as a basis for both practical exercises and 
theoretical analyses� Both war colleges and military staffs used war gaming to 
develop strategy� In addition, in the early twentieth century, quantitative mili-
tary modeling outside of war gaming was adopted more widely� New techniques 
were formulated, such as Lanchester equations, which Frederick W� Lanchester 
published in 1916�4
During World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom instituted 
operations evaluation groups, consisting of scientists, to quantify the outcomes 
of military practices and seek improvements� These groups observed operations, 
collected data, and created models of military operations analogous to the models 
they used in scientific endeavors� Following World War II, the U�S� government 
established federal contract research centers to continue this practice in peace-
time�5 The Navy transformed its Operations Research Group into an Operations 
Evaluation Group that became the Center for Naval Analyses� The Air Force es-
tablished RAND� The Army established its Operations Research Office at Johns 
Hopkins University, which became the Research Analysis Corporation� The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) founded a Weapons Systems Evaluation Group that 
became the Institute for Defense Analyses�6 Initially these organizations provided 
mechanisms for contracting university professors; eventually, they developed 
permanent staffs�
In the long-term competition with the Soviets, the emphasis shifted from 
operations research to systems analysis: operations research focuses on analyz-
ing operations to support commanders; systems analysis focuses on supporting 
the Pentagon’s policy and procurement bureaucracies by attempting to quantify 
the effects of proposed platforms and weapons systems employing advancing 
technology� An expansion of the practice of quantification to optimize opera-
tions spread from the military to industry, leading to the creation of operations 
research as a discipline�
In 1961, coming from Ford Motor Company, Secretary of Defense Robert S� 
McNamara established the Pentagon’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System and a Systems Analysis Office to oversee the selection of military systems 
and force allocation and determine how much was enough to invest in defense�7 
Alain C� Enthoven founded the Systems Analysis Office on well-intentioned te-
nets�8 However, competing interests and divisions in staff responsibilities within 
and among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the 
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services and the need to align analytical processes with Pentagon staff procedures 
and budget cycles resulted in these tenets never being followed fully�
Computers rapidly expanded the scale of problems addressed in the 1960s and 
’70s� Computer-based campaign simulations that strung together and iterated 
sets of equations modeling combat became the primary method the Pentagon 
procurement bureaucracy used to undergird arguments for selecting one military 
platform or technology over another� As the Department of Defense (DoD) ex-
panded its use of contractors to conduct analyses in the 1970s, a sizable industry 
emerged to support and embed Pentagon analytical practices� “Unfortunately, the 
trend over the last decades has been for DoD studies to become more focused 
on standard scenarios and big [computer] models�”9 On 8 May 2015, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Robert O� Work and Vice Chief of the JCS Admiral James A� 
Winnefeld Jr� called for initiatives to renew war gaming within DoD�10
Scientific methods form the foundation for operations research� A frequent 
criticism of war gaming is that it is less scientific, and thus less useful for predic-
tion, than computer-based combat/campaign simulation� This article examines 
war gaming and combat/campaign simulations against scientific standards to 
explore their usefulness and limitations and how they complement each other� 
Computer-based campaign simulation involves much larger uncertainties and 
indeterminacy than generally realized� Both campaign simulation and war gam-
ing require the use of additional analytical techniques to validate and extend their 
findings�
Operations research is rooted in an interactive cycle of observing fleet/field 
operations, collecting data, modeling, collecting more data, proposing changes, 
then cycling through those results again� The original operations research groups 
involved interdisciplinary teams of scientists employing models and paradigms 
from their respective disciplines to understand military operations well enough 
to predict effects� DoD needs to overhaul its current analysis paradigm and its 
focus on individual major defense acquisition programs, weaning itself off large, 
computer-based campaign models� It should adopt analysis campaigns and cycles 
of research to meet growing security challenges within limited budgets�11
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
The System and Its States
Bernard O� Koopman begins his study of the logical basis of combat simulation 
with the following:
Basic to any scientific examination of nature is the concept of the system: the set  
of interacting things considered� In a military action, the system is the totality of 
men[/women] and weapons involved, together with their environment: the medium 
in which the action occurs and which affects its course� And equally fundamental is 
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the concept of the set of states that the system can be in, just one at any given time� � � � 
In each case, the state of the system includes its physical state: positions and velocities 
of the units, condition of armaments, data-gathering status, and all the meteorologi-
cal specifications� But how far into the mental state of the commanders must one 
go in defining the “state” of the system? This can only be settled by asking a second 
question, that of the evolution of the state of the system with the passage of time.
Classical physics has traditionally considered that the state of a system is only ad-
equately described if, once the state is given, all later states are determined: Given any 
two similar systems in the same initial states, all their later states will be the same— 
provided that their environmental influences (external forces) continue the same� 
Thus, in Newtonian mechanics, the full and exact knowledge of the positions and 
velocities of the parts of a material system determine its whole future motion� But it is 
only in the simplest military operations that such an order of determinateness exists�
In far more cases, it is not feasible to specify the state of a system so that its subse-
quent evolution is determined� What is far more common is to have only statistical 
determinateness: in a large number of similar systems starting in the same state, the 
same proportion will go into any given later state�12
The premise of combat/campaign simulation is that the evolution of the states 
in some future combat can be determined adequately statistically� In war gam-
ing, the state of the system evolves move to move through adjudication of player 
decisions� Keeping in mind the concept of states helps us consider the scope and 
limits of computer-based combat/campaign simulation and war gaming�
Scientific Standards
“Standards of scientific excellence, though they may occasionally be self- 
defeating, on the whole and in the long run make for success�”13 However, one 
must stipulate carefully what one intends when posing scientific standards, lest 
they become straitjackets� “The emphasis by historians and philosophers of sci-
ence is that there is no such thing as the scientific method� The more realistic 
danger is that some preferred set of techniques will become identified with sci-
entific method as such�”14
As systems analysis took hold in DoD, those seeking to determine “how much 
is enough” sought to create models using equations that allowed quantitative 
comparisons to predict the costs and benefits of alternative systems� As com-
puters became more powerful, DoD turned to quantitative combat/campaign 
simulations as a basis for major decisions, regarding them as more objective, 
rigorous, and useful than less-formal analytical techniques, such as war gaming� 
Such simulations were considered to be
• more objective, in the sense that computer models would support major 
decisions based on explicit criteria of national interest, not on compromises 
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among institutional forces, and provide open and explicit analysis (including 
transparent data and assumptions) available to all parties
• more rigorous, in the sense that computers would provide quantitative an-
swers to support choices among explicit, balanced, feasible alternatives and 
allow reproducible runs for comparing alternatives
• more useful, in the sense that computers would allow more systematic analy-
sis to predict the effects of decisions15
Therefore, objectivity, rigor, and usefulness provide the set of scientific stan-
dards used in this examination of combat/campaign simulation and war gaming�
Objectivity. “That is objective which insists on its own rights regardless of our 
wishes, and only experience can transmit its claims to us� Experience is ultimate 
because it confronts us with a continuous ultimatum� For a man to by-pass expe-
rience in the pursuit of truth is to make himself God� � � � The subjectivist lives in 
a fool’s paradise�”16
Objectivity equates to “the intersubjectivity of findings independent of any 
one person’s intuitive judgment�”17 Demanding intersubjectivity requires that 
“a scientific observation could have been made by any observer” and “testifies 
that the observation is uncontaminated by any factors save those common to all 
observers�”18 “For an enterprise to be characterized as scientific it must have as its 
purpose the explanation and prediction of phenomena within its subject-matter 
domain and it must provide such explanation and prediction in a reasoned, and 
therefore intersubjective, fashion� � � � While precise predictions are � � � preferred 
to vague ones, a discipline which provides predictions of a less precise character, 
but makes them correctly and in a systematic and reasoned way, must be classi-
fied as a science�”19
Concepts lead to observations, which then lead to theories and laws� Laws 
have counterfactual force, carry explanatory force, and support prediction� They 
serve as standpoints from which we can survey for exceptions� They provide the 
basis for broader theories that advance the understanding of complicated and 
complex phenomena� A definition of an expert is one who knows what context 
must hold for a law to apply�20
Basic Newtonian physics involves laws strictly determining the relationships 
between actions and their effects� But even physics requires statistical laws to 
explain quantum phenomena, thermodynamics, etc�, and cannot predict the 
behavior of many multibody problems and other chaotic systems� Statistical 
laws permit probabilistic explanations for phenomena involving statistical in-
determinacy�21 Similarly, systems involving human behavior admit quasi laws or 
tendency laws�22 “In order for the [quasi] law to be valid, it is not necessary that 
no apparent exceptions occur, it is only necessary that, if an apparent exception 
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should occur, an adequate explanation should be forthcoming�”23 Statements 
such as “fear, honor, and self-interest are the fundamental causes of war” qualify 
as quasi laws�
Both war gaming and combat/campaign simulations are pseudoexperiments: 
experiments carried out on a model instead of in reality�24 The person or team 
designing the experiment reduces a substantive problem to a conceptual model 
on the basis of the perception of what is relevant to the problem� This conceptual 
model is a world, defined as the object or system about which a person is con-
cerned� A state of the world is a description leaving no relevant aspect undefined� 
A true state of the world is a state that does in fact obtain, i�e�, the true description 
of the world�25 The conceptual model is reduced further to physical and semantic 
(quantitative and relational) models, each equating to a theory of behavior of 
the subject matter, employed in the analysis to determine the true state�26 If the 
experiment serves its purpose, this system of models produces an outcome that 
can be generalized by induction to advance a substantive conclusion�27
The character of military (and civil) operations involves both “an evolving phys-
ical system, and � � � an unfolding set of plans, intentions, reasoning and counter- 
reasoning of the men [and women] engaged in the action, the commanders�”28
War gaming addresses the plans, intentions, reasoning, and counterreason-
ing of the roles represented in the game� It highlights “predictions regarding the 
behavior of human organizations inasmuch as the latter can be simulated most 
effectively by having experts play the roles of certain members of such organiza-
tions and act out what in their judgment would be the actions, in the situation 
simulated, of their real-life counterparts�”29 Outcomes result from the interacting 
decisions and actions of the role players, as adjudicated by game umpires and 
game-control oversight�
Epistemologically speaking, the use of an expert as an objective indicator � � � amounts 
to considering the expert’s predictive pronouncement as an integral, intrinsic part 
of the subject matter, and treating his[/her] reliability as part of the theory about the 
subject matter�30 Our information about the expert is conjoined to our other knowl-
edge about the field, and we proceed with the application of precisely the same induc-
tive methods which we would apply in cases where no use of expertise is made� Our 
“data” are supplemented by the expert’s � � � valuations and by his[/her] judgments of 
relevance � � � , and our “theory” is supplemented by the performance of experts�
In this manner the incorporation of expert judgment into the structure of our inves-
tigation is made subject to the same safeguards which are used to assure objectivity 
in other scientific investigations� The use of expertise is therefore no retreat from 
objectivity or reversion to a reliance on subjective taste�31
Computer-based combat/campaign simulations focus on physical aspects 
of combat� Human decisions are present and have a substantial impact on the 
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output, but are embedded in the simulation construction and the choice of inputs 
(data and models) rather than the decisions of combatants� To encompass human 
decision in statistical determinateness, one might turn to doctrine or, absent clear 
doctrine or future systems, query commanders for their expert opinions regard-
ing decisions they would make given each possible state of the system� To be 
practical, this approach requires a world with few states� One also might assume 
that each commander is attempting to do maximum harm and seeks a course of 
action to minimize the harm to his/her forces, using the minimax convention 
of game theory�32 “A more general method of this sort is for each commander to 
maximize his[/her] own value function—not necessarily the negative of his[/her] 
opponent’s�”33 This approach to combat/campaign simulation assumes that once 
the statistics of human decision are incorporated into the model, what remains 
is the statistically determinate evolution of the military system� But separating 
the human from the physical model often leads to erroneous conclusions� Barry 
Watts’s research indicates that, rather than having been let down by their radars 
and missiles, 80–90 percent of the pilots shot down in Vietnam and Korea never 
saw their attackers until it was too late to react�34
By virtue of the statistical determinateness, the basic process is stochastic� 
That is, there is a definite probability—the transition probability—that if the 
system is in state x at time t it will be in state xʹ at time tʹ� “Evidently, if the values 
of the transition probabilities a(x, t; xʹ, tʹ) were all known, the probabilities of every 
outcome of the battle would be known—and this for every assumed starting state” 
(italics in original)� Thus, the whole problem of the quantitative study of military 
operations is that of finding the transition probabilities from knowledge that 
can reasonably be obtained� “[A]ll the standard analytical models, Monte Carlo 
simulations, etc�, fit into this scheme�”35 Clearly, one also must have knowledge of 
the transition rates to specify at which time tʹ the new state xʹ obtains�36
In practice, analyzing stochastic processes also employs the Markovian as-
sumption, which holds that, faced with the same state, the transition probabilities 
for the system remain constant throughout the process� In the context of human 
decision, this means that no learning from previous states, no history, affects the 
process�
Of course, when methods of computer simulation are made in the usual way they 
depend for their validity on the Markov property, but when this does not apply � � � 
the numerical results, however realistic they may appear, are without logical basis—at 
least until they are proved to give an acceptable degree of approximation� The act 
of simplifying and still retaining the Markovian character—as well as operational 
realism—is an art as well as a science� Success is more apt to be achieved by limiting 
the objective of the study to the answer of a precise question rather than a diffuse 
multitude�37
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   70 12/15/16   1:53 PM
76
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11
 HA N L E Y  7 1
In summary: to assume that such a use of machines gives even approximately 
valid information about the military operation is to assume the following: 
• The human uncertainties have been removed�
• The combat situation involves a system that is, at any time, in an objectively 
describable state (presumes transition probabilities and rates are known)�
• The situation’s state transitions are Markovian�
• Its stochastic equations can be satisfactorily approximated by difference 
equations without losing their Markovian character�
• The repetition of runs gives, by the law of large numbers, satisfactorily ac-
curate and reliable values of the desired probabilities�38
At this point, the number of states involved in a combat simulation is worth 
considering�39 Consider an engagement involving m units on the Blue side and n 
units on the Red side�40 Indicate that a Blue unit has engaged a Red unit by draw-
ing a blue line between the two units� Similarly, use a red line for a Red unit en-
gaging a Blue unit� “The resulting colored graph indicates the state of our system� 
How many different graphs are possible? Of the mn possible ways of drawing the 
blue lines, any one can actually be drawn or not� Hence, there are 2mn possibilities 
for the blue lines; and similarly for the red� Consequently, there are 22mn possible 
colored graphs�”41 See the accompanying figure for a depiction of the case for a 
combined-arms rock-paper-scissors contest in which all “units” could engage 
simultaneously or in any order� The number of states of this world for a single 
battle is 218� If we consider whether each engagement is successful, we double the 
number of states to 236� Each additional consideration enlarges the exponent for 
computing the state space�
We can perform a mind experiment to estimate how large the state space 
would be for a battle that a “perfect” parallel computer the size of the universe, 
given the time of the universe, might compute� In this parallel computer, the 
processors are as small as protons, they operate at the speed of light, and they 
are packed densely into the volume of our universe� Each processor is assigned a 
distinct engagement to calculate, can compute the outcome instantaneously, and 
can fetch a new engagement in 10–23 seconds, an approximation of the time it 
takes light to go the diameter of a proton� Given 1045 processors per cubic meter, 
1081 cubic meters in the universe, 1023 calculations per second, and 10 seconds as 
an epoch a bit longer than the age of the universe, this computer could perform 
10168 calculations, or about 2558�42 If 4mn = 558 and we examine the same number 
of force elements on both sides, this “perfect” computer could calculate the states 
for an engagement with just less than twelve force units per side� Note that this 
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formulation of the engagement does not consider the timing of engagements, 
which would vastly increase the possible states of the “world.”
Although simulations such as those of one-on-one air or naval combat might 
be reduced to a computable number of states, force-on-force combat and cam-
paign simulations quickly exceed the number of states that admit of brute-force 
computation. So, how are these simulations implemented? By using a combina-
tion of shortcuts (heuristics) and clever analysis. These heuristics are essentially 
quasi laws whose application requires the contribution of experts who under-
stand well the scope of those laws’ applicability. Combat/campaign simulations 
often use expected-value models to determine what would happen “on average,” 
rather than Monte Carlo simulations. Increasing the number of runs does not 
increase statistical prediction by the law of large numbers in these simulations, 
as the expected value provides a determined outcome for each run. Lanchester 
equations—developed to help predict the outcome of naval and land battles—
most often use expected values, but can employ Monte Carlo techniques.43 Vary-
ing the exponent used in Lanchester equations between square and linear laws es-
sentially reflects the command and control and operational concept employed in 
the engagement. The complexity of ground models results in heuristic techniques 
such as weighted effectiveness indices / weighted unit values or qualitative judg-
ment models to calculate engagement outcomes. All these approaches involve 
subjective judgments and the insights of the analyst/team developing and using 
the model. In a combat/campaign simulation, the analyst/team must use subjec-
tive judgments to anticipate every interaction represented in the simulation, 
R
P
S
R
P
S
COMBINED-ARMS ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS
m Blue-force elements n Red-force elements
# of states considering successful and 
unsuccessful engagements = 24mn = 236
Source: Koopman, ”A Study of the Logical Basis of Combat Simulation,” pp. 871–72.
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supplement missing data, and create models that have not been validated in 
actual operations or exercises�
The works of Wayne P� Hughes, Glenn A� Kent, Bernard O� Koopman, and 
Paul K� Davis, among others, suggest clever approaches to overcoming computa-
tional limitations of brute-force calculations and appropriate forms of analysis�44 
With the development of complexity sciences, computers came to be used to 
simulate cognitive and other processes, rather than to solve equations� As Deep 
Blue and AlphaGo have demonstrated, in games of finite size with well-specified 
rules, computers can use artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to top human 
performance�45 However, current DoD computer-based campaign simulations 
use brute-force calculations� They have yet to incorporate agent-based models, 
automatons, fitness landscapes, genetic algorithms, or other techniques from 
complexity science� RAND incorporated some AI techniques into campaign 
simulations in the 1980s, but DoD chose not to employ those features in the 
simulations it adopted, instead staying with the types of deterministic and sto-
chastic models Koopman addressed�46
So, how do we assess objectivity, given the logics of combat/computer simula-
tion and war gaming?
Guidelines for the practice of operations research, although written with mili-
tary modeling in mind, apply equally to war gaming and to combat/campaign 
simulation�47 Significant distinctions between good operations research practice 
and other scientific inquiry include a presumption of the existence of a client 
(sponsor) and the complications presented by security classification and pro-
prietary work� Close cooperation with the client in framing the analysis is good 
practice common to any technique of analysis�
In war gaming, a design and development team develops the scenario and 
reference materials (e�g�, commander’s intent, task organization, subordinates’ 
missions, orders of battle, unit locations, weather) to establish the world and its 
initial state and develop prebriefings to immerse players into the game� The team 
identifies the number of competing sides, the scope of disciplines required, the 
command echelons represented, the bureaucratic verisimilitude desired, and the 
number and expertise of role players needed to accomplish the game objectives� 
Team members also design the information conditions: the information available 
to each side and its flow, the communications techniques and their verisimilitude 
to accustomed formats, the physical arrangements, the move structure, and the 
game rate to arrive at a desired culmination point�48 To facilitate decision making, 
they construct move forms and provide for feedback among the participants� For 
adjudication, they select methods and models (quantitative and qualitative) used 
to change the world state resulting from each game move, and the qualifications 
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and organization of game controllers and umpires� They also anticipate control 
inputs of plausible events (usually wild cards, such as rogue actions or accidents 
to initiate conflict) to shape player decisions to achieve game objectives�49
Combat/campaign simulations similarly frame the world for the purpose of 
the pseudoexperiment and provide input data to establish its initial state� Where-
as war-game design involves detailed considerations of context for role-player 
decisions—with particular attention to information conditions (who knows what 
and acts when), as discussed above—combat/campaign simulations remove hu-
man decision� Information conditions are embedded in the combat models� The 
models selected incorporate a theory of command and control and the concept 
of operations in their code—consciously or not� The analysts / team members 
develop or choose models and techniques they judge appropriate to the study, 
on the basis of their expertise� “A fundamental truth in analysis is that scenarios 
drive the answers� Thus, much effort should go into conceiving and tuning the 
scenarios used and specifying uncertainty ranges� This should be a deeply ana-
lytic affair rather than the result merely of creative people spinning stories that 
raise interesting issues�”50 Whereas game scenarios are necessarily rich, to provide 
the context essential for expert role playing, the world of the combat/campaign 
simulation employs sparse scenarios, with only the data needed to perform the 
calculations�
In war gaming, a control team and umpires run the simulation� They execute 
the game design, adjudicating changes in the “true” state of the world using the 
decisions of the role players, their quantitative models, and their judgments, 
taking into account the game’s objectives� In computer-based combat/campaign 
simulations, the computer computes the state transitions and the analyst decides 
what constitutes a stopping point or state for ending the computer run� Both war 
gaming and combat/campaign simulation also involve analysts who observe, re-
cord, analyze, and report on the pseudoexperiments� Costs and time available to 
design, develop, and run the simulation and subsequent analysis constrain both 
types of simulation�
Both war games and combat/campaign simulations involve clients, designers, 
developers, and analysts employing informal reasoning processes and subjective 
judgment in creating their theory of the world under study� The totality of the 
participants, models, and data employed in these simulations and the relation-
ships among them represent the theory of the war game or combat/campaign 
simulation� In the case of games, this includes the role players, umpires, and 
control team, in addition to any quantitative models used in adjudication� In 
combat/campaign simulation, it involves the treatment of human decision and 
the concepts and information conditions embedded in the models, as well as the 
flow of outcomes from one process into the next (e�g�, who attacked whom first)� 
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The motivations, expertise, tastes, beliefs, and reliability of all human partici-
pants involved in the pseudoexperiment are thus integral, intrinsic parts of the 
subject matter, and therefore parts of the theory expressed in the war game or 
combat/campaign simulation�
Given the subjective judgment involved in defining the world and assessing its 
true state in both forms of pseudoexperimentation, objectivity comes from inter-
subjectivity� For combat/campaign models, this involves techniques such as the 
use of models that have shown value in actual combat (e�g�, those developed using 
combat data in war) or that have been verified in field/fleet exercises employ-
ing actual forces� A weaker, but essential, form of verification for assessing the 
objectivity of scenarios, models, and data is to open them to debate and review— 
realizing that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”51—while recognizing the pitfalls 
that may result from political logrolling� Interpreting the structure of relation-
ships in and among models and how to sequence these models in pseudoexperi-
ments relies on the subjective judgment of the developers� It also requires devel-
opers who know what factors are indeed relevant to the world under study; e�g�, 
attacking air forces on the ground can be a way to gain dominance of the air�52
Operational experience is useful in developing the expertise to make such judg-
ments� Gaming has an advantage in this regard: “In operational gaming, the sim-
ulated environment is particularly effective in reminding the expert, in his[/her] 
role as a player, to take all the factors into account � � � that are potentially rel-
evant; for if he[/she] does not, and chooses a tactic or strategy which overlooks 
an essential factor, an astute ‘opponent’ will soon enough teach him[/her] not to 
make such an omission again�”53 “People sensitive to a variety of responsibilities 
collaborate, applying the criteria that are relevant to their own interests, making 
estimates that reflect their own kinds of knowledge, and putting themselves in 
a mood to worry about probabilities rather than just a list of possibilities� They 
really live through a simulated crisis and not only learn things about their plans 
and their predictions but learn something about the nature of crisis�”54
Gaming allows all participants—role players, control team, umpires—the right 
of reclama when they need additional information for a decision or question the 
adjudication of a move� Manual games are particularly useful in this regard� In 
manual games (which may employ computer calculation in adjudication), players 
must make decisions from one turn to the next, taking into account the current 
situation; and procedures used to evaluate the consequences of the players’ deci-
sions must be quite clear to the players—simple enough for them to understand�55
Gaming achieves objectivity by allowing all experts involved to share both 
their formal and informal reasoning explicitly and openly� Deficits in knowledge 
and both consensus and dispute are evident, thus providing a foundation for 
further inquiry� Critiques provide ways to improve the games continually� By 
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   75 12/15/16   1:53 PM
81
War College: Winter 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 7 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
contrast, the details of combat/campaign simulations are evident only to the 
analyst/team that developed the simulation or to someone willing to conduct a 
detailed study of the data and models used in the simulation�
In all science, good practice calls for independent review� However, in this 
field the practice is difficult to follow owing to the additional costs and the limi-
tations that security and proprietary concerns impose� Clients often use “need to 
know” as an excuse to hold details of the pseudoexperiments close� Often, when a 
contractor performs the analysis, the details of the pseudoexperiment are propri-
etary� The Operations Research Society of America promulgated “Guidelines for 
the Practice of Operations Research” as a consequence of a dispute in testimony 
to Congress over two studies of ballistic-missile defense that supported conflict-
ing recommendations� The guidelines conclude as follows:
The analyst, as analyst, must restrict his[/her] analysis to the quantifiable and logi-
cally structural aspects of the problem only� In complex problems, perhaps the most 
valuable thing the analyst can do is to point out to his[/her] client that there are 
uncertainties deriving from such factors as:
 • Lack of agreement on means of evaluating the worth of complex systems�
 • Uncertainty about the technical capabilities and costs of systems yet unbuilt�
 • Uncertainty about environmental and operational factors that influence  
performance�
 • Uncertainty about the future capabilities or intentions of possible opposition� 
The analyst should be prepared to engage in dialogue with the client and other advi-
sors to consider how other value systems, assumptions, and conditions might influ-
ence conclusions� � � � The analyst’s job, especially in tough policy questions,  
is to analyze and help illuminate, and this means having the qualities of humility  
and openness necessary to participate in open dialogue with the client and other 
advisors�56
Subjective judgment enters once more in deciding what actions to take as a 
result of the war game or combat/campaign simulation� Here again, gaming has 
an advantage in that those who will decide what actions to take (or those on their 
staffs) have participated in the experiment—the decision makers learn directly 
from the game experience� In contrast, in the case of a combat/campaign simula-
tion, decisions on actions to take depend on how the analyst/team used subjective 
judgment to frame and report the results, adding another layer of interpretation 
to the decision process�
A critique of games is that the subjective judgments of the experts involved 
make them irreproducible� A question for combat/campaign simulation is 
whether, given the same subject matter, independent teams would select the same 
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scenarios, models, data, structures, and relationships, among them producing the 
same results and the same analysis on the basis of those results� A 1973 General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report following promulgation of the Operations Re-
search Society of America’s “Guidelines for the Practice of Operations Research” 
found shortfalls in independent checks to ensure the accuracy, timeliness, con-
sistency, and overall quality of the data—about 18 percent of the models were 
considered generally transferable for use by another person or another site—and 
“[t]he choices of scenarios, equipment performance, and personnel operations 
are based somewhat upon unknowns and uncertainties� The extent that the 
model reflects the real-world situation depends on the accuracy of the model-
builders’ judgment�”57
Relying on intersubjectivity generates concerns centering on the role of bias 
in forming belief� Critiques of limitations on human judgment and decision are 
legion� Irving L� Janis and Leon Mann provide a framework for how people make 
decisions (unconflicted adherence, unconflicted change, defensive avoidance, 
hypervigilance—as with a crowd heading for the exits in an emergency—and 
vigilance)�58 Even vigilant decision making may be subject to cognitive, egocen-
tric (self-serving motives), or affiliative (organizational or social acceptability) 
constraints�59 Charles Pierce provides a set of methods for fixing belief similar to 
those above, including tenacity (such as a child hears from its mother), authority 
(the will of an institution), apriority (the adoption of self-evident assumptions 
that are clear to the user, but to no one else), and finally the method of science�60 
Humans are exceptionally poor at assessing subjective probabilities�61 “When we 
pit [political] experts against minimalist performance benchmarks—dilettantes, 
dart-throwing chimps, and assorted extrapolation algorithms—we find few signs 
that expertise translates into greater ability to make either ‘well-calibrated’ or 
‘discriminating’ forecasts�”62 Humans make decisions on the basis of their tastes 
(preferences) and beliefs (subjective probabilities)�63 They persist in even dis-
credited beliefs� The Central Intelligence Agency provides four reasons for this 
persistence: “We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive; mind sets tend to 
be quick to form but resistant to change; new information is assimilated to exist-
ing images; and initial exposure to blurred or ambiguous stimuli interferes with 
accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available�”64
However, “[w]hether a distortion common to all can nevertheless be said to 
yield something objective is a philosophical question that has no bearing on the 
conduct of the human enterprise of science� The methodological question is 
always limited to whether what is reported as an observation can be used in sub-
sequent inquiry even if the particular observer is no longer part of the context�”65
Thus, for objectivity, the analytical team / rapporteurs in war gaming should 
note the assumptions and design choices that went into the game, arguments 
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both for and against a particular course of action by teams making their deci-
sions, and what outcome the team hoped to achieve, capturing both consensus 
and disputes� Objectivity in combat/campaign simulation involves using models 
validated by observation of operations or field/fleet exercises, employing data 
collected from those exercises� Studies done in advance of actual operations 
should be compared with what transpired and why�66 Analysts of both war games 
and combat/campaign simulations should keep in mind the motivations and 
beliefs of the participants and should extract from the experiment that which 
subsequent inquiry could verify or refute�
Rigor. Aristotle said, “A well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of 
precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits�”
Kaplan goes on to note, “Another failing of models—more accurately, of model 
builders—consists in an undue emphasis on exactness and rigor�”67 Used in this 
way, rigor too often is equated to precise quantification, usually in the form of 
increasing the number of significant figures relative to a decimal point� However, 
the tests of rigor are whether (1) the analytical techniques used are appropriate to 
the subject matter, (2) we can articulate clearly the details of the method used and 
how we arrived at conclusions, and ultimately (3) we can state what valid lessons 
the study produced� Employing analytical techniques that provide overly exact 
answers that do not reflect the uncertainties and indeterminacy inherent in the 
subject matter are not rigorous�
Rigor is related closely to objectivity� It demands careful attention to the de-
sign of a war game or combat/campaign simulation to achieve the objectivity 
described above� It also requires efforts to understand the quality of data used in 
quantitative models, estimating the range of uncertainty in quantitative results, 
and framing conclusions in quasi law–like statements that reflect the consensus 
and disagreement of those involved in the pseudoexperiment� New understand-
ings of chaos and complexity also raise questions regarding the treatment of hu-
man action in combat simulations�
A first test of rigor is the data used in quantitative and semantic modeling� The 
most reliable data are collected during operations or exercises that are essentially 
the same as those represented in the model� Operations research originated dur-
ing World War II with the collection of data, then the use of those data to develop 
models of the operation under study�68 Many of those models and the modeling 
techniques have persisted, but sustained efforts to collect data at sea or in the field 
are now rare� The 1973 GAO study found that in 85 percent of the cases submit-
ted to the researchers, DoD activities used data obtained from sources other than 
field exercises or actual experience�69
Beginning with its World War II experience involving malfunctioning tor-
pedoes, the U�S� submarine force began collecting data on every torpedo fired� 
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When tasked with creating an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability in 1949, 
Submarine Development Group 2 developed a process of designing exercises to 
test technology and tactics, collecting data on system and platform (including 
crew) performance during those exercises, using the submarine approach and at-
tack manual to standardize the data, and reconstructing the exercises to quantify 
the results�70 Using this process, the submarine force went from having essentially 
no ASW capability in 1949 to having the world’s premier ASW capability in 1969� 
The process led to continual improvement of the search and combat models used 
in war games and combat/campaign simulations� At-sea exercises discovered 
and corrected errors in search models implemented on computers�71 The Navy 
used a similar approach in its Tactical Development and Evaluation Program and 
some equipment-development programs in the 1970s and ’80s�72 However, oddly 
enough—given accelerating demands for data—as computer simulation became 
more popular in the Pentagon for platform and weapon systems analysis (what 
DoD calls program analysis), emphasis on prototyping equipment and collect-
ing data on processes and performance at sea and in the field waned� Structured 
operational testing and evaluation for systems in development largely replaced 
mission-oriented operations analysis involving all aspects of the system’s use and 
its effectiveness as one of a suite of systems�
Recent efforts to return to the roots of operations research have encountered 
difficulties� During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, initiatives to put analytical teams 
into the field were severely limited by commanders’ concerns about protecting 
the analysts—and controlling the data� Although we have been fighting in that 
region for a decade and a half, data on processes and performance from the field 
have not been the source for modeling and experimentation that they were in 
World War II�
The majority of friendly-force data used in computer-based combat/campaign 
simulation come from structured operational testing and evaluation of system 
performance (which may or may not reflect its performance in actual field/
fleet use, with different concepts of employment) or from expectations of future 
system performance based on key performance parameters used for design� 
However, data from structured tests have not proved reliable� In World War II, 
“experimental results overestimated the casualty production rate for tanks by a 
factor of two; for artillery duels by a factor of three; and for pure infantry actions 
by a factor of seven�” 73 Given the human penchant for survival and the fog and 
friction of war, structured tests provide overly optimistic estimates�
Lest you think we are better off now with modern computers and powerful algo-
rithms built into our best models, here is a more recent example� The U�S� Navy 
depends mightily for defense of the fleet on the Aegis missile system� Using data from 
controlled experiments at sea, one may calculate that if you shoot two missiles at an 
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incoming missile and they are operationally and statistically independent of each oth-
er, and if you also add some point defense, you can expect to shoot down 90 percent 
or more of the attacking anti-ship cruise missiles� What is the combat record? First, 
in battles at sea warships of other states have averaged around 75 percent success in 
defending themselves� On the other hand, all of their success must be attributed to 
soft kill and point defense weapons, not to surface-to-air missiles [SAMs]� Second, 
there are several instances of warships that might have defended themselves but did 
not, illustrated by the recent successful missile attack on the Israeli missile ship Hanit� 
Navy analysts will also remember the Exocet hits on the defendable USS Stark and 
HMS Sheffield� Third, in the entire record of over 220 missiles fired on ships at sea 
starting in 1967, only one anti-ship missile has been shot down by a SAM�74
Models predicted the United States would incur thirty thousand casualties in 
Operation DESERT STORM, not the roughly three hundred that actually occurred; 
and half of those casualties did not occur in battle�75 Models for casualty estimates 
almost never include friendly fire� Even when friendly-force data are available 
in a combat model, factors such as the reliability and effectiveness of allied and 
adversary weapons, the proficiency of an adversary in using counterfire or coun-
termeasures that depend on the adversary’s training, etc�, must be estimated� Key 
data disputes “often center around order of battle, unit effectiveness, munitions 
quantities, chemical warfare performance degrade values, advance rates, sortie 
rates, and concepts of operation [CONOPS]� More time is spent instantiating and 
refining CONOPS information than systems performance data� Hence the obvi-
ous utility of wargames to understand CONOPS and the flow of the warfight�”76
In World War II, the operations evaluation groups determined that a simple 
estimate of the error in a model is the individual percentage error of the data times 
the square root of the number of data elements� For a model with five thousand 
data entries and a tight error range of 10 percent, this equates to a factor of sev-
en�77 The 1973 GAO report found that 27 percent of the models they examined 
had over ten thousand coded instructions� Campaign models that DoD currently 
uses typically have on the order of one hundred thousand data elements and 
hundreds of equations and semantic models establishing the relationships among 
the data elements� Mistakes in the internal validity of computer models resulting 
from treating continuous functions as discrete and stipulating relationships for 
which no theory or data exist to allow computation compound the errors in the 
final calculation�78 Adding detail to a combat/campaign simulation may or may 
not improve the rigor, but it surely will increase the uncertainty of the calculation�
Understanding this principle, the members of the World War II Operations 
Evaluation Group used a hemibel (half a decibel, or a factor of about three) 
rule� If they could not demonstrate factor-of-three improvements in a recom-
mended change, they were uncertain that they had sufficient accuracy to merit 
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the recommendation, particularly considering the time and costs involved in 
changing operational practices� At a recent Military Operations Research Society 
workshop, a section leader informed me that military operations research no 
longer uses the hemibel rule� Why not is unclear�
The use of combat models to adjudicate war games is subject to the same 
concerns as is their use in campaign simulations� However, employing models 
that participants can question and umpires can explain adds both objectivity and 
rigor to the enterprise�
Whereas combat/campaign simulation requires the analyst/team to repre-
sent all indeterminacy as statistical, war gaming specifically addresses strategic 
and structural indeterminacy� Strategic indeterminacy means that the outcome 
largely is determined by the interaction of role-player decisions and the adjudica-
tion of control/umpires (who may be considered additional actors)� Structural in-
determinacy involves uncertainties in appropriately bounding the subject under 
study, determining which elements are relevant to include in characterizing the 
state of the world, and understanding the relationships among those elements� 
Manual games are good for the following:
• study of partially understood dynamic processes
• study of partially understood force interactions
• building of players’ backgrounds for future study and analysis
• continual game improvement on the basis of players’ criticisms79
Where the fundamental character of the subject under study involves strategic 
and structural indeterminacy, war-gaming techniques are more appropriate than 
combat/campaign simulation� Adding the data and formalities needed for com-
putation detracts from, rather than adds to, rigor�
Usefulness and Value. The final criterion for science under exploration is the 
value or usefulness of the study or, in our case, the pseudoexperiment� Useful-
ness is the ability to use the experiment to take appropriate action� It presumes 
objectivity and rigor�
DoD turned to computer-based combat/campaign simulation because it de-
sired methods that could produce rapid, objective, rigorous simulations to exam-
ine contingencies involving different adversaries to predict force requirements, 
study strategic/operational concepts, and compare costs and effects of alternative 
new platforms or weapons systems� DoD found these simulations useful in pro-
viding a common basis for making comparisons on a timeline consistent with 
annual program and budget development�
However, the “method of Monte Carlo [or any other form of combat/cam-
paign simulation] has one particular value: its educative or intuition-building 
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effect on those who behold the actual performance of the process� It allows the 
results of experimental variations of certain factors of the situation to be per-
ceived in a direct and life-like way� This appearance of realism is so great that 
it has often led observers to forget that they were not in fact observing nature 
directly: a disastrous error�”80
The predictive value of a large-scale, complicated combat/campaign com-
puter simulation depends on how the analyst/team represents the results� Good, 
scientific analysis of computer-based campaign simulation can support quasi 
laws such as the identification of governing factors, but not strictly statistical or 
deterministic answers� Also, the premise that changing the characteristics of one 
system while leaving the rest of the world the same can determine an outcome 
assumes no feedback between the change and the rest of the system (e�g�, that 
a change in combat capability will not influence commanders’ decisions and 
CONOPS)� However, DoD’s use of computer-based simulation seeks to predict 
outcomes rather than to develop deep understanding of the factors governing the 
outcomes of battles and campaigns� Rarely do reports address governing factors 
or attempt to quantify the uncertainties inherent in the simulation�81
When DoD clients are facing a decision, telling them that their simulation 
identified topics that require future study is rarely what they want to hear� How-
ever, failure to identify unresolved issues from the pseudoexperiment obfuscates 
important uncertainties that should be considered� Science values the so-called 
heuristic fertility of studies rich in implications for further observations, experi-
ment, or conceptualization�82
Making predictions from games presents challenges similar to making predic-
tions from combat/campaign simulations, with the added proviso that although 
there is widespread skepticism about accepting any prediction of human behavior 
—much less quantified predictions—from a game, predictions derived from 
computer models are widely accepted� Yet although experts making stand-alone 
predictions are unreliable, “[e]xperience has shown that people often tend to 
adopt the same solutions to similar problems� Insofar as this is true, a realistic war 
game may predict the future, or at least some aspects of it[,] quite accurately�”83 
Where games have preceded military battles and campaigns, they have dem-
onstrated value in anticipating adversary tactics and courses of action and the 
many governing factors needed to prosecute battles and campaigns successfully� 
Examples include the following:
• Naval War College (NWC) games anticipating tactics in the Russo-Japanese 
War
• battle of Tannenberg gaming by both the Russian and German general staffs
• German general staff gaming of the Schlieffen Plan before World War I
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• gaming different strategic approaches for a war with Japan at the College 
between the world wars
• Japanese gaming of the battle of Midway
• NWC gaming of the naval mining campaign against the Japanese in World 
War II
• German and Russian general staffs gaming the German invasion of Russia 
(Operation BARBAROSSA) in World War II
• Israelis’ gaming before their operations
• U�S� Joint Staff gaming in anticipation of North Vietnam’s Tet offensive
In almost all these cases, the games accurately predicted factors driving the 
success of future operations� However, in many cases the military system was 
unable to adapt in a timely fashion or the games had no effect on the political 
leadership conducting the war� Sometimes senior military leaders rejected game 
results�84
The Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG) conducted 
a game exploring the implications of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in February 
1990, before the actual invasion in August� Although the game had Iraqi forces 
advancing into Saudi Arabia toward the oil fields, otherwise it accurately an-
ticipated a need for nontraditional coalitions, challenges in strategic lift, and the 
inadequate numbers of precision weapons on deployed Navy forces, among other 
things�85 Yet many senior officials briefed on the game in March 1990 expressed 
no interest, viewing Iran rather than Iraq as the adversary of concern� Requests 
for game documents increased as Iraq conducted the invasion�
“Gaming is a powerful method for simultaneously mastering complexity, en-
hancing communication, stimulating creativity, and contributing to consensus 
and a commitment to action�”86 Thomas C� Schelling found the following: “First, 
the games are intensely stimulating; people are very active; ideas and conjectures 
get tossed around and analysed by a highly motivated group of people; a great 
deal of expertise is collected in a single room, expertise that is not often col-
lected together; and people discover facts, ideas, possibilities, capabilities, and 
arguments that do not in any way depend on the game but nevertheless emerge 
in it�” Players discover important facts that may never have occurred to them or 
are counter to what they understood (e�g�, unprecedented acts excite attention, 
jurisdictional seams, and overlaps), and ways that players not represented in their 
usual thinking affect the feasibility and acceptability of possible courses of action� 
[T]he game, as a social and intellectual occasion, tends to be highly productive of little 
things of this sort� � � �
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Second, people � � � learn more � � � about a country, by going through a game � � �  
than by any cram course [of equivalent time]� � � � If somebody were going to be re-
sponsible for some operations in the Pacific Islands, or were going to be Deputy Chief 
of Mission in Finland, or going to run an [Agency for International Development] 
program in Cyprus, just putting him[/her] into a game for three days focused on the 
area he[/she] is going to would teach him[/her] more than he[/she] could get by any 
kind of briefings, lectures, reading program, or other program of self-improvement�
Third, acquaintance is made with people with whom one might have occasion to 
work in the future involving intense common experience in joint problem solv-
ing� These by-products are just preliminary to costs� People can spend the other 
362 days of the year pursuing other forms of analysis and learning� “All analytical 
techniques, all research methods, all stimulants to the imagination are danger-
ous� This includes games� But games are not much worse in this regard than the 
other techniques�”87
A critique of current professional military education is that it does not give 
officers a detailed appreciation of military geography in theaters of interest or of 
adversaries’ weapons systems and their concepts for using them� Theater-level 
games are valuable for learning geography, including the military geography of 
basing; the kinds and ranges of adversary and allied forces that may come into 
play and the complications they represent; and the logic of adversary concepts, 
as represented by Red teams� At the tactical level, war games are good for teach-
ing junior officers the capabilities of adversary forces in an experiential way that 
tends to stick better than reading intelligence reports�88 As the Prussian and Ger-
man militaries recognized, games are exceptionally useful for developing an ap-
preciation of command relationships and skills in writing orders and in working 
through control of forces in complicated situations�
Between the world wars, the German army (Wehrmacht) conducted field 
exercises during the summer and gamed when in garrison the rest of the year� 
During winter, each echelon, from the general staff to the company level, gamed 
their roles in the operations contemplated, then took what they gamed to the field 
the next year, beginning with company-level exercises and culminating, usually 
in August, in as large-scale an exercise as they could manage� With the army re-
stricted in size by treaty, the games aimed to teach each rank, career enlisted and 
officer, how to perform at two ranks senior so the army could expand quickly� 
During war, these games became rehearsals for upcoming operations and occa-
sionally continued as battles were being fought� The games were of great value to 
the Wehrmacht for developing concepts such as the blitzkrieg, and for developing 
its operational competence when it had sufficient forces to retain the initiative�89
The interaction of experts trying to achieve opposing aims within the context 
provided in the scenario helps ensure that relevant factors are not overlooked� 
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Games provide a basis of shared experience and a common vocabulary�90 Where-
as creativity of the analyst in combat/campaign simulation is reflected in the 
coding and analysis, the Markov assumption does not allow for learning during 
the game� Including learning algorithms (e�g�, Bayesian calculations) in the code 
further complicates analysis of the results� In war games, the role players adapt to 
each state of the world, as provided by game umpires and control� Courses of ac-
tion that do not provide desired results lead to reexamining possible approaches 
and objectives� New ideas that do work become apparent to all participants, con-
tributing to the consensus needed to generate commitment to a course of action� 
Concerns over the appearance of realism in gaming represent the same risks and 
unintended consequences as those resulting from combat/campaign modeling�91
The scope of issues amenable to war gaming exceeds that of combat/campaign 
simulation� Manual war gaming is uniquely suited to increasing our understand-
ing of and appreciation for the information dimension of warfare�92 Ultimately, 
military operations are about influence: deterring or compelling change in others’ 
actions inconsistent with one’s political aims, while reassuring and encouraging 
others’ actions that are consistent with one’s political aims� The critical feature 
of a game, as opposed to computer modeling or any other forms of one-sided 
analysis,
is that at least two separate decision centers are involved, neither of which is privy to 
the other’s planning and arguing, neither of which has complete access to the other’s 
intelligence or background information, neither of which has any direct way of know-
ing everything that the other is deciding on� � � � What this mode of organization can 
do that can not otherwise be done is to generate the phenomena of understanding 
and misunderstanding, perception and misperception, bargaining, demonstrations, 
dares and challenger’s [sic], accommodation, coercion and intimidation, conveyance 
of intent, and uncertainty about what each other has already done or decided on� � � �
� � � If I draw a face with a hidden picture there is no way for me to tell how hard it is 
to see the face except to show the picture to somebody� � � � 
It is the peculiar element of collaboration, communication, and bargaining, that is 
involved in any crisis game, that cannot be captured by “straightforward” unilateral 
analysis� � � �
� � � [I]n arguments about the treasures or dangers that one may stumble on in games 
it is significant that there is at least something that games can do or generate that can-
not be done or generated in any other way�93
Another value is that those who participate in a pseudoexperiment learn far 
more than those who receive a report of the study’s findings� Few clients have the 
time or technical ability to understand the internal details of the combat/cam-
paign simulation; they instead rely on their analytical teams to distill key findings 
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relevant to the objectives of the study� In contrast, war gaming facilitates partici-
pation by those who must make and implement decisions� Joint planning dictates 
that, ideally, “the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of the 
COAs [courses of action]” should participate in the gaming used to develop those 
COAs�94 War gaming facilitates recognition-primed decision making that allows 
commanders and their staffs to adapt rapidly to emerging situations, using their 
experiences in games “demanding careful sequential analysis of plans, decisions, 
events, and intelligence�”95
IMPLICATIONS FOR DOD ANALYSIS AND A WAY AHEAD
The principal implication of this assessment is that DoD should overhaul its 
analytical paradigm that began with the Systems Analysis Office and evolved 
with the development of computers� DoD should rely on talented analysts and 
not again make the mistake of attempting to create universal answer machines 
through standardized processes and techniques� The focus of analysis for acquisi-
tion and force development should shift from individual weapons systems to ca-
pabilities to conduct sets of missions� DoD should reinvigorate the examination 
of warfare and military operations to develop an appreciation of fundamental 
questions to focus analysis, balancing a marketplace of ideas and approaches with 
the instincts of its hierarchy to centralize planning� It then should employ analy-
sis campaigns, using cycles of research focused on top decision makers’ concerns, 
that incorporate the following:
• war gaming
• DoD’s investment in large-scale campaign models, to develop intuition and 
help identify factors governing combat outcomes
• field/fleet operations analysis
• intelligence collection
• campaign analysis
• quantitative modeling using simple, understandable models that incorporate 
only governing factors derived from observation and analysis (as opposed to 
creating computer code for each combat process and adding more code to 
already complicated models to address new technologies and phenomena)
• the study of history and recent advances in complexity sciences, and comple-
mentary analytical techniques based on advances in artificial intelligence 
and cognitive and social sciences
• review of study results against actual operations
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No new analysis paradigm can meet scientific standards without addressing 
the roadblocks created by the abuse of need-to-know strictures and proprietary 
control of analyses�
Avoiding Past Mistakes
With the recent policy to make more use of war gaming, the first principle for 
a way forward should be to avoid mistakes of the past� Efforts to use large-scale 
computer modeling to create universal answer machines were misguided� In its 
search for systematic analysis routines, the natural tendency of the Pentagon will 
be to create similar standardized systems of war gaming that would allow those 
developing procurement programs and strategists to “turn the crank” to address 
issues as they arise� However, even the most objective and rigorous efforts in the 
past have not produced the desired results, as the following examples indicate�
RAND Strategy Assessment System. In the 1980s, concerns over the ability to 
analyze a possible war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact leading to a nuclear 
exchange motivated the OSD Office of Net Assessment to sponsor RAND in de-
veloping the RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS)� The approach was to 
combine the best features of war gaming and analytical modeling in a comprehen-
sive, farsighted framework for comparing views rigorously and moving toward 
some conclusions� RAND formed a stellar team to do the work, led by Paul Davis�
To this effort, war gaming provided the following: 
• the contextual richness of complete scenarios
• interaction of political and military factors
• operational constraints
• often-ignored features of real war (e�g�, unconventional attacks against 
command-and-control communications)
• asymmetries in objectives and perceptions
• asymmetries in national forces, doctrines, and styles
• relatively realistic descriptions of military campaigns
• action and reaction among the nations involved in the conflict 
Analytical modeling provided the following:
• clarity of assumptions and causality
• reproducibility
• logical structure and rigor
• efficiency, permitting many war games (multiscenario analysis)
• depersonalization, by laying issues out on paper logically96
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To make gaming more efficient and rigorous, the RSAS approach used AI 
techniques to replace human teams� To make the process transparent, the de-
sign permitted human interaction at all levels, with the exception of some core 
model and execution coding� The intent was not to eliminate the role of expert 
judgment but “to capture most of the human-expert contribution in background 
research reflected in the models�”97 Computer code was written so that analysts 
knowledgeable in the subject matter did not need to have extensive experience 
to read and program decision rules�98 The team intended that analysts and senior 
decision makers would be able to get definitive explanations and have the op-
portunity to change assumptions readily�
Departures from traditional analysis included automated game-based simu-
lation to permit multiscenario analysis, heuristic rule-based modeling to make 
explicit the key assumptions on which outcomes depend, structured military 
campaign analysis, and interactive force-operations modeling� This would enable 
the analysis to treat interrelationships among strategic and nonstrategic forces; 
cut across theater boundaries, military services, and types of warfare; and reflect 
the effects of special phenomena such as unconventional warfare and failures in 
command and control�99 The aim was not to predict outcomes but to understand 
what affected outcomes most�
In 1986, government agencies received the first installations of RSAS� An 
RSAS Steering Group, consisting of sponsors, developers, and users, approved 
requests to use the system� Although the RAND team intended that actual deci-
sion makers use the system for policy analysis, it proved too complicated to be 
of use in evaluating immediate operational situations, and high-level decision 
makers turned to their own analysts� RSAS was open to review, critique, and 
improvement� The challenge was that it was akin to an engineering library� One 
could investigate any subject, but only the developers could comprehend the 
whole system�100
As a spin-off from RSAS, RAND developed the Joint Integrated Contingency 
Model (JICM)� It designed the model to be modular for transparency and to 
avoid needing to add hundreds of thousands of input variables� “As the model 
[JICM] was used in later years, however, the optional simplicity fell into disuse as 
users focused on getting the detailed databases ‘right’ (meaning agreed upon) for 
running standardized cases�”101
Although RSAS and JICM were as objective, rigorous, and comprehensive as 
was practical, the limited interests and capacity of the DoD bureaucracy defeated 
RAND’s sophisticated efforts to meet exacting standards of science�
Joint Warfare System. In a subsequent effort to allay concerns over the services 
using their own scenarios, models, and data, in the 1990s OSD began funding 
the Joint Warfare System (JWARS) to “support multi-billion dollar resource 
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allocation decisions and critical operational planning�” JWARS was “a closed-
form analytic simulation” using deterministic and stochastic models, including 
information operations, and “high-level abstractions of sensor and communi-
cations systems, the related information flows, imperfect perception of the bat-
tlespace, and command decision making�”102 The aim, as with individual service 
campaign simulations, has been to create a simulation to determine the effects of 
varying the characteristics of a system or concept by turning a crank, leaving the 
rest of the simulation unperturbed�
Given the expansiveness of the state space, the use of models and data based 
on judgment rather than observations from operations or exercises, and the likely 
feedback among systems characteristics and concepts, this approach involves 
large uncertainties that are difficult to quantify� As Koopman stated, “Rightly 
employed, it [combat simulation] gives a useful indicator in evaluations; it can 
never be relied on to predict the future�”103 JWARS was expensive, yet could not 
accomplish the vision of those who conceived and advocated for it�
Analytic Agenda / Support to Strategic Analysis. Given the expense and chal-
lenges of JWARS, in 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald H� Rumsfeld created an 
Analytic Agenda (now called Support to Strategic Analysis—SSA) to transform 
DoD’s analysis system supporting strategic and programmatic decision making� 
The Analytic Agenda was a set of activities designed to do the following:
• Articulate, through scenarios, the secretary’s guidance to the department 
about the missions, environments, and threats for which the future force 
should be prepared�
• Apply joint concepts to future missions depicted in planning scenarios�
• Produce standardized, accessible, transparent data and common assump-
tions for department-wide use in analysis�
• Design and conduct major joint analyses to support decisions on force struc-
ture, investments, and capability trade-offs�104
This effort did result in scenarios for analysis approved by DoD leadership, 
and it created conferences at which the services met to agree on common datasets 
they would use in their analyses� Each service was assured of having one of its 
preferred scenarios included� The services also used their preferred “all-purpose” 
campaign simulations for their capability-development processes, incorporating 
data beyond that in the common datasets as needed� However, few of these data 
came from detailed analyses of operations and exercises� These efforts have had 
little impact on cross-service force structure investments or capability trade-offs�
The details of studies done using these simulations are classified and propri-
etary, limiting opportunities for review of their objectivity and rigor� OSD, the 
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   89 12/15/16   1:53 PM
95
War College: Winter 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 9 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Joint Staff, and the services should take care not to create a similar, highly struc-
tured set of expensive, complex, proprietary war games�
No defense problem is specified well enough that an optimum can be calculated 
without employing subjective judgment to establish values� The large campaign 
simulations used for SSA result in large sets of feasible courses of action� Expect-
ing large combat/campaign simulations or war games to resolve conflicting pref-
erences among institutional forces within the military-industrial-congressional 
enterprise that drive the defense program and budget is illogical�105 Improve-
ments to JWARS or the SSA are incapable of providing the precise predictions for 
resolving complicated and complex defense issues that those who misunderstand 
scientific rigor expect� “As one goes up the scale of complexity, the personal quali-
ties of the analyst shift from scientific to artistic and his[/her] model from precise 
to abstract� That is why asking me which model to buy is asking the wrong ques-
tion� Instead, ask me which analysts and modelers to hire�”106
Capabilities-Based Planning
DoD’s acquisition system, which consumes the vast majority of the Pentagon’s 
attention and analytical effort, focuses on major defense acquisition programs—
platforms and systems that involve the commitment of billions of dollars�107 Un-
der Secretary Rumsfeld, DoD attempted to introduce capabilities-based planning 
as a means of putting the development of individual weapons systems in context� 
Capabilities-based planning has received rough treatment in recent reviews for 
being tied to the revolution in military affairs and force transformation, focus-
ing on concepts such as net-centric warfare rather than on strategy to defeat the 
strategies and forces of identified potential adversaries� These critiques largely 
miss the mark�108
The usual driver for acquisition is that an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel is reaching 
the point where it is expensive to maintain or upgrade with new technology, and 
a military service proposes to replace that platform with a new one incorporat-
ing the latest generation of technology� A 1992 study of the cost growth of DoD 
Major Force Program categories since Secretary McNamara instituted them in 
1962 demonstrated that DoD needs 7 percent growth in its budget to maintain 
its force structure if it continues attempting to replace each platform with the 
latest generation on a one-for-one basis�109 Using the rule of 72, this means that 
a 4 percent growth in defense budgets results in halving the force roughly each 
quarter of a century�110
Following the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD made an effort to in-
stitute “strategic and tactical” acquisition reform�111 A major part of the reform 
involved pilot Evaluation of Alternatives on topics such as integrated air and mis-
sile defense as a basis for resource allocation, rather than conducting an Analysis 
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of Alternatives for each major defense acquisition program� The effort demon-
strated promise, but failed when key leaders departed� Also, weapons program 
managers wanted to know what the study would show before providing their data 
for analysis, despite direction from higher authorities�
If DoD is to overcome its accelerating mismatch between limited budgets and 
growing challenges, it requires a new analysis paradigm and a culture focused 
more on national security than on protecting parochial service and program 
priorities by withholding knowledge and data�
Asking Essential Questions and Selecting Appropriate Methods
Adoption of a new analysis paradigm will involve some time before the paradigm 
becomes institutional practice within DoD, and will incur transition costs� DoD 
should ensure that initial efforts focus on substantive issues� In the 1950s and 
’60s, federally funded research centers led the way in understanding the implica-
tions of nuclear weapons for warfare and deterrence� RAND employed Bernard 
Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas C� Schelling, Albert J� Wohlstetter, and Roberta 
M� Wohlstetter, among many other highly talented intellects, to explore funda-
mental questions of war in the nuclear age, strategy and games, and many other 
topics� Now, federally funded research and analysis centers have become princi-
pally an extension of Pentagon staff studies� Funding for independent research 
on fundamental questions has been eliminated in favor of studying the issue du 
jour, which eliminates many fundamental distinctions between federally funded 
research centers and for-profit defense contractors� In addition to making better 
use of its Office of Net Assessment, which under the leadership of the recently 
retired Andrew W� Marshall (who came to OSD from RAND in the 1970s) had a 
long history of searching for the right questions, DoD should return to the for-
mer model and mission for federally funded research centers, having them help 
DoD’s leadership understand the questions they should be asking and the issues 
they should analyze�
DoD should realize that the principal value of good analysis is in eliminat-
ing infeasible or unsuitable courses of action, and that no analyses can provide 
point solutions to complicated problems� Prevailing concepts and political power 
among those involved will determine the final trade-offs in defense policy and 
plans within the space of feasible and suitable solutions� Centralized processes 
that give too much power to one institution, such as OSD or the Joint Staff, are 
likely to generate more mistakes than a messier analytical competition among 
concepts, methods, and proposed solutions� The Secretaries of Defense must 
earn their pay�
That said, different subjects call for different analytical approaches� In turn-
ing to war gaming, DoD should avoid the law of the instrument�112 To improve 
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rigor, the Military Operations Research Society should assist DoD in developing 
guidelines for analysts to align analytical techniques with the fundamental char-
acteristics of subjects under study�
The most appropriate action from pseudoexperimentation, whether war gaming 
or combat/computer simulation, is exploring the validity of the findings using 
other techniques� Analysis campaigns involve using a variety of techniques to 
address important issues� Cycles of research emphasize the interaction among 
these techniques as progress in one investigation informs others and is in turn 
informed by them�
Learning from RSAS and decades of experience in defense analysis, Davis 
recommends analysis campaigns� “The analysis campaign should provide for 
breadth with a mix of models, human gaming, historical analysis, trend analysis, 
and collaboration with experienced operators,” and should consider multiple 
objectives� The approach is to conduct first-cut analyses to narrow the world 
under consideration, then to conduct detailed analyses� “Campaign models, for 
example—when used with large negotiated databases for only some standard 
case—are poor decision aids but are excellent for integration, for understanding 
the many facets of a successful large operation, and for building analyst expertise 
that is valuable in answering specific questions quickly, often with simpler mod-
els�”113 As an example of first-cut analysis considering multiple objectives, Hughes 
recommends examining alternative futures�
For example, in determining the best naval forces to influence China and our Asian 
allies, it is essential to remember that the same American ships and aircraft, many 
of which are built for 30 and even 40 years of combat life, must serve our interests 
whether the China-American international relationship at any given moment is 
one of cooperation, competition, crisis containment, or conflict at different levels 
of intensity� By testing our fleet’s utility in each circumstance we can judge how and 
where risks are involved with different fleet compositions and deployment patterns� 
The OSD Office of Net Assessment found that looking at alternative futures by region 
or economic circumstance was powerful� One did not make predictions about which 
future was most likely to come to pass� Instead [one] looked for common forces, solu-
tions, deployments and negotiating positions that were suited for every future�114
Scenario planning has proved an effective technique for resolving structural 
indeterminacy�115 Davis provides a comprehensive matrix of instruments (tech-
niques) assessed by important attributes to be considered in an analysis cam-
paign�116 The discussion below represents the author’s appreciation of techniques 
essential to cycles of research�
War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation. War gaming and combat/
campaign simulation are complementary to each other� Both provide insight to 
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participants on factors governing the contingency under study and issues and 
data needing further study� War games are particularly valuable for helping 
those employing DoD’s large, computer-based campaign models to understand 
CONOPS and the flow of campaigns�117
Fleet/Field Operations Analysis. Games and combat simulation should tie direct-
ly to field/fleet exercises experimenting with new concepts, using prototype sys-
tems designed to address capability enhancements, and carefully collecting data 
to inform important areas of ignorance and assumptions used in plans, games, 
and campaign simulation�
The approach and attack manual served as a basis for data collection to 
advance U�S� submarine force capabilities rapidly, as did the coordination-in-
direct-support (CIDS) fleet exercise guide for operational data on fleet commu-
nications� The analysis based on these data demonstrated that a CIDS concept 
for using submarines as an outer screen for aircraft carriers was infeasible� The 
fleet communications data, collected in ten fleet exercises over a two-year period 
in the late 1970s, provided the basis for the Warfare Environment Simulator, a 
simulation sponsored by Naval Electronics System Command (now the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Command) focused on command and control� Un-
fortunately, the Warfare Environment Simulator morphed into the Naval Warfare 
Simulation System, losing its focus on using fleet data and on command and 
control, instead becoming a large-scale campaign simulation�118
NWC war games served as the basis for developing new operational concepts 
to be explored at sea, both before World War II and during the 1980s and ’90s� 
Fleet exercises in the 1920s and ’30s turned concepts for amphibious and carrier 
air warfare and underway replenishment of naval task forces into key capabilities 
for the World War II effort� Fleet exercises in the 1980s translated operational 
concepts developed by the CNO SSGs (at the College) into capabilities to execute 
the 1980s Maritime Strategy�119 Similarly, in the 1990s, the Navy Warfare Devel-
opment Command (then collocated at the College) pursued fleet experimenta-
tion through a program called Sea Trial� However, the Navy did not sustain that 
effort� A debate exists over whether dedicated units are required to conduct such 
experimentation� The submarine force since 1949, the Navy Tactical Develop-
ment and Evaluation Program in the 1970s, and U�S� Pacific Command around 
2000 have made experimentation a matter of routine during fleet and joint exer-
cises� Data collected from routine rather than structured exercises better repre-
sents what would occur in unstructured combat and operations�
As part of war-gaming initiatives, OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services should 
reinvigorate field/fleet experimentation and embed operations analysts in de-
ployed battalions and carrier strike groups and on higher-echelon staffs to collect 
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data on operations and exercises� For large programs and issues, exercise and 
operations analysis guides using conceptual processes would provide consistent 
datasets for analysis and use in pseudoexperimentation� Those educated in engi-
neering and the hard sciences are likely to perform in the field as well as or better 
than those educated in operations research curricula emphasizing mathematical 
programming (optimization) and stochastic processes�120
Cyber warfare should receive particular attention, given current challenges in 
creating operational models� Beyond Red teams, white hats should experiment 
in the field with what it would take to turn unmanned systems into kamikazes at-
tacking their host forces, for example, before making large investment decisions�
Intelligence Collection. War games also should be tied to intelligence collection 
and analysis� While military intelligence naturally tends to focus on possible ad-
versary technical capabilities (e�g�, range and accuracy of weapons), war games 
require Red teams that understand adversary planning, training, ethos, and op-
erational concepts� Similarly, war games also suggest adversary courses of ac-
tion that would create difficulty for the Blue team� Therefore, war-game findings 
should play into intelligence requirements to determine whether adversaries have 
identified and are preparing to execute such courses of action�
Campaign Analysis. Rather than using war games or large campaign models that 
require significant amounts of time to set up, rapid, focused analyses on the eve 
of war have demonstrated value in anticipating important outcomes� Shortly be-
fore each war began, Captain/Professor Wayne Hughes gave Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) students seventy-two hours to analyze the Falklands War between 
the United Kingdom and Argentina, the wars in Afghanistan, and the wars in 
Iraq� These analyses all provided results that would have been valuable to the 
commanders involved�121 The key is selecting appropriate measures for quantifi-
cation� Selecting appropriate analytical measures begins with developing an ap-
preciation for the principal factors governing outcomes, and often is not done 
well�122
What useful results reasonably can be expected from war gaming and rapid 
campaign analysis, since accurate results cannot be expected? At NPS, Hughes 
teaches the students in his joint campaign analysis course that these war-gaming 
and campaign analyses provide the following: 
• patterns of activity, both tactical and operational; the reward of new tactics 
to accompany new technology
• a focusing by decision makers and their staffs on the important things—
those most likely to influence the outcome and achieve “victory,” or whatever 
the intended outcome is
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   94 12/15/16   1:53 PM
100
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11
 HA N L E Y  9 5
• synthesized information about almost anything: the traffic, the places of 
concealment, the beaches, the mountain passes to block, the critical roads, or 
the vital bridges to protect or destroy; and, perhaps most important because 
it is calculable, the time to arrive on scene and the logistical support neces-
sary to sustain operations
• advice to the decision maker that is quantitative, objective, informed,  
specific—and incomplete
• unexpected side benefits; for example, in designing a warship one might dis-
cover that it is not a good idea to put too many eggs in one basket if the ship 
can be lost while performing a dangerous task123 
Observe that predicting outcomes, or even winners by some criterion, does 
not appear on the list� Hughes is a great proponent of campaign analysis and its 
value—if one does not claim too much predictive power from it� Decisions have 
to be made amid uncertainty, and informed decisions are better than those based 
on individual experience and personal predilections alone�124
Simple versus Large Combat Models. Good analysis derives from understanding 
those few essential features of the subject under study that govern an outcome�125 
Although using models to understand essential features is valuable, attempting 
to predict outcomes by adding ever more detail without considering the impli-
cations for additional uncertainty is antithetical to analysis� Campaign analyses 
and manual war games employing simple, focused combat models and rules that 
are understood and subject to question by all participants can expose the factors 
that govern success—i�e�, those on which commanders and capability developers 
should focus�
Barring a more exact method for quantifying the uncertainty of a combat 
simulation, the analyst should estimate the typical error involved in the variables 
used in the models, multiply that times the square root of the number of vari-
ables, and present and report the result as the range of uncertainty in the quan-
titative findings� Although simulations are of great value in providing insights to 
analysts, analysts should be appropriately humble in recommending program or 
policy changes solely on the basis of the outcomes of their models�
Complexity Sciences. Advances in complexity sciences raise questions regarding 
current combat models and present new opportunities for defense analyses� The 
combat models used in war gaming and campaign simulations were developed 
before more recent improvements in understanding chaos and complexity� Chaos 
involves sensitivity to initial conditions on a space of measure zero� In a space of 
measure zero, no matter how precise an interval, area, or n-dimensional volume 
around an initial state, there exist points that will result in far different future 
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states of the system� A pendulum hung amid three magnets—such as Clause-
witz described in explaining the pulls of government (reason), the population 
(primordial violence), and the military (chance) in war—is such a chaotic sys-
tem� Classical physics and statistics, as discussed above, presume that describ-
ing the initial state allows prediction of future states, at least with probabilities� 
The foundations for statistics on spaces of measure zero are not well understood� 
Mathematics based on continuity does not apply in chaotic and in many complex 
systems�
Complexity involves power laws� Power laws have a mean, but unlike Poisson 
or Gaussian distributions, their standard distribution is infinity�126 The law of 
large numbers does not apply to power laws� Power laws apply to phenomena 
such as earthquakes—and to much of human behavior that involves bursts of 
activity�127 Historically, a small number of pilots and submarine commanders ac-
count for the most kills� Is this a power law? If so, how do combat models account 
for the distribution of talent among pilots and commanders? More broadly, how 
many events treated statistically in combat/campaign simulation involve chaotic 
and complex phenomena that make Monte Carlo processes and Markov assump-
tions inappropriate?
Warfare is renowned for extended periods of boredom followed by bursts of 
intense activity during battle� The outcome of battles is determined by tens to 
107 motivated agents performing individual functions that are more difficult to 
represent than molecules in a liquid or gas� Agent-based models involve agents 
executing rules based on the local information they have� These models are 
known for demonstrating emergent behavior, such as the collapse of a line of 
troops when adjacent soldiers retreat�128
Fundamental features of warfare suggest chaos and complexity sciences 
may be more fruitful for understanding underlying phenomena than current 
models�129
History, Cognitive and Social Sciences, and Artificial Intelligence. The cycle of 
research for war gaming and combat/campaign simulation also extends to study-
ing history and developments in social science, including experimental gaming 
on human behavior (such as in behavioral economics) and cognitive science 
studying developments in understanding the brain, etc�, to explore human rea-
soning and dynamics�
AI has had recent success in defeating human champions in games such as 
chess and Go, and increasingly is embedded in computers and weapons� Having 
people who understand AI on a team conducting analysis campaigns will add 
considerable value to the effort�
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Reviewing Previous Results. A final area of emphasis in a cycle of research is 
reviewing previous results�
Clearly war gaming and campaign simulations are a blend of an objective, scientific 
approach and the artistry of human designers and participants� What can be done to 
evaluate how well individual studies, or a series of mutually reinforcing games, simu-
lations, results, and conclusions have aided decision makers? One thing that is rarely 
done is to review “old” studies and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses after the 
projected future scenario year has passed� It is too much to ask, perhaps, for an evalu-
ation of the study results and conclusion and it is exceedingly difficult to evaluate any 
study’s impact on decisions it was to have enlightened�130
An objective examination of the scenario, the Red and Blue forces available, 
and the Red and Blue force combat capabilities after the fact can consider how 
well the study anticipated reality�131 Independent review of key features of the 
analysis will contribute to objectivity and rigor and help to identify analytical 
techniques appropriate to the subject matter�
The extent to which pseudoexperiments, whether war games or combat/ 
campaign simulations, are scientific depends wholly on the character of their 
execution� “Electronic computers, game-theoretic models, and statistical for-
mulas are but instruments after all; it is not they that produce scientific results 
but the investigator who uses them�”132 Neither type of simulation is inherently 
more scientific than the other� The principal difference is that combat/campaign 
simulation is analytical—reducing the problem to constituent pieces—while war 
gaming emphasizes synthesis—ensuring all relevant factors are considered, in-
cluding how they work together�
War gaming and large-scale computer-based combat/campaign simulation 
differ little in their inability to predict quantitative outcomes� The scientific value 
of the pseudoexperiment lies in the objectivity, rigor, and usefulness of the theory 
the pseudoexperiment represents� This includes the motivations, tastes and be-
liefs, and expertise of all the participants, including the client�
War gaming has a record of anticipating factors that largely govern outcomes, 
thus preventing surprise� Because DoD has used combat/campaign simulation 
for quantitative prediction, its performance at comparing quantitative results of 
combat models with actual combat has been less accurate and less reliable than 
that of war gaming that explored the processes and nonquantitative features that 
would affect a campaign most� Whereas those commanding and conducting op-
erations rarely have the motivation and skills to become deeply involved in com-
bat/campaign modeling, they can make the time and do have the skills to par-
ticipate in war gaming� Repeated war gaming can provide firsthand experiences 
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to limit surprise and facilitate recognitive decision making that allows rapid 
adaptation to emerging situations�
Using governing factors uncovered through war gaming, detailed computer 
models, campaign analyses, or other techniques to create simple models of the 
phenomena requires much more analytical skill than adding detailed models 
of additional processes to existing computer models� Simpler models provide 
greater understanding with appropriate precision than complicated computer 
models with large numbers of variables that give an appearance of precision but 
whose range of uncertainty is difficult to estimate and grows with the uncertainty 
of each parameter added and the square root of the number of variables�
Returning to the roots of operations research—observing, modeling opera-
tions, and collecting data in the field—is an essential aspect of a cycle of research� 
Work in the field yields data and knowledge that increase understanding of which 
concepts actually work and which do not, and provides essential data for use in 
computer and war-gaming simulation�
Although the discussion of questions and possibilities raised by developments 
in complexity sciences is incomplete, it suggests a need to reexamine combat 
models and to extend analytical techniques to add the rigor of appropriate tech-
niques to combat simulation�
The Pentagon needs to overhaul its analysis paradigm if it is to meet growing 
security challenges with limited budgets� Overhauling the Pentagon’s analysis 
paradigm again will require interdisciplinary teams of scientists—from both hard 
and social sciences, and with an appreciation for the humanities—interacting in 
analysis campaigns and cycles of research� Client and contractor use and abuse 
of need-to-know security barriers and proprietary restrictions on studies present 
formidable obstacles to implementing scientific standards in DoD studies�
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A HIMALAYAN CHALLENGE
 Ever since 1962, when soldiers from the People’s Republic of China inflicted a humiliating defeat on Indian forces, India and China have maintained an 
uneasy coexistence along the world’s longest disputed frontier.1 While certain as-
pects of the Sino-Indian security dynamic have improved markedly, others have 
given rise to growing unease. On the positive side of the ledger, the two nations 
have succeeded in avoiding a direct, armed conflict since a bloody skirmish in 
1967, and have developed a number of confidence-building measures to prevent 
isolated incidents from spiraling out of control. Similarly, neither country any 
longer actively sponsors proxies or foments insurgencies on the other’s soil. Ana-
lysts also have pointed to the relative stability of the Sino-Indian nuclear dyad, 
which does not appear to present the same escalatory risks as the India-Pakistan 
strategic relationship.2
Other issues and developments, however, are cause for concern. While the 
Sino-Indian relationship may have become less overtly conflictual, the military 
rivalry between the two rising Asian powers has taken on different aspects and 
has spread to new theaters. In addition to their long-standing border dispute, 
there is now a maritime component to the Sino-Indian rivalry.3 Meanwhile, 
enduring sources of tension—such as China’s 
military support of Pakistan and India’s harboring 
of the Tibetan government in exile—continue to 
act as spoilers. Despite nineteen rounds of negotia-
tions at the time of this writing, India and China 
have yet to define clearly the extent of many por-
tions of their border—still officially designated as 
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the Line of Actual Control (LAC)—let alone resolve the issue. Finally, certain 
ongoing trends in Chinese strategic behavior—whether in China’s near seas or 
along the Sino-Indian border—have generated grave concern in New Delhi, 
whose vocal strategic community regularly points to a perceived recrudescence 
in Chinese border incursions.
Following one particularly tense standoff in 2013, the Indian government 
confirmed the creation of a long-discussed new Mountain Strike Corps, with the 
professed goal of reinforcing India’s conventional deterrent along the Sino-Indian 
border. This massive accretion in manpower was presented as part of a larger, 
more-sustained Indian effort to address a perceived growing military imbalance 
with China. A core component of this effort has been to reinforce India’s basing 
and transport infrastructure in a singularly austere operating environment. These 
developments have been commented on widely, both in India and abroad. Yet 
there has been a surprising lack of granular analysis of the Sino-Indian military 
dynamic, whether in terms of the two states’ respective orders of battle, competi-
tive advantages and disadvantages, or theater strategies.
Drawing on field trips to the Himalayan border states of Sikkim, Himachal 
Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir as well as close to thirty interviews with intelli-
gence officials and Indian Army (IA) and special forces officers, both serving and 
retired, this article aims to give a clearer picture of the security situation along 
the Sino-Indian border. In particular, it questions whether the Indian military’s 
current operational concepts are sufficiently tailored to the nature of the terrain 
and the evolving Chinese challenge. It suggests a more proactive approach to ter-
ritorial defense, one that places a greater emphasis on the integration of forward- 
deployed, highly mobile teams of Indian special operations forces (SOFs) coupled 
with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision-
strike capabilities, and complemented by an extensive network of tribal scouts 
and militias.
To develop this argument, this article proceeds in three substantive parts. The 
first briefly summarizes the current military “state of play” along the border, out-
lining both countries’ respective orders of battle, modernization plans, and op-
erational concepts. It argues that, while possibilities for greater escalation always 
exist, in the near- to medium-term future any Sino-Indian territorial conflict is 
likely to be relatively limited in scope and short in duration, rather than a pro-
tracted, large-scale, force-on-force campaign.4 Such a conflict also would differ 
in a number of key characteristics from the war of 1962, most notably in that it 
would take place under a nuclear shadow and with the likely involvement of air, 
space, and cyber assets.
The second section conducts a survey of the literature on special operations 
and mountain warfare, and reflects on the role that Indian SOFs could play in 
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the event of a limited Sino-Indian border war� Their potential function as a force 
multiplier is examined along three axes, or spectra, of conflict: their ability to 
counter acts of creeping coercion, or “gray-zone aggression”; their aptitude to 
perform vital enabling functions in mutually denied or deeply contested areas; 
and their capacity to wage special warfare campaigns across the Plateau of Tibet� 
Throughout, the article draws attention to the distinct geographic characteristics 
of the putative battle space; the high elevations, harsh temperatures, and rugged 
topography of many critical subregions along the border would have a defining 
impact on any combat operations�
The third and final section evaluates whether India has developed the requi-
site capabilities to implement such a nimble, proactive strategy� It examines this 
question through a tripartite lens, focusing on the operational, institutional, and 
political-strategic barriers to implementing such a strategic shift� The research 
findings are summarized in the conclusion�
THE SINO-INDIAN MILITARY DYNAMIC ALONG THE LAC: THE 
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Certain misperceptions endure regarding the military balance along the Sino-
Indian border� The most common is that China’s localized military strength 
along the LAC far outweighs India’s�5 In reality, India possesses a clear advantage 
in sheer number of troops� With regard to airpower, New Delhi also holds some-
thing of an edge over its trans-Himalayan rival, even though it may be eroding 
rapidly—in large part owing to the continued hemorrhaging of India’s fighter 
fleet and the growing density and sophistication of China’s integrated air defense 
system (IADS) in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)�6 The vulnerability of 
India’s air-basing infrastructure to artillery and missile strikes is, as we shall see, 
another concern� When it comes to mobile and lightweight artillery—perhaps 
one of the most critical factors, given the nature of the terrain—China holds the 
upper hand, in large part because of India’s unending procurement woes in this 
domain�7
However, a simple bean-counting approach to the Sino-Indian military bal-
ance, based on various correlations of forces, rapidly reveals its limits� Indeed, 
analysts long have pointed to the manifold difficulties inherent in measuring 
military power and effectiveness� A nation’s “conversion capability,” or its capacity 
to convert resources into a balanced, well-trained, and technologically proficient 
force, is a key metric when gauging military power�8 Another is its ability to tailor 
its strategies and force structure effectively to the nature of the threat it faces�9
When examining the continental dimensions of the Sino-Indian military ri-
valry, four factors are important to keep in mind�
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   106 12/15/16   1:53 PM
112
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11
 R E H M A N  1 0 7
M
A
P 
1
TH
E 
SI
N
O
-I
N
D
IA
N
 B
O
R
D
ER
So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
r’s
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n,
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
G
oo
gl
e 
M
ap
s.
6852_Rehman.indd   107 12/16/16   9:52 AM
113
War College: Winter 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 1 0 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
The first is the difference between the countries’ territorial defense postures� 
Whereas India maintains a large (and growing) body of troops relatively close to 
the border, China’s military presence in the TAR is more limited� In accordance 
with its doctrine on frontier defense, China stations most of its conventional 
forces in its interior, to be surged in times of crisis�10 This posture has been facili-
tated by the impressive development of China’s highway and high-speed railway 
networks, particularly the extension of the Qinghai–Tibet railway�11 These logisti-
cal feats have not been lost on Indian planners, who estimate that Beijing could 
dispatch several divisions to the LAC within a few days�12
The second defining factor is the nature of the climate and terrain� Topograph-
ically, different portions of the LAC vary substantially� Areas along the Indian 
side are not amenable to mechanized warfare, except certain parts of Ladakh 
and northern Sikkim� Owing to the high elevations of the Plateau of Tibet, Chi-
nese ground forces benefit from some commanding advantages—they overlook 
many Indian forward positions, rendering surveillance and artillery operations 
easier to execute—and are better acclimatized physiologically to high-altitude 
warfare�13 On the other hand, the altitudes of the TAR make high-tempo air 
campaigns more difficult: at very high altitudes jet engines take longer to ignite 
owing to lower air density, and fighter aircraft are constrained in terms of their 
overall payload capacity� The weather also can have an inordinate impact on the 
planning and conduct of military operations: in mountainous environments, me-
teorological conditions are highly unpredictable and can shift drastically within 
a few hours�14 Extreme cold, altitude, and weather affect almost every element of 
military equipment, ranging from artillery cannon to helicopter rotors�15 Even 
precision-guided aerial munitions can undergo significant performance varia-
tions at very high altitudes�16 During the harsh winters, certain mountain passes 
can be inaccessible temporarily, while other regions, such as Aksai Chin, para-
doxically can be rendered more passable for heavy vehicles by the presence of a 
thicker layer of frost and ice� In Arunachal Pradesh, some of the world’s heaviest 
quantities of rainfall regularly cause landslides, disrupting motorized traffic and 
troop movements�
The third major factor is the infrastructure disparity along the LAC� Whereas 
Chinese troops can gain rapid access to most areas along the LAC, Indian troops 
often have to trek several hours, if not days, to attain certain areas�17 The People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) also benefits from a much more robust, multilayered 
communications architecture, having laid fiber-optic cabling and installed nu-
merous small-aperture terminal satellite stations�18
Finally, the two nations have erected very different command structures along 
the border� Whereas in India the responsibility for the defense of the LAC is di-
vided among several regional army and air force commands, in February 2016 
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China announced a major military rezoning that folded the former Chengdu and 
Lanzhou Military Regions into one unified western theater command�19 This will 
have an impact on China’s military effectiveness in the event of conflict, noted 
one Indian defense analyst, allowing for greater unity of effort and a “more ratio-
nalized marshalling of military resources�”20
CHINA’S REVITALIZED WAR-ZONE STRATEGY AND THE  
EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
China’s Revitalized War-Zone Strategy
Chinese war planning traditionally has placed a heavy emphasis on preemptive 
military action as a means of seizing the initiative and throwing an adversary off 
balance� Considered under the overarching rubric of active defense, PLA opera-
tions in the Korean War of the early 1950s, the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and the 
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 all have been qualified by Chinese analysts as “self-
defensive counterattacks,” even though in each case it was Beijing that launched 
general hostilities�21 For Chinese thinkers, there is no clear conceptual firewall 
separating defensive grand strategies from offensive military tactics� To the con-
trary, preemptive military action is framed as an integral part of the Chinese con-
cept of escalation management, or war control�22 Beijing’s military planning with 
regard to the Sino-Indian border is a reflection of this tradition, and of its broader 
thinking on “war-zone campaigns” and “winning informationized local wars�”
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the PLA 
began to redefine some of its core strategies and concepts� The war-zone cam-
paign doctrine, formulated in the 1990s, placed a new emphasis on jointness, 
transtheater mobility, and the rapid massing of strength on a particular front�23 
Writings called for the concentration of “elite forces and sharp arms” and stressed 
the importance of “gaining initiative from striking first” and “fighting a quick 
battle to force a quick resolution�” When it came to conflicts along China’s ter-
restrial borders, it was argued that a growth in the effectiveness of transregional 
support operations—principally via enhanced rail mobility—would allow the 
PLA to surge units stationed deep within China’s interior rapidly� These forces 
would be shielded by interlocking “mobility corridors” generated by early strikes 
on an adversary’s standoff platforms or the movement of mobile surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) batteries�24 China’s concept of informationized local wars, which 
complements in many ways the war-zone campaign doctrine, attaches inordinate 
importance to operations in the cyber and space domains and to prevailing in the 
electromagnetic spectrum�25
Many of these key tenets permeate contemporary Chinese military thinking 
with regard to future operations along the LAC� Thus, in the event of a conflict 
with India, conventional forces would be surged from the Chinese interior, with 
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the vast majority being deployed via rail, and another portion being flown in 
via heavy airlifter, and potentially also via government-requisitioned civilian 
aircraft�26 As Larry Wortzel has noted, the Chinese fully seem to expect that air, 
cyber, and electronic operations will be part of any Sino-Indian border contin-
gency�27 A key role of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), along with the PLA Rocket 
Force (PLARF), would be to conduct standoff strikes to interdict, disrupt, and 
delay the arrival of Indian forces coming from the lowlands� As one Chinese 
military analyst notes, “Along the Sino-Indian borders, where the IA enjoys � � � 
manpower superiority vis-à-vis the PLA, the PLAAF will launch ‘shielding bom-
bardment’ campaigns in a defensive land war to rebuff the enemy’s second-tier 
infantry and logistical reinforcement� If India’s supporting units are delayed in 
getting to the battlefield, PLA reinforcements from the rear can arrive at the front 
line to consolidate the defense line and launch a counterattack�”28
PLA SOF units no doubt would be central to China’s concept of “key counter-
attacks�” According to the PLA’s The Science of Campaigns, one of the key roles 
of Chinese special operations units would be “to assault enemy vital targets, 
paralyze enemy operational systems, reduce enemy operational capabilities, 
and interfere, delay, or disrupt enemy operational activities to create favorable 
conditions for main force units�”29 One recently retired Indian SOF general drew 
attention to this aspect of Chinese thinking on special operations, noting, “If a 
divisional size attack is launched, say, in Tawang, then the Chinese could employ 
SOFs to cut off all routes for buildup of reserves, attack specific sensors, and also 
raid artillery and logistic locations� The deep induction of SOFs for providing 
early warnings and information on the movement of Indian reserves could also 
be tasked�”30
China’s Western Military Region possesses its own SOF brigade (formerly at-
tached to the Chengdu Military Region) and both the Xinjiang and TAR Military 
Districts have large, dedicated SOF units, as well as elite, rapid-reaction units of 
People’s Armed Police (PAP)�31 
India also has been following, with a certain degree of trepidation, the rapid 
development of China’s airborne assault capabilities, in the form of the PLAAF’s 
15th Airborne Corps� Consisting of three divisions numbering over 35,000 
troops, with a light artillery and mechanized component, the 15th Airborne 
Corps is headquartered in Xiaogan, from which it is expected to reach any part 
of China within ten hours�32 The Central Military Commission has prioritized its 
modernization, and its capabilities recently were bolstered by the introduction of 
the Y-20 heavy airlifter�33 The 15th Airborne Corps is considered “key to the War 
Zone Campaign Concept” and would be used “for the kind of disruptive deep 
strikes that the War Zone Campaign calls for�”34 Indian military planners have 
monitored closely the growing number of large-scale airborne exercises the PLA 
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has conducted in the TAR over the past few years, with one retired air marshal 
making the following observation: “We are aware of China’s increasing focus on 
airborne assault operational capability, involving integrated forces� � � � A future 
[limited] war could see the Chinese depending heavily on their airpower for 
air defense and air support� Offensive operations would be SOF- and air assault 
forces–intensive, unlike the simple infantry operations of 1962 vintage�”35
India’s concerns over certain aspects of the PLA’s war-zone campaign doctrine 
and evolving force structure have been amplified by recent developments in 
China’s strategic behavior, most notably along the Sino-Indian border but also 
in the South and East China Seas� Since the eastern Ladakh border standoff in 
2013, there have been a number of similarly fraught confrontations�36 One such 
incident in 2014 reportedly led to the deployment of close to one thousand troops 
by each side�37 Territorial incursions have continued ever since, with notable ten-
sions flaring in September 2015 and, most recently, in March 2016�38
The Evolution of India’s Attitude toward Territorial Defense
India’s responses to China’s intensified military coercion have been twofold� First, 
the country has decided to augment its force structure significantly, with new 
battalions of scouts; via the stationing of additional air, missile, and surveillance 
assets; and by raising a new Mountain Strike Corps� Second, it has sought to 
remedy one of its key defensive shortcomings: the paucity of rail and road infra-
structure in certain key border regions�
The latter represents an important shift away from the so-called scorched-
earth strategy that had held sway since 1962� For many decades Indian military 
planners deliberately eschewed the development of border infrastructure, as 
they feared it would facilitate Chinese ingress deep into the Indian plains and 
lowlands�39 According to one informed journalistic account of the Indian mili-
tary’s thinking vis-à-vis the Sino-Indian border, it was only in the middle of the 
first decade of this century that the IA began to see the pitfalls of this approach 
more clearly�40 The lack of solid infrastructure along the Indian side of the LAC 
had rendered large tracts of contested land acutely vulnerable to Chinese prob-
ing and creeping forms of encroachment� Trudging through treacherous terrain 
on foot or via mule train, Indian patrols often discovered Chinese preparation of 
positions or infrastructure development only weeks after it had occurred� In the 
depth of winter, when snow rendered some footpaths impassable, Indian forces 
tacitly conceded certain areas, only to reinvest them in the spring� In the event of 
a standoff, China could surge reinforcements more rapidly, with Indian troops 
perhaps taking hours, if not days, to arrive at their destination� In short, while 
an absence of infrastructure conceivably could help delay a large-scale invasion, 
it had proved remarkably inadequate at deterring Chinese military coercion and 
territorial encroachment�41
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It also had become gradually more apparent that a short-duration, limited, 
border conflict is far more likely than a protracted, large-scale, force-on-force 
campaign, not only because of the nature of current Chinese operational plan-
ning, but because both nations would be conducting military operations under a 
nuclear overhang� As one much-discussed Indian report noted in 2012, “Though 
both countries have a doctrine of ‘no first use,’ the nuclear factor can be expected 
to impose caution on political decision makers on both sides� The stakes at issue 
will again determine the degree of risk in political calculations� Generally, the 
nuclear factor can be expected to limit the scale of conflict and impact the scope 
of feasible political objectives�”42
Finally, the longer the conflict lasts, the more likely it will attract third-party 
intervention in the form of diplomatic or military assistance or both� According 
to declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports, this was one of the 
main reasons China planned for a short, limited war in 1962�43
Responding to a limited-war contingency requires operational agility and the 
ability to respond rapidly and effectively to a crisis�44 This reinforces the need for 
a tighter web of infrastructure that can enable Indian forces to react promptly to 
any “tremor felt along any one of its strands�”45
Over the past few years, India has launched a bevy of large-scale border infra-
structure projects, albeit with chequered results� While some progress has been 
made in certain areas, most of India’s road and rail construction projects have 
fallen victim to considerable delays� As of May 2016, only twenty-one of sixty-one 
border road projects designated strategic had been completed�46 Similarly, while 
the Indian government sanctioned the construction of twenty-eight strategic rail-
way lines along India’s borders in 2010, six years later none have been finalized�47
The accretion of India’s conventional force structure along the LAC and the 
attendant development in infrastructure provide two material indicators of the 
shift in India’s defense strategy toward China� The most significant change, how-
ever, has occurred in the intellectual domain, as Indian defense planners have 
adopted a much more vigorous, tactically offensive approach to territorial de-
fense� The creation of the Mountain Strike Corps, note Indian commentators, 
was part of a larger movement toward deterrence by punishment and away from 
what has been perceived to be an overreliance on deterrence by denial in the 
past�48 Indeed, for many decades India’s two-front planning construct called for 
India simply to hold along the border with China while its forces engaged in 
more-offensive operations against Pakistan to the west�49
This approach progressively has been replaced with what has been described 
to this author variously as a form of “offensive defense,” a “quid pro quo strategy,” 
and a “cross-border riposte strategy�” Following Clausewitz’s well-known dictum 
that “a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive” is often the most “brilliant 
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point in the defensive,” Indian military planners have adapted their concepts of 
operation to the natures of both the opponent and the topography�50 As one army 
colonel candidly noted, mountainous terrain “can favor the first mover,” adding, 
Once the Chinese seize a position, it may be very difficult to dislodge them� Rather 
than expend much blood and treasure attempting to storm impregnable positions, we 
should pursue a strategy of horizontal escalation and capture territory elsewhere� If 
you cannot counter symmetrically, you can effectively counter by shifting the locus of 
the battlefield� The political compulsions of territorial defense make things very dif-
ficult for us in the Army� Our elected government will not tolerate us losing even one 
centimeter of territory� This cannot be achieved without us seizing territorial chips 
for bargaining purposes elsewhere� We have to think of conflict termination�51
Another IA officer concurred, observing, “Raising the strike corps was part of a 
move to create a more offensive defense� If India’s sovereignty is weakened, we 
should have the ability to mount a riposte� If the PLA strikes at Tawang, we can 
provide a mechanized Indian response via Ladakh� In the past we had a dissuasive 
posture, solely focused on static defense� Deterrence is now being rebalanced�”52
Both Ladakh and northern Sikkim are considered good locations for mount-
ing such a mechanized riposte, not only because they provide some of the few 
staging areas along the Indian side of the LAC conducive to mechanized warfare, 
but because they overlook main axes of approach (the plateau of Aksai Chin and 
the Sora Funnel) and logistical lifelines, such as the China Western Highway�53 
In the event of conflict, India’s mechanized forces would sweep down from these 
mountain plains to conduct pincer movements behind advancing Chinese for-
mations, with the hope of breaking troop concentration�54
India’s mechanized counteroffensive would form only one component of a 
wider theater strategy, however� In addition to these movements, Indian air and 
missile power would be brought to bear on transport and communication nodes 
deep within the TAR, with the goal of delaying or preventing the arrival of PLA 
reinforcements�55
INCORPORATING SOFS INTO INDIA’S CURRENT APPROACH TO 
AREA DENIAL
Despite this shift toward a more offensive form of area denial, India’s current 
approach to conventional deterrence along the LAC appears to suffer from 
certain limitations� Indeed, while New Delhi’s overarching military strategy has 
evolved—most notably by more vigorously stressing the need for cross-border 
strikes—the force structure changes it preconizes are remarkably similar to those 
pursued in the wake of the 1962 war: a massive accretion in conventional land 
power�56
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New Delhi also continues to rely on geographically dispersed conventional 
units or on poorly equipped paramilitary forces, the latter in the form of the 
Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), as India’s first line of defense in many of the 
forward areas most vulnerable to Chinese aggression�57 The rugged nature of the 
topography, along with the continued paucity of infrastructure, means that even 
though India forward-deploys a large number of conventional screening forces 
along some of the most obvious axes of approach (the five main river valleys in 
Arunachal Pradesh, for instance), these troops are relatively static and could be 
outflanked by small detachments engaging in rapid lateral movements�58
Meanwhile, a large portion of the IA’s mechanized units still will be stationed 
in the lowlands, with the expectation that they would be rushed to higher alti-
tudes in the event of conflict� Not only would this prove logistically challenging 
owing to the enduring deficits in India’s road and rail infrastructure; it also would 
prove physically taxing�59 In contrast to the first wave of PLA troops flowing from 
the heights of the Plateau of Tibet, Indian troops deployed from interior garrisons 
would be surged into combat before having been acclimatized properly�60 Medical 
studies have shown that a physically fit soldier requires about two weeks to adapt 
progressively to a new altitude, and three weeks to conditions of extreme cold�61 
In the absence of proper acclimatization, soldiers operating at extreme altitudes 
can suffer from acute mountain sickness, severe sleep disorders, high-altitude 
pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema�62
Second, such a manpower-centered approach to deterrence already has proved 
to be prohibitively costly� In April 2015, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar 
announced that the planned Mountain Strike Corps would be halved to approxi-
mately 35,000 troops for financial reasons, and that the formation budget for the 
corps would be frozen at U�S�$6�1 billion, significantly less than the originally 
sanctioned U�S�$13�8 billion�63 Scandal already had erupted a year earlier when 
it was revealed that the IA had been compelled to dip into precious weapon and 
ammunition reserves to equip its newly raised forces properly�64 While the Indian 
defense minister appears to have reversed his prior decision, renewing assurances 
that the Mountain Strike Corps would be resourced properly, India’s efforts to 
add thousands more boots on the ground inevitably will prove onerous�65 Indeed, 
India’s expansion of its ground forces has been accompanied by a rise in person-
nel costs, a trend that is slated to increase exponentially over time�66
Finally, the natural compartmentalization of much of the terrain—which often 
does not allow large units to maneuver effectively—disincentivizes the massing of 
force, especially when moving uphill�67 As India’s conventional forces wind their 
way up narrow, mountain roads to higher elevations or are funneled through 
mountain valleys, they could find themselves targeted by Chinese artillery bar-
rages, missile strikes, and “shielding bombardment campaigns�” They might 
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suffer disproportionate casualties when targeted by Chinese forces positioned 
in height and depth or find their main axes of approach to certain remote areas 
suddenly cut off�68
In short, India’s intense reliance on large, centralized, conventional forces—a 
substantial portion of which are stationed at lower altitudes—would not be the 
most operationally judicious approach in the event of a short, fast-moving, lim-
ited war launched from high elevations along the LAC�
One French study on mountain warfare notes that for conventional forces to 
assail higher-altitude positions successfully, they must rely on a “different yet 
complementary force,” that is, a force that is “decentralized, highly trained, and 
optimized for heliborne assault and the neutralization of enemy positions located 
at higher vantage points�”69 The next section of this article makes an argument 
for providing the IA with a similarly “different yet complementary force”—one 
that is forward deployed, distributed, and able to respond both rapidly and ef-
fectively to various contingencies� The candidate force—a mixture of SOFs and 
locally raised scouting battalions—would be geared toward rapid reaction and 
proactive defense�
The argument is not that large-scale conventional forces have no role to play 
in the event of a Sino-Indian border contingency, or that India should rely exclu-
sively on special operations for conventional deterrence along the border� Many 
of the missions at the heart of India’s operational concepts—such as the seizure 
of limited tracts of territory—are suited to mountain infantry, not SOFs�70 Rather, 
the emphasis is on developing a better complementarity between these elements 
rather than on clearly dissociating them� Indeed, it has been demonstrated re-
peatedly that modern militaries are at their most effective when they succeed 
in integrating conventional and special operations within a common, clearly 
defined, strategic framework�71
PROACTIVE DEFENSE AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES
This section evaluates the role of India’s SOFs within the framework of a more 
proactive territorial defense strategy� India possesses a large number and variety 
of elite units, some of which fall under the Home Affairs Ministry, such as the 
National Security Guard (NSG), which focuses almost exclusively on counter-
terrorism (CT) operations, and the Special Protection Group, a VIP-protection 
unit� To add to the confusion, some units occasionally qualified as SOFs in In-
dia, such as the IA Ghatak platoons and the Sagar Prahari Bal—the latter a unit 
formed following the 2008 Mumbai attacks to provide better coastal security—
are not so much special operators as specialized forces�
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The primary focus of this discussion is the SOF units most likely to play a 
role in the event of a Sino-Indian border conflict: the SOF-qualified elements of 
the IA’s Para Commando battalions and, to a lesser extent, the relatively newly 
formed Garud unit of the Indian Air Force (IAF)� At the time of this writing, 
the IA possesses eight battalions of special operators (Para SFs), with plans for 
future expansion, as well as five battalions (a brigade) of airborne paras, which 
are more akin to airborne assault units�72 Each battalion nominally is pegged at 
approximately seven hundred men, but many units reportedly are undermanned, 
underequipped, and suffering from a 30 percent officer shortfall� The Garud, 
which was formed in 2003, currently comprises about one thousand troops, and 
their numbers will double in the aftermath of the attacks on Pathankot Air Base 
in early 2016�73 The IAF has struggled to define the role of the Garud adequately, 
beyond base protection� (While the Indian Navy’s SOF component, the Marine 
Commando Force [MARCOS], has been stationed in small numbers at certain 
high-altitude lakes in Jammu and Kashmir, its role would be minimal at best, and 
therefore MARCOS will not be addressed further�)
Another unit, the fabled Special Frontier Force (SFF), will be discussed in ad-
dition to the Para SFs and the Garud�74 Formed in late 1962, following the Sino-
Indian War, the SFF is part of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research 
and Analysis Wing (RAW), and answers directly to the Cabinet Secretariat�75 
Modeled on the Kennedy-era Green Berets, the unit is rumored to contain about 
ten thousand soldiers, trained to conduct operations behind enemy lines and en-
gage in special warfare�76 There is some debate over whether this secretive force 
has preserved its elite status as well as its original mandate�
The roles of these units will be examined along three axes: their utility in coun-
tering gray-zone aggression, their aptitude for engaging in direct action behind 
enemy lines, and their ability to conduct special warfare in the TAR�77
COUNTERING GRAY-ZONE AGGRESSION
Over the past few years, numerous observers have drawn attention to the chal-
lenge that acts of creeping coercion pose to the international order� These con-
cerns have been compounded by revisionist powers’ shared predilection for so-
called gray-zone strategies, a combination of “salami-slicing” tactics, information 
warfare, and military coercion�78
Certain aspects of gray-zone campaigns, such as the use of proxies, long have 
been familiar to Indian security managers, who have had to contend with such 
modes of Pakistani covert action since independence�79 China’s historic use of 
infrastructure development as a means of cementing—literally—its claim over 
contested territory is also well known in New Delhi� After all, many past episodes 
of border tension have occurred following Indian forces’ belated discovery of 
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Chinese road and basing development in remote border areas� Despite India’s 
familiarity with such forms of great-power competition, its strategic community’s 
literature on the challenges that gray-zone aggression poses is surprisingly sparse� 
Moreover, when Indian strategic thinkers reflect on such issues, they tend to do 
so with Pakistan in mind rather than China� Yet as demonstrated in the first sec-
tion of this article, the threat of gray-zone aggression should not be perceived as 
exclusive to Indo-Pakistani security dynamics�
Within U�S� strategic circles, it is the special operations community that per-
haps has thought the longest and hardest about how to counter such forms of 
territorial encroachment effectively� As one recent official document notes, de-
mocracies can face certain disadvantages when confronting authoritarian rivals 
whose decision-making and civil-military structures can facilitate “unity of effort 
in the gray zone�”80
For the same reasons that SOFs can prove immensely attractive to democra-
cies when prosecuting CT operations overseas—their tactical agility, deniability, 
and restricted oversight—they are emerging as the tools of choice in responding 
to certain features of authoritarian aggression�81 For example, in the event of 
Chinese operatives landing on the Senkaku Islands (claimed by both China and 
Japan), disguised as fishermen, Japanese military planners view “advance par-
ties” of heliborne special forces as forming one of their first lines of defense�82 
Similarly, central and eastern European states envision rapid-reaction SOF units 
as providing some of the most effective counters to any future Russian attempt to 
replicate a Crimean “little green men” strategy on NATO soil�83
SOFs provide democratic policy makers with the capacity to respond rapidly, 
effectively, and in a tailored manner to such acts of infiltration, subversion, or 
sabotage�84 In India’s case, a wide variety of scenarios were mentioned in the 
course of private conversations with the author, such as Chinese clandestine 
operatives or SOFs entering Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim disguised as Tibetan 
refugees, nomadic herdsmen, or economic migrants from India’s troubled north-
eastern territories�85 Indian military officers also expressed concern over their 
past inability to detect Chinese infrastructure development in a timely fashion 
and mentioned the possibility of Chinese engineers discreetly constructing small 
landing grounds, hidden ammunition depots, and SAM sites during the off-
season when Indian soldiers no longer can gain access to certain areas close to 
Chinese positions, owing to snow and the paucity of infrastructure on the Indian 
side of the LAC�86
To respond with alacrity to such scenarios, Indian SOFs would need, first 
and foremost, to be able to detect them� India’s advances in space-based surveil-
lance, along with the planned introduction of a large number of surveillance 
platforms—in the form of high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and 
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aerostats—promise to help in this regard, but the difficult nature of the terrain 
imposes limitations�87 India has been contemplating erecting Israeli-type security 
systems along certain portions of its border with Pakistan, complete with night-
observation cameras, long-range detection radars, motion sensors, and thermal 
imaging�88 However, the deep valleys and craggy peaks that prevail across much 
of the LAC—not to mention the prohibitive expense—preclude such ambitious 
technological solutions�89 Radio, radar, and even satellite communications sys-
tems have difficulty operating around terrain folds, and the very fact that the 
Sino-Indian border has not been delineated officially means that China would 
view any large-scale Indian fencing effort as a severe provocation�90
As a result, human intelligence (HUMINT) would prove absolutely critical in 
detecting Chinese gray-zone operations, whether the latter were in the form of 
cross-border infiltrations, illicit infrastructure development, or attempts at sabo-
tage and subversion� For decades, Indian intelligence services have depended on 
the knowledge gleaned from nomadic herders, who frequently wander between 
Indian- and Chinese-controlled territory along the LAC�91 Religious pilgrims 
and resident tribal populations provide other valuable sources of information� 
India should seek to sharpen its HUMINT capabilities further along the LAC, 
by recognizing that the key to preserving long-term control lies in the degree of 
influence it wields over the complex patchwork of border peoples� For example, 
in Arunachal Pradesh alone there are more than twenty-six major tribes and one 
hundred subtribes�92 India should focus on training more of its intelligence offi-
cers and SOFs in the languages and dialects of the many peoples along the border 
and on fast-tracking the central government’s much-delayed Border Area Devel-
opment Program (BADP), with a particular focus on the regions most likely to be 
the targets of future Chinese incursions, i�e�, Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh�93 A 
less heavy-handed policing approach in certain areas also might prove construc-
tive in terms of winning hearts and minds and might foster better information 
sharing between local communities and Indian authorities�94
Finally, the addition of more tribal and local forces—in the vein of the Ladakh 
Snow Tigers or the recently raised scout battalions from Sikkim and Arunachal—
would buttress considerably India’s conventional deterrent in its border regions�95 
Not only does this constitute a low-cost approach to frontier policing; it also 
provides Indian security managers with a year-round, forward-deployed, “trip 
wire” force whose members are physiologically acclimatized to high altitudes and 
mountain warfare and have an innate knowledge of the terrain and local condi-
tions�96 Because of their familial ties with local villagers and herdsmen, these 
scouts are better positioned to recognize signs of cross-border infiltration� Small 
teams of Indian special forces—in the form of joint terminal attack controllers 
(JTACs) or communications experts—could be attached to each battalion, much 
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in the way the United States embedded small teams of SOFs among its Northern 
Alliance partners during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM�97 This would provide 
lightly armed tribal and ethnic battalions with the ability to call on airpower or 
follow-on conventional forces in the event of an encounter with a more formi-
dable foe� Equipping select teams of Sikkim and Arunachal Scouts with antitank 
guided missiles, light mortars, and shoulder-mounted rocket launchers, in the 
vein of the Ghatak platoons that act as the spearheads of conventional IA units, 
also could prove valuable�98 The goal should be to provide the IA not only with 
lightly armed reconnaissance units but also with hybridized structures that can 
help mount a Fabian defense of their respective home states in the event of a 
larger-scale Chinese incursion, by delaying, harassing, and attriting PLA forces�99
DIRECT ACTION AND ENABLING OPERATIONS
India, albeit somewhat more belatedly than China, has begun to attach more 
importance to airborne assault operations, especially their utility for targeting 
Chinese transport and communications infrastructure in the TAR in the event of 
conflict�100 There is also a growing realization among some military thinkers that 
Indian SOFs could be called on to play a critical role behind enemy lines, con-
ducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and direct-action operations� While one serv-
ing IA special forces colonel cautiously stated that “Indian SOFs would be used 
for direct action operations primarily on Indian soil, with the occasional cross 
border deployment in a limited manner,” another IA special forces brigadier was 
less circumspect, observing that “India’s dissuasive posture being based in part 
on the threat of horizontal escalation, SOF operations behind Chinese lines will 
necessarily be part of the mix�”101 IA doctrine, for its part, defines special forces 
as “specially selected troops who are trained, equipped, and organized to oper-
ate in hostile territory, isolated from the main combat forces� They may operate 
independently or in conjunction with other forces at the operational level� They 
are versatile, have a deep reach, and can make precision strikes at targets of criti-
cal importance�”102
It is this last function—the ability to strike at rear-based targets—that seems 
to hold the most appeal for Indian military planners� There is a recognition that 
the combat environment straddling the Sino-Indian border may morph progres-
sively into something of a no-man’s-land for large clusters of ground forces and 
high-signature platforms, owing to the growing ubiquity of extended-range, 
precision-guided munitions� The PLA’s increased focus on transtheater mobility 
and the ability to deploy SAMs, truck-mounted UAVs, and land-attack cruise 
missile batteries rapidly along its side of the LAC has engendered particular 
anxiety in New Delhi�103 Indian advanced landing grounds and air bases are in-
creasingly vulnerable to missile and artillery bombardment�104 Furthermore, the 
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government has yet to finalize the construction of hardened shelters for the IAF’s 
squadrons of Su-30MKI aircraft�105 While Indian fighter pilots have begun to 
train using sections of road and highway as dispersal runways, other passive de-
fenses could be implemented, such as investing in large numbers of subterranean 
shelters with large stockpiles of munitions, lubricants, and petroleum�106 Absent 
such efforts, Indian airpower near the border effectively may be crippled in the 
first phases of conflict, or could suffer from virtual attrition—devoting the bulk 
of sorties to defensive counterair missions or to suppressing enemy air defenses, 
rather than conducting precision strikes against enemy air bases and ground tar-
gets�107 This role, note some Indian military officials, may need to be entrusted to 
small demolition teams of SOFs, which could carve “holes” in China’s reconnais-
sance strike complex and provide terminal guidance for standoff missile strikes 
conducted from outside the range of China’s IADS networks� In some ways, this 
resembles Soviet thinking on the deployment of Spetsnaz SOFs behind NATO 
lines for sabotage and demolition missions against mobile missile batteries�108
This “penetrating role” is in line with the conceptualization by some U�S� 
analysts of SOFs as low-signature entry forces within heavily denied or contested 
environments�109 IAF doctrine specifies that the “destruction and degradation of 
enemy air assets” constitute one of the core functions of its dedicated SOF unit, 
the Garud�110 One retired IA brigadier confided the following: 
In the conceptualized role of the mountain strike corps, the future Air Assault Divi-
sion and Special Operations Forces will operate in tandem as part of India’s area 
denial strategy� What is implied is, SOFs will be inserted up to and beyond an opera-
tional depth to disrupt the build-up of PLA forces, isolate and invest critical vulner-
able points and areas� These isolated vulnerable points will then be attacked via air 
assaults through heliborne and airborne forces� It is important to keep in mind that 
the Tibetan plateau is a plane with little undulations, which allows for the application 
of both air assault forces as well as air assault mechanized forces�111
The challenge, however, would be to succeed in inserting SOF guidance and 
demolition teams in the absence of dedicated, stealthy airlifters�112 Advances in 
air-defense systems and long-range surface-to-surface fires have raised new ques-
tions about how to conduct airborne operations without incurring large-scale, 
potentially catastrophic losses�113 Large, high-signature transport aircraft, such as 
India’s C-17 Globemasters or C-130J Hercules, would be vulnerable to Chinese 
radar-guided SAMs—providing the latter had not been suppressed prior to the 
air assault� More-discreet modes of airborne insertion, e�g�, via low-flying heli-
borne strike forces, still could be put at risk by lower-altitude air-defense systems 
and antiaircraft guns�114 Indian troops most likely would need to establish drop 
zones at a distance from the densest thickets of Chinese low-altitude systems 
and rely on airborne light armored vehicles (LAVs) to gain greater mobility and 
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firepower and compensate for the distances separating their lodgments from 
their target points�115 The U�S� Army has been developing a new family of LAVs 
designed for this particular role and Indian SOF officers expressed interest in ac-
quiring several such vehicles, with future airborne assault operations in mind�116
Once successfully inserted, Indian SOF teams may need to operate “blind” 
within an environment characterized by the denial of command, control, com-
munications, computers, and ISR (i�e�, C4ISR) capabilities, particularly if India’s 
fragile space-based communications architecture has been degraded or disabled 
preemptively� Mindful of this, the IA has released an updated request for infor-
mation (RFI) for mini battlefield UAVs, which senior officers have indicated 
would enable two-man IA SOF teams to conduct over-the-hill surveillance be-
hind enemy lines�117 The introduction of longer-range, high-altitude UAVs, when 
combined with a more-robust satellite and airborne communications network, 
also could improve IA ability to locate and direct fire at enemy targets situated at 
greater distances as well as to preserve communications among dispersed units�118
Finally, if a Chinese offensive indeed proves to be air assault–intensive, small 
teams of Indian SOFs equipped with shoulder-mounted SAMs could prove in-
valuable� Given the rough, mountainous terrain, limited avenues of approach, 
and growing ability of China to target larger formations of conventional forces, 
SOFs could provide a key comparative advantage in this more defensive role�119
WAGING SPECIAL WARFARE IN THE TAR
The Tibetan issue always has been at the heart of Sino-Indian tensions�120 For 
New Delhi, the PLA’s absorption of the mountain territory in 1951 signified the 
loss of a historic buffer zone, and the progressive hardening of Beijing’s Tibet pol-
icies has caused both anger and dismay� For China, India’s harboring of the Dalai 
Lama and the Tibetan government in exile following the 1959 Tibetan uprising 
amounted to an almost unforgivable affront� Throughout the late 1950s and up 
to the 1962 border war, Chinese intelligence remained absolutely convinced that 
India was attempting to foment unrest across the Plateau of Tibet�121
Following India’s defeat, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the fateful 
decision—long encouraged by certain of his intelligence czars—to aid and abet 
insurgency movements within Tibet and to arm India’s sizable Tibetan refugee 
community�122 A large paramilitary unit, the ITBP, was raised and entrusted with 
patrolling forward areas along the LAC�
In addition, a much more secretive force was established: the SFF� Composed 
of thousands of ethnic Tibetans, many of whom had been resistance fighters in 
the TAR or part of the Dalai Lama’s bodyguard, the SFF was an elite unit of para-
troopers trained in mountain warfare, sabotage, and demolition� Commanded 
by IA officers on special assignment, the unit is “managed” by RAW and reports 
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directly to the Prime Minister’s Office via the Directorate General of Security in 
the Cabinet Secretariat� The CIA played an important role in shaping the SFF’s 
development in its early years, providing training and instruction in guerrilla 
warfare tactics�123 Doctrinally, the unit is inspired heavily by Kennedy-era U�S� 
Army Special Forces, with the Green Berets’ intellectual predilection for special 
warfare and operations deep behind enemy lines�124 In fact, this was the SFF’s 
original mandate� Some claim that Nehru even went so far as to frame the SFF as 
the potential vanguard of a future liberation of Tibet from Chinese rule�125 Since 
its creation, the SFF has played an active role in India’s regional conflicts, fight-
ing behind enemy lines in Bangladesh alongside Indian-sponsored militias—the 
Mukti Bahini—in the war of 1971, detonating bridges, and suffering, according 
to some accounts, dozens of casualties�126 Unconfirmed reports also have indi-
cated that the SFF played a role in the Indian military assault against the Golden 
Temple, Operation BLUESTAR, in 1984 and in the Kargil War of 1999�127
The current state of the SFF is difficult to ascertain� The unit continues to ex-
ist and is based in the hill town of Chakrata, in the state of Uttarakhand� Details 
pertaining to its force structure, equipment, and operational mandate in the 
event of a Sino-Indian confrontation are considered extraordinarily sensitive� 
Even retired IA special forces officers were distinctly uncomfortable when ques-
tioned on the matter� Some claimed complete ignorance, stating that the SFF’s 
operations and training regimen were strictly compartmentalized, with little to 
no interaction with regular military SOFs� This is clearly not the case, as Para SFs 
are seconded to SFF units frequently� When queried on its alleged elite status, one 
former IA general dismissed the SFF as little more than a “rag tag force, poorly 
equipped and no longer commando-trained�”128 A smattering of press reports has 
drawn attention to troubling shortages in certain essential pieces of equipment, 
such as parachutes�129 There is also uncertainty surrounding the force’s dedicated 
air-transport assets, now that the Aviation Research Center, RAW’s private air 
wing and border-surveillance unit, has been dissolved and split between the IAF 
and the National Technical Research Organization, a signals-intelligence agency 
created in 2004�130 Overall, however, other interviewees’ assessments were at odds 
with those of the general� Many expressed a grudging admiration for the tough-
ness of those “Tibetan boys,” as well as that of the Gurkhas and hill tribesmen 
who have swollen the SFF’s ranks over the years�
The main question, however, relates to the contemporary role of what some 
have referred to as India’s “secret Tibetan army�” Ever since the late 1970s and the 
tentative beginnings of Sino-Indian rapprochement, a tacit quid pro quo arrange-
ment has been observed� China agreed to end its support for insurgent groups in 
India’s troubled northeast, while India subscribed to a one-China policy and offi-
cially abandoned its clandestine efforts across the Tibetan border�131 However, the 
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reality is somewhat more complex� Although China no longer directly supports 
militancy in places such as Nagaland, Mizoram, and Assam, Chinese middle-
men have been known to funnel in weaponry via countries in Southeast Asia�132 
Meanwhile, other countries, such as Pakistan, continue to play an active role in 
the area, raising questions over whether China chooses to maintain close ties with 
certain of these groups via a third party�133 When it comes to India and Tibet, 
there is a similar sense that New Delhi could revert to older policies if it found 
itself compelled�134
For this reason—for purposes of what might best be described as a form of 
unconventional deterrence—it would appear that the SFF has remained true to 
its special warfare roots� One former planner within India’s Integrated Defence 
Staff commented that, in his opinion, “in light of current circumstances, I see no 
reason to dilute the operational mandate�”135 A recently retired Para SF lieuten-
ant general responded in a more oblique fashion, saying that “envisioning what 
role the Tibetan boys would play does not require much imagination�”136 Serving 
officers either refused to respond or simply suggested that there had been “no 
change in their tasking�”137
One might question, however, whether the SFF would be able to prosecute 
such a campaign successfully in today’s environment� First, such an effort most 
probably would be far more isolated than if it had occurred during the early to 
mid-1960s, when the SFF was established� During that period, both Nepal and 
the United States played an active role, alongside India, in supporting Tibetan 
militancy� In fact, for many years it was the ancient kingdom of Mustang, in Ne-
pal, that served as the true epicenter and safe haven for Tibetan combatants�138 By 
the end of that decade, however, China had succeeded in convincing Nepal to be-
tray the Tibetan cause, while the United States had sacrificed its anticommunist 
freedom fighters on the altar of Nixonian rapprochement with China�139 In the 
event of another conflict, India essentially would find itself conducting the bulk 
of its covert campaigns alone� Depending on the circumstances, one could envi-
sion the United States discreetly providing a modicum of intelligence support, 
but not much more� Even if SFF task forces are inserted successfully, it might 
prove extremely challenging to sustain them, given the contested nature of the 
aerial environment over Tibet� Investment in systems such as the U�S�-developed 
Joint Precision Airdrop System, which can be dropped from a height of 25,000 
feet, might alleviate this challenge�140
Another key difference lies in the extent of China’s surveillance and control 
over Tibet, which is far greater today than it was in 1962� Since the 2008 distur-
bances, in particular, Beijing has improved vastly its internal security apparatus 
in the TAR� New, highly sophisticated frontier-monitoring systems, incorporat-
ing electro-optical devices, radars, unmanned aircraft, and tools for imagery 
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analysis, have been put in place� Tibetan communities in India have registered a 
sharp drop in the number of incoming refugees—many who seek to depart are 
apprehended or shot while attempting to cross the border�141 China recently en-
acted a draconian new counterterror law that further curtails Tibetans’ freedom 
of movement and expression, and Chinese intelligence officers have deeply pen-
etrated Tibetan monasteries and refugee networks�142 Surveillance of neighbor-
hoods has been amplified via the establishment of an intricate “grid system” and 
facilitated by the forced sedentarization of historically nomadic populations�143 
PAP forces, often formed from recently decommissioned PLA troops, have 
grown ever more numerous in Tibet and increasingly militarized, incorporat-
ing heliborne rapid-reaction units and equipped with armored vehicles�144 Their 
presence, in addition to the PLA element already stationed in the TAR, could 
present a formidable challenge to Indian special warfare efforts� Moreover, it re-
mains unclear whether the majority of the younger generation of Tibetans living 
on the Indian side of the border would be as willing to take up arms alongside 
their brethren as some have claimed�145 Finally, as we shall see in greater depth 
in a later section, India’s political leaders might be reticent to deploy the SFF in 
such a role, either because they viewed such a step as too escalatory or because it 
would lead to protraction, thus impeding war termination�
THE CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY OF  
PROACTIVE DEFENSE
Technical and Operational Hurdles
The first and most immediate set of hurdles resides in the technical and op-
erational domain� Numerous observers, both within and outside India’s special 
operations community, have drawn attention to chronic shortfalls in essential 
equipment, such as parachutes, night vision devices, communications devices, 
laser designators, and high-altitude clothing�146 U�S� SOFs, having observed their 
Indian counterparts during training exercises, noticed that in many cases Indian 
paratroopers preferred to discard their expensive Israeli-designed Tavor rifles—
which are ill suited for Himalayan conditions and occasionally jam—in favor of 
the more reliable AK-47�147
Another common complaint was that the SOFs had expanded too rapidly in 
size and in an ad hoc manner, without the benefit of careful, deliberate plan-
ning�148 As a result, noted one colonel, in numerous cases during the raising of 
Para SF battalions existing equipment sourced from regular infantry regiments 
was distributed among the new units, resulting in their soldiers having to make 
do with inferior equipment�149 In some cases, observers pointed to seemingly 
prosaic concerns as having genuine security implications� One example is the 
continued absence of aluminum, belt-attachable water bottles� Indian Para SF 
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personnel often are compelled to carry large, heavy, plastic bottles of potable wa-
ter in their rucksacks� When removed, these reflect very far out into the sunshine 
and off the snow—running the risk of revealing hidden positions�150
Another issue concerns officer manpower, especially declining retention rates� 
Most Para SF units suffer from an estimated officer shortfall of 25–30 percent�151 
As one brigadier general stationed at IA headquarters noted, a growing number 
of Indian SOF officers are leaving the service to pursue more-lucrative careers in 
the private sector, where they often specialize in VIP protection�152 It is important 
to note, in passing, that this problem is not specific to India; the United States 
faces a similar challenge�153 The net result, however, is that India’s SOFs are in-
creasingly “bottom heavy,” with a large number of fresh, new recruits but too few 
experienced officers and noncommissioned officers�
This overly rapid expansion also has exposed certain deficiencies in India’s 
SOF training infrastructure� SOF officers warned in 2010 that it would take 
“many years” for the IA’s Special Forces Training School (SFTS)—located in Na-
han, 300 km to the north of Delhi—to catch up with the expanded force’s new 
requirements�154 Foreign observers note that the SFTS still lacks key facilities, 
such as vertical wind tunnels, next-generation simulators, and sufficient firing 
ranges�155
Questions also were raised about the nature of certain aspects of the selection 
and training processes, which often are delegated to each individual battalion, 
and how to ensure consistent standards� Indian SOF officers, however, were of the 
view that this more-decentralized system had its advantages, as it allowed units 
to be highly specialized in certain niche competencies and to have “excellent area 
and terrain specialization�”156
Organizational and Doctrinal Challenges
Perhaps the greatest set of challenges lies in the organizational domain� Absent a 
restructuring of India’s special operations capability around a Joint Special Oper-
ations Command (JSOC), many of the more chronic problems affecting training, 
procurement, and information sharing most likely will endure�157 Indian strategic 
commentators long have called for the creation of a JSOC, via which India’s com-
munity of special operators could be provided with “fully fused” informational 
support from the nation’s notoriously factionalized intelligence agencies�158 While 
the formation of India’s Defence Intelligence Agency in 2002, following the rec-
ommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, has led to better integration 
among the services’ respective intelligence wings, reportedly there is still much 
scope for improvement�159 This would necessitate the permanent deputation 
of civilian intelligence officers drawn from all the relevant agencies, including 
the Intelligence Bureau, which, while theoretically domestically oriented, plays 
an important role along certain tracts of the Sino-Indian border� Optimizing 
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the functionality of India’s (future) JSOC also would require providing it with 
its own budget, requirements-validation process, and streamlined acquisition 
procedures� This would enable it to fast-track much-needed items, such as night 
vision devices and parachutes, bypassing the traditionally cumbersome procure-
ment process of the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD)�
The existence of a JSOC also would bring about greater strategic and doctri-
nal clarity, along with more institutionalized joint training� For the time being, 
India’s Para SFs have no organic air wing, and the IA air arm as yet does not 
possess its own ground-attack capability� After years of bitter wrangling among 
services, the MOD arbitrated in favor of the IAF retaining control, for the time 
being, over newly acquired heliborne platforms critical for special operations and 
airborne assault, such as the Apaches and Chinooks purchased from the United 
States�160 While this is projected to change in the near future, the process points 
to the persistent dysfunctionality of interservice relations, which could affect 
the effectiveness and reactivity of Indian SOFs in the event of a crisis� With each 
service striving to create its own SOF unit, there also has been a certain amount 
of duplication in terms of core competencies and a relative absence of profound 
reflection on what some of these newly formed units could bring in terms of 
added value—this despite the existence since 2008 of a (classified) Indian Joint 
Doctrine for Special Operations�161 The IAF’s Garud, for example, has yet truly to 
evolve beyond its primary objective of protecting air bases and installations, a 
task that could be relegated to a force already designed for such a purpose: the 
paramilitary Central Industrial Security Force� There is a broad consensus within 
India’s SOF community that where the Garud truly needs to focus its efforts is 
on developing a core of highly trained JTACs and forward-deployed air combat–
control teams�162 Another core objective would be to specialize in the emergency 
extraction of downed IAF pilots or groups of SFFs or Para SFs isolated behind 
enemy lines�163 Yet, according to most interviewees, until now not much progress 
has been made on these fronts�
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi came into office in May 2014, there was 
hope in a few quarters that some long-advocated defense reforms, such as the 
creation of a chief of defense staff, an aerospace command, a cyber command, 
and a JSOC, finally would materialize� As time has gone by, hopes of sudden 
and major reform under this government—whether in the realm of economy 
or defense—have begun to dwindle� This does not mean, however, that there is 
no movement�164 The current defense minister, Manohar Parrikar, reportedly 
has sought inspiration from both past U�S� defense reforms and Israel’s ongoing 
efforts to fashion a “Depth Corps Force” that would operate in symbiosis with a 
new Israeli JSOC�165 During a visit to U�S� Pacific Command in early December 
2015, Parrikar allegedly also sought details on the conduct of U�S� Air Force 
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special operations, with the goal of applying these insights to the future develop-
ment of the Garud�166
Some Indian interviewees noted, rather pessimistically, that major organiza-
tional reform might occur only in the wake of some form of catastrophe� This was 
the case, for example, for the United States, which created its Special Operations 
Command in the wake of the humiliating debacle of 1980’s Operation EAGLE 
CLAW�167
Special Operations and the Question of Political Sponsorship
In his detailed, empirical study of the efficacy of past special operations, Colin 
Gray points to the fundamental importance of “permissive domestic conditions, 
and a tolerant political and strategic culture�”168 Owing to the unorthodox nature 
of SOF tactics and the politically sensitive missions with which SOFs are often 
entrusted, their use implies a certain risk tolerance on the part of political deci-
sion makers�
In 2015, the Indian government signed off on a much-publicized, and 
relatively successful, Para SF raid into Myanmar� That operation, however, was 
undertaken against lightly armed insurgents and with the acquiescence of the 
Myanmar government�169 Most recently, IA SOFs allegedly carried out punitive 
strikes against “terror launchpads” in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, in response 
to a bloody terrorist attack on Indian soil�170 At the time of this writing, the 
specifics of the operation remain shrouded in uncertainty and subject to heated 
speculation, particularly in the Indian and Pakistani press�171 According to some 
of this author’s more-reliable sources, the operation was conducted by two units 
of Para SFs (from the 4th and 9th Battalions), operating under cover of artillery 
fire� Heliborne operations were limited to the drop-off and pickup points, from 
which the SOFs proceeded on foot� Ghatak platoons drawn from regular army 
units provided rear-area security, helping to ensure the safe extraction of the 
Para SFs once their direct-action mission was completed�172 If this account is 
accurate—and it may prove impossible to verify completely—it would not be the 
first time India (or Pakistan) has deployed SOFs for shallow thrusts across the 
Indo-Pakistani Line of Control�173 It is important to stress, however, the inherent 
differences from employing SOFs in some of the China-related contingencies dis-
cussed in this paper� Deploying Indian SOF teams for more-prolonged missions, 
deeper into contested territory, and against a far more capable adversary would 
require a much greater willingness to embrace risk, friction, and uncertainty�174
On a broader level, successful covert action hinges on a clear intellectual un-
derstanding of the strategic value of special operations rather than a fixation on 
short-term tactical gains�175 A previous section demonstrated that Indian security 
managers have yet to develop a truly joint vision for special operations� Within 
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the Indian media, for their part, commentary on SOF-related issues all too often 
is confined narrowly to CT-related issues� A common refrain among Indian Para 
SF officers is that India’s political leaders and public view special forces as “little 
more than glorified infantry,” and through a narrow tactical lens rather than 
strategically�176 What such statements imply is that SOFs frequently are reduced 
to functioning as heavily armed substitutes for standard units, or are viewed as 
shock troops—ancillary forces whose role is to support a wider war effort� While 
there is certainly a danger in overly fetishizing special operations and in neglect-
ing to integrate SOFs properly with conventional forces, there also are costs to 
failing to appreciate the uniqueness of SOF attributes�177 As one U�S� study from 
the 1990s eloquently articulated, “A military structured for linear, attritional 
warfare gains little leverage from SOF operations� It correspondingly sees little 
value in SOFs and would prefer that SOF assets be distributed broadly to the force 
as a whole� By contrast, a force structured for thrusting along fault lines will use 
SOF units to gain leverage by initiating the breach and by generating chaos in the 
enemy’s rear�”178
A common criticism levied at the IA is precisely that it is structured for “linear, 
attritional warfare,” not for “thrusting along fault lines�”179 Well-known South 
Asianists have described India’s military strategy as one of restraint and as suf-
fering from an absence of strategic initiative�180 While there may be some truth 
to these characterizations, they are also far too sweeping�
Indeed, India’s very unique model of civil-military dysfunction, somewhat 
paradoxically, has provided the armed services with a lot of leeway in the pursuit 
of operational planning�181 As evidenced in the section detailing India’s strategy 
of “offensive area denial” vis-à-vis its trans-Himalayan neighbor, the IA concept 
of operations for a LAC-related contingency is far from passive or reactive� To 
the contrary, it places a strong emphasis on regaining the initiative rapidly, on 
conducting surgical strikes deep within the Chinese interior, and on horizontal 
escalation across multiple sections of the border�
The question, however, is whether India’s political leadership would be willing 
to sign off on these plans� Even though India’s current government seems intent 
on signaling that it is less reticent to use force and risk escalation, much would 
depend on the circumstances of the conflict and the exact nature of Chinese 
aggression� A number of important questions remain open� Would India’s politi-
cians be willing to accede to IA requests to extend the army’s operational ambit 
far beyond the LAC? Would airpower be employed for standoff strikes across 
the border, or would it remain confined to the Indian side, as during the Kargil 
War?182 If some of the priority targets are communication and transportation 
nodes within the TAR and the PLAAF and PLARF have not yet entered the fray, 
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   130 12/15/16   1:53 PM
136
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/11
 R E H M A N  1 3 1
would India consider it more judicious to employ ground-based, deniable SOFs 
rather than initiating a cycle of vertical escalation via targeted missile strikes and 
the use of air-launched ordnance?
Perhaps most importantly, would India’s political leadership draw on its Tibet 
“trump card” and exercise the special warfare option? New Delhi may be leery to 
do so, for several reasons� First, it may fear a Chinese counterescalation in India’s 
northeast, with all the attendant implications for India’s long-term stability and 
its ability to secure the narrow Siliguri corridor that connects its northeastern 
states to the Indian subcontinent�183 Second, such a move could encounter hostil-
ity from the current Tibetan government in exile, which officially has renounced 
violence and historically has perceived Tibetan guerrilla movements as com-
peting power structures within a heavily factionalized refugee community�184 
Furthermore, within some segments of Indian society, sentiments toward the Ti-
betan community occasionally have verged on the hostile, and support for greater 
Tibetan autonomy has not been uniformly robust�185 While the Modi government 
has been more overtly supportive of the Tibetan cause than its predecessor, this 
may not always be the case� Indian security managers may be unwilling to stoke 
the flames of militancy for fear of inadvertently redirecting Tibetan nationalism 
and thereby spawning yet another form of separatist movement on their own soil�
From a purely operational standpoint, an unconventional warfare campaign 
would no doubt yield precious tactical dividends, by increasing Chinese rear-area 
anxiety and compelling the PLA to tie down large numbers of troops in surveil-
lance and garrison duties� If India’s goal in the event of conflict, however, is to 
conclude hostilities rapidly on favorable terms, such a move could prove coun-
terproductive, as it inevitably would lead to protraction, along with widespread 
suffering among the Tibetan people, thus impeding war termination� In effect, 
the wisest posture might be to maintain such a capability as a form of deterrent 
and as part of a broader competitive strategy, and to resort to special warfare only 
in the event of significant escalation on the part of China�186
The LAC constitutes the longest disputed land border in the world� For close to 
six decades, the lack of resolution has served as a vivid reminder of the tensions 
that linger at the heart of the Sino-Indian relationship� For New Delhi, the preser-
vation of local superiority along the Himalayan belt is of paramount importance 
and continues to inform its defense planning and force-structure plans�
This article has summarized the various correlations of military force along 
the Sino-Indian border and has charted the changes in New Delhi’s operational 
concepts and attitudes toward territorial defense� While Indian planners have 
moved toward adopting a more-offensive form of area denial, they continue to 
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rely, for the most part, on conventional forces that could be overcome or circum-
vented in the event of a fast-moving, localized, and limited border confrontation 
launched from higher elevations� Taking into account the rugged nature of the 
terrain and the continued paucity of infrastructure, a case has been made here 
for a more reactive, distributed, and mobile force structure and for greater reli-
ance on special forces, working in tandem with locally raised battalions of scouts�
Despite the existence of a large number of SOFs, along with plans for further 
expansion, India has yet to articulate their role clearly and continues to view such 
units as ancillaries to conventional troops rather than as potential force multipli-
ers� While warning against an overreliance on special operators, this article has 
laid out the operational benefits to be accrued from their tailored employment in 
a number of potential Sino-Indian contingencies, ranging across a broad spec-
trum of conflict�
Before India is able to envisage such ambitiously minded concepts of opera-
tions, however, steps will need to be taken and reforms will need to be enacted� 
These extend well beyond issues of equipment, training, and procurement; 
defense management, political vision, and doctrinal definition will need to be 
addressed� The long-discussed creation of a triservice JSOC would constitute 
an important step forward� Perhaps most importantly, India’s security managers 
will need to embrace an operational philosophy that places a greater emphasis 
on rapidly regaining the initiative and on high-end asymmetric warfare� In short, 
their mode of thinking may need to become more Chinese�
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM’S  
SEA-DENIAL STRATEGY
n the past two decades, Vietnam’s military investment has manifested a strategic 
shift of national interest from land to the maritime sphere, especially since 2000� 
This evolution reflects the country’s altered external environment and its eco-
nomic transformation�
During the Cold War, Hanoi focused on land warfare� Despite the existence of 
a small navy since the 1960s, land warfare represented the main security issue for 
Vietnamese decision makers, whether it concerned the Vietnam War against the 
United States and its allies, military intervention in Cambodia, or border defense 
against China�
Subsequently the normalization of relations with neighboring countries, 
particularly China, as well as a pivot toward a more trade-oriented economy, 
altered Hanoi’s strategic circumstances� Whereas all of Vietnam’s land borders 
have been accepted mutually in a series of treaties, Vietnam’s water territory is 
still vulnerable, especially in the face of China’s rising maritime power, because 
the maritime boundaries are unsettled� This threat affects not only Vietnam’s 
management of its maritime resources but also the security of sea lines of com-
munication (SLOCs), a critical factor in international trade�1 Given the large 
gap in naval and air military capabilities between 
Hanoi and Beijing, the former’s projects in pursuit 
of military modernization reflect a clear strategic 
focus on sea denial�2
However, a series of questions concerning Viet-
nam’s sea-denial capabilities present themselves, 
and those questions cannot be answered fully yet� 
I
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Why did Hanoi adopt a sea-denial strategy? What are the characteristics of that 
strategy? How much does Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy serve its national inter-
ests? This article examines Vietnam’s geostrategic circumstances to understand 
better its choice of a sea-denial strategy� Hanoi’s current achievements in build-
ing its sea-denial capability, as well as the characteristics and limitations of that 
capability, are reviewed� Finally, as the United States and its allies vis-à-vis China 
increase their military presence in the South China Sea, the article discusses the 
effects of Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy and the country’s relevant military capa-
bilities on the geostrategic situation�
VIETNAM’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND  
NATIONAL INTERESTS
In Vietnam’s geostrategic environment, Beijing poses the greatest threat to 
Hanoi’s maritime interests� Other countries are unable or unlikely to pose any 
significant challenge�
A number of regional states, e�g�, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indo-
nesia, claim particular territories in the South China Sea, but their limited naval 
capabilities do not pose a credible threat to Vietnam� Given geographic adjacen-
cy, Cambodia and Thailand might be thought to have the potential for conflict 
with Vietnam over maritime interests, but in fact these countries cooperate on 
maritime and military issues�3 With regard to capability, no country in the region 
possesses a navy strong enough to threaten Vietnam’s� As for the great powers, 
only China has territorial disputes with Vietnam�
Despite several cases of bilateral cooperation, such as during the Vietnam War, 
Chinese geopolitical pressure on Vietnam goes back more than a thousand years� 
In the past, the countries’ shared land borders presented natural points of access 
for projecting force, as evidenced in the war between them of 1979�4 Therefore, 
history forms an indispensable part of Vietnam’s strategic culture, and resisting 
China’s dominance remains important�5 Since the normalization of bilateral rela-
tions in 1991, Hanoi pragmatically has hedged its bets in relations with Beijing 
in the economic and political areas� In parallel, the countries have concluded 
bilateral agreements on land borders, which tends to reduce the risk of territorial 
disputes, a common cause of warfare�
However, the theater for bilateral territorial disputes has moved to sea areas� 
Since 2009, various events have confirmed some serious security concerns, such 
as Beijing’s nine-dash line; its assertive attitude toward its territorial claims, 
backed by its strengthening military capability; and a series of maritime territo-
rial conflicts employing violent means—Beijing’s so-called salami strategy�6 Since 
Vietnam’s 2007 launch of its strategy to develop its maritime industries for greater 
contribution to its economy, followed by the introduction of a range of related 
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legislation and policy, the conflicts with China on territorial waters have become 
even more pressing�7
Given the geostrategic conditions and the nature of maritime conflict in 
general, three levels of possible scenarios for a conflict between Vietnam and 
China suggest themselves: low-intensity conflicts, medium armed conflicts, and a 
blockade conducted by China� (Higher-level scenarios, such as attacking onshore 
targets and conducting land warfare, would not be purely maritime conflicts, and 
thus are not covered in this article�)
Low-intensity conflict mainly would involve coast guards or other paramili-
tary forces� Military units might be involved, but without applying most weapon 
systems�8 The category of medium armed conflicts covers a wide spectrum of 
military engagements; protecting or restoring control of an island and exchang-
ing fire are two prospective scenarios� Instituting a blockade is classified as a ma-
jor act of war because of the magnitude of the sphere of battle affected� Whereas 
an armed conflict that occurred in water territory might not endanger major 
economic activities or populations, both Hanoi and Beijing nonetheless might 
view it as an intense territorial collision� A naval blockade, having a broader and 
greater impact, in particular economically, would be seen as escalation, because it 
would represent a greater application of strategic pressure, or even a challenge to 
survival—which Vietnam’s political leaders could neither ignore nor downplay� 
Since a considerable portion of the Vietnamese economy is based in the north 
and China’s adjacent Hainan Island makes the Gulf of Tonkin a semiclosed body 
of water, even blockading only northern Vietnam would have significant effects� 
Blockading the entire Vietnamese coastline may not be impossible for China’s 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN), but an operation of that scale 
would be more challenging�
Low-Intensity Conflict
As the maritime collisions that have occurred in the South China Sea in recent 
years have demonstrated, both Hanoi and Beijing use their coast guards, mari-
time police forces, and other law-enforcement entities to attempt to establish the 
legitimacy of their claims over territories while avoiding military engagement� 
Notwithstanding this, they do carry out aggressive actions such as deliberate 
collisions and ramming, the shooting of flares, and water cannoning�9 In such 
scenarios, the direct involvement of Vietnam’s military capabilities, such as 
fighter-bombers or submarines, is unsuitable� This leaves Hanoi with surveillance 
systems as the only support available to its coast guard operations� However, 
attempts to maintain control of islands or direct attacks on vessels and aircraft 
might escalate into armed conflict�
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Vietnam’s military deployments to a number of islands, particularly the 
Spratlys, are vulnerable to blockade, raid, and invasion owing to their isolation 
and limited firepower� According to satellite images, the Vietnamese posts in the 
South China Sea are too small to contain sophisticated weapon systems or related 
surveillance equipment�10 Therefore, the Vietnamese troops at best may be armed 
with short-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but likely only with light arms 
and antitank weapons�
As long as Chinese armed forces did not succeed in bringing about a fait ac-
compli, i�e�, accomplishing a takeover in one fell swoop, the Vietnam People’s 
Army (VPA) Navy (VPAN) and the VPA Air Force (VPAAF) might focus profit-
ably on denying Chinese access� Once an island was captured, Vietnam would 
experience considerable difficulty in retaking it by force, as doing so most likely 
would involve a joint operation� If Vietnamese forces were unable to retake such 
an island, they could isolate it by denying its SLOCs� However, this kind of 
siege tactic would take time to work, and the situation would turn into a war of 
attrition—which would be unfavorable for Vietnam� In a war of attrition, the 
small numbers of Vietnamese combat aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines 
likely could not sustain a blockade in the face of their superior Chinese counter-
parts� (A later portion of this article is given over to a comparison of the respec-
tive forces�)
Medium Conflict
Exchange of fire, either accidental or intentional, could occur in the South China 
Sea� Escalation is the key factor: no matter which side loses in the first round of 
combat, the subsequent response is critical� If one side sends in reinforcements, 
the other may do so as well� If an increasingly intense spiral of response develops, 
the situation may evolve into a war of attrition—again, a situation unfavorable 
to Vietnam�
However, unlike in the previous scenario (protecting or retaking an island, 
which involves concentration on a specific location), in an exchange-of-fire 
scenario Hanoi could apply guerrilla tactics by moving aircraft or vessels or both 
into other sea areas where Beijing has concerns� Although China’s maritime 
forces are superior to Vietnam’s, they cannot deploy everywhere� Thus, Hanoi 
could make use of any weaknesses in Beijing’s military presence to launch attacks 
for tactical advantage�
Blockade
A Chinese blockade of Vietnam’s SLOCs would constitute an intermediate sce-
nario, representing an escalation above small-scale armed conflict but not yet 
reaching the level of an attack on the mainland�
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Although it would not be easy for the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet alone to achieve 
a full blockade of Vietnam’s long coastlines, its submarines plus its surface com-
batants, supported by maritime patrol aircraft and satellites, have the potential 
to interfere with Vietnam’s SLOCs from a distance� Given the ability to move 
reinforcements from its other fleets, the PLAN might be able to establish a near-
total blockade�
Hanoi could negotiate land transport through Cambodia, via something like 
the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail, or use the ports in Rach Gia on the Gulf of Thai-
land to make sea-transportation connections via the water territories of Cambo-
dia, Thailand, and Malaysia� However, since such alternative arrangements would 
involve foreign countries, their viability remains uncertain� In any case, the mi-
nor ports in Rach Gia would be insufficient to replace the existing major ones�11
VIETNAM’S SEA-DENIAL STRATEGY
In most scenarios—other than low-intensity conflicts that involve few or no mili-
tary forces—the VPAN generally faces asymmetrical challenges from its Chinese 
counterpart� In such circumstances, a sea-denial strategy is appropriate, in con-
trast to sea control or a postmodern navy� Although sea denial is not mentioned 
in Vietnam’s official publications, its practices demonstrate a preference for such 
an approach�
Sea Control
Sea control refers to fleets controlling a specific body of water at a certain time� 
This demands a broad formation of surface fleets incorporating comprehensive 
air/missile defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antiship capabilities, 
and additional assistance from aircraft and submarines� A navy exercising sea 
control intends to be able not only to expel hostile naval forces but to protect its 
country’s maritime activities� However, implementation of a sea-control strategy 
is expensive, requiring the building of various vessels and aircraft, especially 
surface combatants equipped with excellent capabilities against air, surface, and 
underwater targets�12
In Southeast Asia, even Singapore, with its great financial capacity and its 
willingness to invest in defense, has only six Formidable-class frigates, which have 
some sea-control capability�13 In the asymmetrical naval relationship between 
Vietnam and China, even if the former were able to muster defense expenditures 
similar to Singapore’s, six to ten surface combatants would not rival any one of 
the latter’s three major fleets, each of which has more than twenty major surface 
vessels�14 Operationally, Hanoi’s sea-control navy would be vulnerable to Beijing’s 
sea-denial capabilities in the air, on the surface, and underwater� (The latter is 
also known as an antiaccess/area-denial [A2/AD] strategy�)
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Postmodern Navy
A postmodern naval strategy is aimed at threats from nonstate actors such as 
pirates, terrorists, and criminals rather than at other states’ navies� Such a navy 
concentrates on sea control, expeditionary operations, keeping order at sea, sta-
bility, humanitarian assistance, and cooperative naval diplomacy�15
Note that sea control is listed above as a major goal� However, vessels devel-
oped to counter nonstate actors lacking sophisticated military technology—such 
as the U�S� Navy littoral combat ships, which provide flexibility, maneuverability, 
and speed at relatively low cost—bring only limited capability to a conventional 
naval battle�16 Given the present incidence of low-intensity conflicts in the South 
China Sea, a postmodern navy might have a role to play, and its relatively cheap 
assets would be affordable� However, neglecting conventional naval combat ca-
pability likely would leave a postmodern navy, with its limited firepower, unable 
to support escalation� Following this naval strategy would leave Vietnam with 
limited options by which to respond to maritime challenges from China�
Sea Denial
Sea denial refers to the prevention or disturbance of an enemy’s use of the sea, 
particularly in areas adjacent to the defender’s coast� This strategy has been 
applied widely by states lacking sufficient capacity or capability to exercise sea 
control�
The concept of sea-denial strategy has experienced evolution and enrich-
ment as a result of the development of modern defense technology� Owing to 
the invention of torpedoes, then of antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as 
the various platforms on which each of these can be deployed, the strike range 
of sea denial underwent a gradual expansion, from distances in the visible range 
to hundreds of nautical miles� The importance of surveillance and targeting 
increased accordingly� Thus, a variety of platforms (e�g�, land-based reconnais-
sance and strike aircraft, over-the-horizon [OTH] radars, ocean-reconnaissance 
satellites, ASCMs) have been applied to the problem, gradually enabling a multi-
dimensional and networked system for sea denial�17
This result mainly flowed from the Soviet navy’s efforts during the Cold War�18 
With its similarly asymmetrically limited resources, Vietnam might find that 
a variety of sea-denial technologies would present an economical solution by 
which it could counter China in the maritime environment� The building of sub-
marines, missile boats, maritime strike aircraft, ASCMs, moderate surveillance 
capability (the South China Sea is relatively small), and other sea denial–oriented 
technologies is in fact the approach Vietnam has taken in its recent military 
buildup� Furthermore, a sea-denial strategy usually is constrained to a specific 
space, which presents it as a less-offensive posture; this fits well with Hanoi’s of-
ficial principle of self-defense�19
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Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy would focus on Chinese surface vessels—the 
main platforms for most maritime activities—in the South China Sea� Chinese 
submarines and aircraft are also valuable targets, but the stealth of submarines 
and the mobility of aircraft make them less feasible targets than surface vessels, 
which are comparatively slow and detectable�20 Furthermore, most maritime ac-
tivities, such as mining and fishing, are conducted using surface platforms, rather 
than aerial or underwater ones�
A Vietnamese sea-denial strategy might be conceptualized and executed as 
follows:
• The relatively small size of the South China Sea would allow Vietnamese 
reconnaissance aircraft, as well as other reconnaissance facilities such as 
satellites, to locate targets for the command center and the strike forces�
• Then Vietnamese combat aircraft, equipped with airborne ASCMs, would 
constitute a major strike force capable of covering the greater part of the 
South China Sea�
• Despite their slow speed, submarines would be the best platforms for anti-
ship missions owing to their stealth and lack of need for air cover�
• Small surface vessels, such as missile boats, are valuable in defending coastal 
areas, as they are easy to hide and wield the considerable firepower of ASCMs� 
However, their narrow range in detecting targets, especially beyond the hori-
zon, and their low durability would restrict them in such a large theater�
• Although major surface vessels, such as frigates, have better surveillance 
capability because of their larger space for equipment and shipboard he-
licopters, which might enable them to make a greater contribution to sea 
denial, their vulnerability to a saturated attack by ASCMs and their high cost 
constrain their use for sea-denial operations�
In addition to the sea surface, airspace is essential to sea denial� If the VPAAF 
is able to establish air superiority, or at least to constrain its Chinese counterpart’s 
activities, it would make a sea-denial strategy more effective�
VIETNAM’S DEVELOPMENT OF SEA-DENIAL CAPABILITY
So far, Hanoi’s recent military procurements generally have reflected the sort of 
strategy laid out above� Vietnam practiced a sea-denial strategy previously, dur-
ing the Indochina War� As far back as the early 1960s, it acquired a number of 
Soviet P-4 and P-6 torpedo boats, and later introduced Project 183 and Project 
206 missile boats armed with P-15 ASCMs� However, as most battles in that war 
occurred on land, Hanoi paid more attention to denying American airpower us-
ing numerous Soviet SAMs, such as the S-75, S-125, and 2K-12, as well as a range 
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of fighters, mainly MiG-21s� After unification in 1975, Moscow supplied a range 
of sea-denial weapon systems, such as Su-22 attacker aircraft equipped with 
airborne Kh-23, Kh-25, and Kh-28 air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), more missile 
boats, and S-35 coastal ASCMs, supported by better surveillance systems such as 
Be-12 flying boats and Ka-25/27 helicopters�21
However, following the political reforms of 1986, the rapprochement with 
China, Vietnam’s withdrawal from its military interventions in neighboring 
countries, and the easing of international tensions overall at the close of the Cold 
War, Vietnam dramatically shifted application of its national resources toward 
economic development� This decreased military preparation, and therefore the 
country’s sea-denial capability� In particular, the decrease in operational strike 
aircraft such as Su-22s significantly reduced Vietnam’s sea-denial radius�22
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Hanoi lost financial and logistical support 
from that source� This led to a period of stagnation for the VPAN and the VPAAF, 
at the same time as their Chinese counterparts were increasing their moderniza-
tion projects� After surviving the most difficult years in the early 1990s, Vietnam 
made minor efforts in the later 1990s to resume a slight buildup of its naval and 
aerial capabilities� It introduced two BPS-500 missile boats, four Project 1241 
missile boats, and twelve Su-27SK fighters with Kh-35 ASCMs, all from Russia�23 
However, such small-scale projects constituted the VPAN and the VPAAF merely 
keeping up with progress in military technology rather than providing a strong 
response to the regional arms dynamic�
In the latter part of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Vietnam’s 
improving financial capacity eventually allowed a large-scale military procure-
ment� Since the end of the Cold War, Hanoi has maintained a gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rate of more than 5 percent, except in 1999, and late in 
the following decade it increased its defense budget significantly, to an amount 
three times larger than it was in 1991�24 For strategic and operational reasons, 
the increase in investment mainly went into maritime capability� However, the 
VPAN’s Cold War legacy of Soviet vessels remains small and aging, and thus the 
service is incapable of properly protecting Vietnam’s maritime activities within its 
water territory�25 The recent increase in procurement reflects Vietnam’s security 
concerns regarding China, especially the latter’s increasingly tough approach to 
territorial disputes since 2007, as seen in a variety of bilateral conflicts at sea�26 
In this strategic environment, the VPAN and the VPAAF have been considered 
strategic priorities—despite the VPA’s superiority in the Vietnamese military 
structure and its political influence—and their military procurement projects 
have been oriented toward denial�
The country’s determination to improve maritime and aerial defense is 
evident�27 The maritime buildups comprise ten additional Project 1241 missile 
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boats armed with Kh-35 ASCMs, thirty-six Su-30MKK fighter-bombers with 
Kh-29 and Kh-31 ASMs and KAB-500/1500 guided bombs, thirteen used Su-
22M attackers from the Czech Republic and Ukraine, six Project 636 diesel-
electric submarines (SSKs) equipped with fifty 3M-54 ASCMs, two Bastion-P 
coastal defense systems with forty P-800 supersonic ASCMs, four to six 
Gepard-3 frigates, two Dutch Sigma 9814-class corvettes, eight Project 10412 
patrol vessels, and six Canadian DHC-6-400 and two Polish M-28B maritime 
patrol aircraft�28 As fourth-generation fighters, the Su-30MKKs—with new 
avionics and an eight-ton payload for ground-attack munitions, especially for 
Kh-31 supersonic ASMs—form a considerable strike capability, in particular 
against surface vessels� Despite their old design, modernized Su-22 aircraft still 
can provide platforms for some ASMs, to supplement the Su-30s in sea-denial 
missions�29 Hanoi also has shown an interest in purchasing non-Russian com-
bat aircraft�30 Russian Kh-35, 3M-54, and P-800 missiles also are used to deny 
adversary surface vessels beyond the horizon, with maritime patrol aircraft as-
sisting in finding targets�31 Vietnam’s procurement of two S-300PMU-1 SAM 
systems (maximum range: 150 km) and its procurement in the near future of 
S-400 SAMs (maximum range: 400 km) may provide the capability to deny Chi-
nese aerial activity in some offshore areas�32 In contrast to other Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations countries, Vietnam’s efforts in military modernization 
are outstanding� And they are concentrated fully on the maritime field—the 
VPA has received no major project�33 The predominance of Russian equipment 
probably reflects the legacy of the Soviet sea-denial strategy that somewhat fit 
Vietnam’s needs, as well as the tight bilateral relations�34 However, the Russian 
dominance in Hanoi’s arsenal may present operational and logistical obstacles 
for several non-Russian systems�
Sufficient training is an indispensable factor in the efficient use of military 
assets, and Hanoi is making improvements in this area� For decades, limited 
budgets constrained training of VPAN and VPAAF forces, but the new projects 
are bringing in additional capacity� Weapon systems from foreign suppliers come 
with the provision of training in operation, maintenance, and repair, as well 
as simulation facilities� In addition, joint exercises with foreign countries can 
strengthen training�35 Internally, the personnel interchange program between 
the VPAN and the VPAAF that began in 2009 also may strengthen their ability 
to conduct joint operations�36 However, the VPAN is still rather inexperienced in 
operating and maintaining sophisticated naval weapon systems and operations, 
especially those for submarines�37
Despite its lack of mention in official Vietnamese materials, such as the de-
fense white paper, Vietnam’s enhancement of its naval and aviation assets may 
represent Hanoi’s intention to prepare for multilevel conflicts� As the economic 
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importance of maritime resources grows, the naval and aviation buildups indi-
cate some concern about control of the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ)� The patrol vessels, corvettes, frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and fighters 
are designated to protect the EEZ in an armed conflict up to a medium level� In 
other words, Vietnam’s military buildups suggest that Hanoi is concerned about 
more than just sea denial� In the case of larger-scope warfare scenarios involv-
ing China’s massed forces, the VPAN and the VPAAF likely would be ineffective 
at protecting aerial and maritime activities, or even simply providing escorts, 
so they would concentrate on denial operations� The Vietnamese missile boats, 
SSKs, coastal ASCMs, and SAMs are intended specifically to deny particular 
aerial and maritime targets�
However, in contrast to their earlier capabilities, the VPAN and the VPAAF 
now can extend their denial power by using longer-range arms with greater de-
structive capability� For example, the maximum range of the 3M-54 ASCMs is 
at least 220 km, a figure that could be multiplied depending on the mobility of 
their submarine platforms� The supersonic P-800 ASCMs with 300 km range are 
less likely to be intercepted than the older subsonic ASCMs�38 The S-300PMU-1 
SAMs have the potential to cover a range of airspace over some coastal waters, 
while the Su-30MK2’s wide combat radius and beyond-vision-range capability 
can extend the range of engagement�39
Moreover, the longer-range weapon systems not only enable Hanoi to deny 
hostile aerial and maritime activities beyond its EEZ but also present opportuni-
ties to strike certain Chinese military facilities� A prime candidate would be Yulin 
on Hainan Island, the home base of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet—a major facility 
less than 300 km from Vietnam’s coastline�40 Hanoi’s R-17 and 3M-54 missiles 
could reach the Chinese naval base, and the act of striking its vessels and facilities 
could be seen as part of a sea-denial strategy�41 However, as previously discussed, 
attacking onshore targets almost certainly would be classified as escalation, and 
Vietnam would face even greater retaliation from China� Furthermore, the short-
ness of the distance between the Vietnamese coastline and Hainan Island would 
be convenient in turn for the PLAN and other Chinese military units to launch 
retaliatory attacks, thus leaving Vietnamese facilities vulnerable� Therefore, while 
such threats may help in deterrence, they may be disadvantageous to carry out�
THE CAPABILITY GAP
Despite considerable investment, several factors constrain Vietnam’s current 
capability to achieve fully its strategic goal—denial of China’s maritime activities 
in the South China Sea�
First, Vietnam’s surveillance capability may be insufficient, or at least weak� 
Long-range weapon systems rely on targeting; the platforms themselves, whether 
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vessels or aircraft, may have limited detection capability� Vietnamese surveillance 
currently relies on the country’s VNREDSat-1 natural resource satellite, which 
uses French technology, and several aerial platforms such as the VPAN M-28, 
DHC-6 maritime patrol aircraft, and Vietnamese Coast Guard C-212 maritime 
patrol aircraft� Strike aircraft such as the Su-22, -27, and -30 add limited detection 
capability�42 Hanoi’s current remote-sensing cooperative effort with New Delhi 
may contribute to surveillance as well�43 Land-based radars, signal-collection 
facilities, and surface vessels also may be important for Vietnam, although 
little information is available on Hanoi’s planning in this regard� A central and 
networked command system could be established, as long as the VPAN takes 
significant lessons from the Soviet sea-denial strategy�44
Given the above, Vietnam may be able to observe the whole South China Sea 
area� However, several questions arise regarding this surveillance arrangement, 
relating to integration and survivability�
Integrating and sharing the collected intelligence among various aerial plat-
forms, the command chain, and strike units would not be easy� Owing to its 
earth-observation function and foreign management, the VNREDSat-1 might 
not provide real-time information� A similar situation might occur regarding the 
Vietnam-India space cooperative venture�45 Because Vietnam’s existing aerial-
surveillance platforms come from various sources, such as Russia and Israel, their 
integration would present another challenge�46
With regard to survivability, Vietnamese propeller-driven maritime patrol 
aircraft lacking VPAAF escort would be vulnerable in the air to Chinese fighters; 
and even when escorts were available, VPAAF fighters would be outnumbered by 
their Chinese counterparts� In the Guangzhou Military Region alone, the PLAN 
Air Force and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) deploy four times as many fourth-
generation fighters as the VPAAF, not to mention potential reinforcements from 
other areas in China (see table 1)�47 The recent formation of the Chinese Southern 
Theater Command, which has broader coverage than the Guangzhou Military 
Region, may allow its commander to concentrate even more assets�48 China’s 
air superiority also includes better intelligence and command, accommodated 
by its airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and longer-range 
air-refueling aircraft�49 In addition, in the near future PLAN fighters based on 
aircraft carrier(s) or on forward bases on some of the Spratly Islands may pre-
sent a further feasible option�50 This would mean that the VPAAF’s surveillance 
capability could be decreased significantly, if not neutralized, during wartime� 
Ground facilities in Vietnam also may be exposed to Chinese strikes, particularly 
from ASMs�51 The Vietnamese Suhkoi Flanker aircraft, with their high mobility 
and air-to-air combat ability, may be more likely to survive, but they likely would 
be occupied with various other missions, such as aerial combat, rather than with 
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detecting maritime targets� Without aerial intelligence from fixed-wing aircraft, 
the VPAN would be dependent on its Ka-27 helicopters and sonars alone to 
detect targets beyond the horizon� But those helicopters easily could fall prey to 
attack by China’s fighters, and the availability and quality of information from 
sonar are sometimes unstable owing to fluctuations in maritime conditions�
In short, the VPAN and other forces may not be able to provide sufficient 
information on targets beyond the horizon�
Second, the majority of Vietnamese weapon systems share the same Russian 
origins as their Chinese counterparts� For example, both Hanoi and Beijing 
purchase the Su-30MK2 and Project 636 SSKs, although the former’s subma-
rines may be more advanced than the latter’s�52 Thus, the general technological 
characteristics and even the details of Vietnam’s supposed “trump cards” may 
be transparent to China already� The Vietnamese crews may learn different 
doctrines and tactics as a result of training in India; however, the Chinese op-
erators of those Russian aircraft and submarines have had more time than their 
Vietnamese counterparts—owing to earlier procurement and perhaps to reverse 
engineering—to master similar weapon systems�53 Besides the fighters and sub-
marines, the VPAAF’s Kh-31P antiradar missile is valuable in destroying enemy 
radars, AWACS, and other surveillance systems, or threatening to shut them off, 
but it would not be as formidable against the PLAN or the PLAAF, again owing to 
China’s earlier procurement advantage�54 Although Hanoi has begun to purchase 
non-Russian arms unavailable to Beijing, such as the Dutch Sigma corvettes, it 
will be difficult for it to change the Russian-dominant nature of its military in 
the near future�
Finally, quantitative inferiority would constrain the durability and credibil-
ity of Vietnam’s A2/AD strategy, and Vietnam’s limited logistical facilities and 
training may not help the situation� As most modern sea-denial platforms, such 
as submarines and fighter-bombers, require intensive maintenance as well as 
excellent training to retain their operability, even Hanoi’s increased investment 
Fighter Generation Vietnam Guangzhou Military Region, China (com-bined PLAAF and PLANAF units)
3rd MiG-21Bis/UM: 33; Su-22M/UM: 28 J-7s: 3 regiments and 1 brigade, about 120; 
J-8s: 1 regiment, about 24
4th Su-27SK/UBK: 11; Su-30MK2: 36 (29 
delivered)
J-11/B (Su-27): 4 regiments, about 96; J-10: 2 
regiments and 1 brigade, about 72; Su-30MKK: 
1 regiment, about 24
Note: PLANAF = PLA Naval Air Force
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2016, pp. 244–45, 248, 298; van Creveld, The Age of Airpower, pp. 198–204.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF AIRPOWER BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CHINA
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to date may not be sufficient.55 Although Russia is assisting Vietnam with mis-
sile manufacture and shipbuilding, Vietnam remains restricted by its limited 
defense industry and its resultant dependence on foreign supply for some critical 
parts, such as engines. Most VPAN and VPAAF weapon systems, especially non- 
Russian ones, also would face supply issues during conflict.56 Apart from the 
above-mentioned quantitative gap in the number of combat aircraft, the numbers 
of Vietnamese major surface vessels and submarines are much lower than those 
of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet (see table 2).57 Despite the sometimes advanta-
geous asymmetrical nature of Hanoi’s sea-denial strategy, Beijing’s sheer numeri-
cal superiority may allow it to absorb losses Hanoi would inflict during warfare, 
and eventually to coerce the latter toward the former’s strategic goals.
Vietnam might achieve a tactical or operational victory in the initial phase of 
a conflict. However, owing to integration issues, dependence on Russian arms, 
and quantitative inferiority, it is doubtful that Vietnam could sustain that victory 
in the face of China’s superior military capability.
In cases of protecting or restoring control of an island and exchanges of fire, 
Beijing easily could reinforce its Guangzhou Military Region from other regions 
with more vessels and aircraft to prolong the war, and even to transform it into 
a war of attrition. A positive outcome for Vietnam would be a decisive victory 
that caused China to withdraw because of serious damage to either its military 
capability or its international reputation. With regard to achieving this strategic 
goal, the VPAN’s Project 636 SSKs, with their stealth characteristics and long-
range ASCMs, would be most likely to survive and might succeed in launching 
several waves of attacks on the surface vessels of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet. 
The Sukhoi aircraft and surface vessels also could contribute their respective 
ASCMs to sea-denial strikes. Since major surface vessels are a significant—and 
expensive—component of China’s sea power, the sinking of a number of frigates 
and destroyers, or even an aircraft carrier, might force Chinese decision makers 
to cease fire. However, the South Sea Fleet’s sixteen SSKs plus two nuclear attack 
submarines might constrain or even neutralize the Vietnamese SSKs’ tactical 
advantages, as submarines often make effective ASW platforms.58 By the same 
Type of Vessel Vietnam South Sea Fleet, China
Surface combatants Frigates: 2 (total of 8 involved in current deals) Destroyers: 7; frigates: 20
Submarines SSKs: 6 SSNs: 2; SSKs: 16
Note: SSN = nuclear attack submarine 
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2016, pp. 248, 298.
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF NAVAL POWER BETWEEN VIETNAM AND  
CHINA’S SOUTH SEA FLEET
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token, Vietnamese aircraft and vessels may bear considerable losses in the face 
of dominant Chinese countermeasures, especially if the latter can attack the for-
mer’s bases ashore�
In a blockade scenario, the VPAN—limited in ASW capacity, frigates, helicop-
ters, and aircraft—would be unlikely to neutralize or expel the PLAN’s numerous 
submarines or to be able to escort merchant vessels through the SLOCs to a safe 
area� VPAN and VPAAF ASCMs could keep the PLAN’s surface vessels at some 
distance from the Vietnamese coastline, but Vietnam might fail to deal effectively 
with a blockade established at a greater distance, owing to its inadequate surveil-
lance capability and the limited ranges of its surface vessels and strike aircraft� 
The VPAN’s small flotilla of Project 636 SSKs would pose a considerable threat 
against major Chinese surface ships, but their number may be too small to cre-
ate a real impediment to China’s access to SLOCs, given their limited long-term 
durability, the narrow margin for loss, and the risk of attacking vessels from 
other countries� In other words, Beijing would be likely to press Hanoi through 
blockade, and the latter’s countermeasures might not be enough to neutralize the 
former’s operation�
In summation, the VPAN and the VPAAF, using an asymmetrical approach 
and employing their denial capabilities, may not achieve their strategic goals in 
all wartime scenarios by fully neutralizing their Chinese counterparts’ superior-
ity� With Hanoi’s cautious attitude on defense expenditure—allocating roughly 
2�5 percent of GDP to the defense budget—it will take a few years to complete its 
recent procurements, making future projects rather unlikely, or at least likely to 
be of smaller scale�59
It can be deduced from the scenarios outlined that Vietnam faces limited 
chances of overall military success, but nonetheless has strengthened its de-
terrence against China� Given the inherently asymmetrical nature of bilateral 
relations between Hanoi and Beijing, the former’s deterrence helps its “hedging 
engagement” with the latter by adding considerably to the costs of using force�60 
Compared with a decade ago, the cost to China of conducting armed conflict 
against Vietnam has become higher, and the outcomes have become less certain� 
Before the VPAN and the VPAAF acquired additional assets, Hanoi only had a 
declining number of aging Su-22M attacker aircraft to react to any contingency 
on the islands it has occupied or the water territories it claims� Although the gap 
between the military capabilities of the two sides remains wide, Hanoi now has 
expanded its options compared with previous periods� This means the PLAN 
and the PLAAF now need to deploy more units in any operation against Viet-
nam if they are to maintain superiority� This both increases the preparation time 
and effort needed, thus reducing the possibility of a surprise attack, and poten-
tially paints China with the more aggressive image on the international stage� 
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Tactically, this may make Beijing less likely to use its military units to provoke 
small-scale conflicts, especially in cases that involve an unnecessary risk of loss 
or defeat�
Since China is involved in other territorial conflicts, such as those relating to 
Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands, concerns over any one of them may prevent 
Beijing from concentrating enough force to achieve absolute superiority over Ha-
noi� Without sufficient Chinese superiority, Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy would 
prove especially effective, or at least influential, within the broader regional 
geostrategic picture, as opposed to the purely bilateral relationship� In this way, 
Vietnam’s military investment may contribute to stabilizing or ameliorating the 
changing maritime balance of power currently being driven by China’s increasing 
naval might�
Hanoi’s sea-denial strategy had its foundation in the Cold War era� The current 
version can be interpreted as a moderate form of military modernization and a 
reasonable, asymmetrical response to Beijing’s superior military power�
Vietnam’s beefed-up denial capability may mean that China would not per-
ceive it to be the “easiest prey” in the South China Sea; in terms of pure military 
capability, the VPAN and the VPAAF are indeed much stronger than their 
Philippine counterparts� However, Manila can rely on extended deterrence by 
strengthening its alliance mechanisms with the United States, such as the En-
hanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), and with other countries, 
such as Japan� As the Philippines and Vietnam are two frontline states facing 
China’s expanding sea power, once the Philippines achieves better deterrence, or 
even if Chinese decision makers simply perceive this to be the case, Vietnam may 
suffer heavier strategic pressure because of its nonallied international stance�61 In 
this context, Hanoi’s pursuit of a sea-denial strategy helps to ensure that, overall, 
it is not weaker than Manila when facing Beijing�
Vietnam’s denial capability serves as a diplomatic bargaining chip� During 
peacetime, Hanoi’s military investment demonstrates its commitment to secu-
rity and serves as a form of defense diplomacy� Commitment to defense is a sign 
of shouldering responsibility rather than free riding, a matter of importance to 
countries considering forming alliances, other cooperative security efforts, or 
both with Vietnam� Defense diplomacy (e�g�, joint exercises and friendly visits) 
represents an effective means by which the VPAN and VPAAF can strengthen 
relations with their foreign counterparts�62
If Vietnam had no substantial defense capability, an external third power 
would face relatively high costs of intervention, especially in the case of a di-
rect confrontation with China; those costs might be so high that the power 
would refrain from taking any substantial action� Since Hanoi is developing the 
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capability to take its own steps to resist Beijing’s military initiative during an ini-
tial period, a third party—which most likely would be Washington—would have 
more options, including providing arms or putting military pressure on Beijing’s 
other fronts, such as in the East China Sea� Additionally, if China succeeded in 
presenting the world with a fait accompli it would render subsequent external 
intervention less meaningful, but Vietnam’s resistance might prevent this� How-
ever, despite improving Vietnamese-U�S� military ties, as demonstrated by some 
partnering and cooperation, U�S� intervention may remain uncertain owing to 
the lack of a formal alliance like that with the Philippines� In this context, Viet-
nam’s sea-denial capability would be a critical factor for decision makers in the 
United States�63 Such a strategy would provide Hanoi with some breathing space 
to wait for changes to occur on a domestic or international level, as influenced 
by third parties�
The similarity between the Russian-originated weapon systems that Vietnam 
and China both use, Vietnam’s quantitative inferiority, and its limited surveil-
lance capability make it unlikely that Vietnam’s denial-oriented military strategy 
will be able to counter fully the might even of China’s Guangzhou Military Region 
alone� Thus—unless the VPAN and the VPAAF develop some new tactics that 
would constitute a significant surprise to their Chinese counterparts—Hanoi’s 
present military assets likely are insufficient to achieve the asymmetrical effects 
at which its sea-denial strategy aims� Strengthening that deterrence at least would 
ameliorate Vietnam’s situation in the geostrategic landscape, including in its bi-
lateral relations with China�
When considering the development of Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy, three 
points are worth further discussion: the country’s alliance or defense diplomacy, 
further procurement, and political leadership�
Despite an official emphasis on nonalliance, Hanoi is not bound by any treaty 
to remain neutral, leaving it free to change its diplomatic policy� In a fashion 
similar to the Philippines’ use of the EDCA to strengthen its deterrence against 
China, Vietnam also can set up some type of security arrangement with a third-
party power, whether it be an alliance in name or not� There might be some future 
breakthrough in Vietnamese-U�S� relations, although Vietnam’s long relationship 
with Russia in defense and economic matters may affect such a process�64 Once 
any alliance is formed, the role of Vietnam’s sea-denial strategy may be adjusted 
accordingly� Even at a level below an alliance, joint exercises and other forms of 
military cooperation also may affect Hanoi’s sea-denial strategy, in addition to 
increasing Beijing’s uncertainty about its strategic calculation regarding Hanoi�
As for further procurement, the means by which Vietnam deals with the 
weak points in its sea-denial capability will be crucial� Adding surveillance 
systems, whether OTH radar, maritime patrol aircraft, or maritime satellites, 
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would improve targeting and the organization of attack and command, thereby 
strengthening the overall efficiency of sea-denial operations� A more integrated 
chain of command would enhance sea-denial capability immediately� Regarding 
means used for strikes, ASCMs and aerial platforms would be preferable because 
of their high mobility and lower costs of procurement and training compared 
with submarines� If financial capacity is limited, land-based ASCMs present an 
economical solution�
Finally, it is possible that the new Vietnamese leadership, given its pro-China 
record, may adjust the pace and content of military modernization to stabilize 
bilateral relations�65 Such a development would require time to manifest itself, be-
cause Hanoi’s present arms contracts have not been filled yet, and the situation will 
not become clearer until Vietnam launches a new wave of military procurement 
—or does not� As deterrence is an indispensable part of Vietnam’s current 
China policy, investment in defense is not likely to be dropped entirely from the 
country’s list of priorities; but if Vietnam achieves relatively stable relations with 
China, it may pay greater attention to economic or other issues, and the pace of 
building a sea-denial strategy for Vietnam might slow down�
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what is victory?
John B. Hattendorf
The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of 
Modern War, by James Q� Whitman� Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard Univ� Press, 2012� 336 pages� $19�95 (paperback; e-book 
$29�95)�
Understanding Victory: Naval Operations from Trafalgar to the 
Falklands, by Geoffrey Till. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014� 
248 pages� $60 (e-book $60)�
How does one measure victory in combat operations? Is there a difference 
between victory ashore and victory at sea? These are certainly two fundamen-
tal questions about the nature and character of war that are worthy of careful 
reflection, but too often they become lost among vague assumptions� The two 
scholars who have taken up the challenge in these two volumes represent differ-
ent academic disciplines and each looks at the subject through quite a different 
lens� While each volume makes a substantial contribution to the literature by 
itself, when read together they provide an even more interesting and provocative 
basis for the readers of this journal to think about victory, both in the past and 
in the future�
James Q� Whitman is Ford Foundation Profes-
sor of Comparative and Foreign Law at the Yale 
Law School� His book focuses mainly on the great 
land wars of the eighteenth century in Europe and 
in European colonies around the globe, and does 
not include naval warfare� In contrast, Geoffrey 
Till is professor emeritus of maritime studies at 
King’s College London, and a distinguished naval 
Dr. John B. Hattendorf is the Ernest J. King Profes-
sor Emeritus of Maritime History at the Naval War 
College. He joined the Navy in 1964 and served in 
uniform at the Naval War College in 1972–73 before 
returning as a civilian faculty member in 1977. He 
retired from the civilian faculty in September 2016. 
He is the author, coauthor, editor, or coeditor of more 
than forty books on British and American maritime 
history and naval warfare.
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historian and historian of modern strategic thought� His book is a set of four case 
studies from naval history that focus on single-warship operations in the context 
of four major naval events: the battle of Trafalgar in 1805, the battle of Jutland in 
1916, the battle of Malaya in 1941, and the Falklands campaign in 1982�
It is useful to start with Whitman’s book� Harvard University Press provocatively 
describes his volume as “an iconoclastic tour de force�” Whitman shows that the 
concept of victory in battle has changed dramatically over time� He introduces his 
topic by quoting the description of the aftermath of the 1859 battle of Solferino 
written by Henri Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross and recipient of the first 
Nobel Peace Prize: “Anyone crossing the vast theatre of the previous day’s fighting 
could see at every step, in the midst of chaotic disorder, despair unspeakable and 
misery of every kind” (p� 2)�
Whitman then goes on to show that this mid-nineteenth-century pacifist’s 
view of the pointless slaughter and misery of battle contrasts sharply with the 
view more widely held in history: that death in battle was a profoundly meaning-
ful sacrifice in the process of larger contexts and struggles� Such efforts included 
maintaining principles of religion or law and order, redrawing borders, preserv-
ing hereditary legal rights, overthrowing regimes, or maintaining national or 
imperial survival� Whitman reminds his readers that in the past many writers 
described a pitched battle as a type of trial or legal proceeding—a lawful way to 
settle disagreements� In ancient times, battles could be fought separately from 
society—a farmer could be tending his fields peacefully while a battle took place 
nearby� In European medieval history, the result of a battle was seen as the judg-
ment of God� Battle was viewed as a kind of legal ordeal staged to summon God 
to judge cases that humans were incapable of deciding on their own� This, Whit-
man points out, now seems utterly bizarre, when in the modern world we have 
come to view legal proceedings as a means to avoid violence� By the eighteenth 
century, the medieval view had developed into a concept of contractual settle-
ment: solving international differences through the chance outcome that battle 
involved� Under this interpretation, a pitched battle was a way of limiting vio-
lence in war and preventing warfare from spilling over into the broader aspects 
of society� Although pitched battles involved the savage slaughter of hundreds or 
thousands of young men, limiting conflict to such crucibles of violence protected 
societies from worse forms of unlimited warfare� In this way, pitched battles 
avoided the attacks on general society involved in the indiscriminate violence 
of systematic pillaging, scorched-earth campaigns, carpet bombing, terrorist at-
tacks, guerrilla warfare, and the like� The concept of the pitched battle, Whitman 
argues, was a more effective means of civilizing warfare than what is available to 
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us today, when lawyers argue about jus ad bellum and jus in bello� While these 
modern concepts are intended to humanize warfare, they strictly forbid limiting 
war by consensual battle, providing for the use of war only in cases of self-defense 
and extreme necessity�
Whitman deals with his subject in six chapters�
• In “Why Battles Matter,” he establishes that eighteenth-century pitched 
battles were a meaningful and lawful means of establishing rights and set-
tling disputes� This concept broke down in the mid-nineteenth century in 
the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, when its eighteenth-
century legal meaning became lost�
• In “Accepting the Wager of Battle,” he argues that the eighteenth-century 
concept had nothing to do with Clausewitzian concepts of battle or with the 
culture of dueling, but rather with the minds of eighteenth-century kings—a 
battle could gain or lose a kingdom�
• In “Laying Just Claim to the Profits of War,” Whitman shows that warfare in 
the eighteenth century, as in earlier times, was about dividing up claims to 
territory in the tradition of the ancient just war theorists and insisting that a 
legal pretext be given for war� What was different in the eighteenth century 
was that only kings retained the practical power to go to war to settle their 
differences�
• In “The Monarchical Monopolization of Military Violence,” Whitman 
explains that often in history wars have been waged to assert or deny le-
gitimacy to political powers� Agreeing with Max Weber, Whitman writes 
that “the sovereign is one who can succeed in claiming the right to exercise 
unrestrained violence” (p� 171)�
• In “Were There Really Rules?,” Whitman agrees that the eighteenth century 
was an era of exceptionally restrained warfare, although it saw actions such 
as the unusually bloody battle of Malplaquet in 1709 during the War of the 
Spanish Succession; the clash produced some 32,000 casualties� Although 
the Duke of Marlborough and his allies lost nearly twice as many men as the 
French, contemporaries judged the former the victors because they retained 
possession and full control of the battlefield, which their enemies ceded�
In making his point, Whitman points out that the analogy of wars to games, 
while an attractive one, is highly misleading� Games have rules that must 
be obeyed; war does not� In looking at the eighteenth century, Whitman 
concludes that the practice of limited warfare in that era showed that victory 
in warfare succeeded in shaping the conduct of war and its results in a way 
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that the simple implementation of force did not� The law of victory is seen 
in battles such as Chotusitz in 1742 and Yorktown in 1781, making warfare 
more controlled and decisive than what came before or after�
• In Whitman’s final chapter, “The Death of Pitched Battle,” leading up to his 
conclusion, he discusses the rise of the “great battle” theory and the way in 
which it eclipsed the earlier idea that God, fortune, or chance ruled human 
events� In the romantic era of the early nineteenth century, chance became 
a factor that a genius could control, rather than being the basis for a legal 
doctrine of war� In this context, the idea of battles as grandiose pivotal events 
in world history gained traction, eclipsing the concept at work during the 
eighteenth century�
There is much to learn from understanding the changed conceptions of vic-
tory in warfare� Today it is not victories in battle that are seen as world-changing 
events; instead, change is created by broader underlying structural forces, such 
as economics� Pitched battles do not often occur in the modern world; but as a 
result, Whitman notes, it has become hard to bring our wars to an accepted con-
clusion� The modern victors tend to make claims to limitless rights� Reflecting 
on the issues of our time, Whitman concludes: “We need a law of victory that can 
help us cut deals and end wars without insisting that every victory must end in a 
great triumph for the historic cause of democracy” (p� 260)� At the same time, he 
cautions: “Wars enter their most dangerous territory when they aim to remake 
the world, and the same is true of lawyers” (p� 262)�
Geoffrey Till takes a completely different approach to understanding naval vic-
tory� His objective is to analyze what has changed and what has not changed in 
the successful conduct of naval warfare over the past two hundred years� In ex-
amining his four chosen naval battles or campaigns, he concentrates on the role 
of a particular ship in each campaign, purposefully selecting a ship that does not 
come to mind immediately when one recalls the battle� In doing so, he is well 
aware that a superficial glance at his book might lead an observer to conclude that 
his focus on battle and little-known individual ships might be considered passé 
or even perversely antiquarian�
For that reason, he takes time to explain that his approach is a multilayered 
one that presents his subject in a manner that provides an unusual, but highly ef-
fective, light on the changing character of naval warfare� In doing this, Till points 
out factors that are very useful for modern naval planners to consider regarding 
what generally has worked and what has not worked out over time and in dif-
fering technological circumstances� To make his point, he systematically applies 
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a set of eleven perspectives to use in evaluating each of the cases: (1) strategic 
design, (2) technological advantage, (3) command and leadership, (4) organiza-
tional efficiency, (5) training, (6) intelligence, (7) concept of operations, (8) battle 
awareness, (9) maneuverability, (10) firepower, and (11) resilience�
Using these criteria, Till produces a set of superb, detailed analyses of the 
actions� The four studies vary in length from thirty-four to fifty pages and are 
based on careful examination of the detailed literature on each topic� Each study 
stands alone as a separate battle analysis� “On the face of it, these four ship battles 
were very different because of their unique circumstances, their very different 
technologies, and their disparate geographic and chronological settings� But they 
did have things in common, most obviously, in that they mattered� � � � [They] 
conveyed important messages and had important consequences� These battles 
had decisive effects, for good or ill” (p� 189)�
In a most interesting section of his conclusions, the author reveals that the 
book had its origins in the late-1990s era of “transformation” and the concept of 
the revolution in military affairs that went along with it� He reminds readers that 
the most vocal proponents of that concept often gave the impression that nothing 
in the past held any relevance for the future; however, their own statement in Joint 
Vision 2020 suggested that there was much more to transformation and to the 
ability to prevail in combat than mere technological advantage� Till agrees that 
naval operations are much more complicated than a matter of mere technological 
advantage, and this explains the long gestation period for this book�
With the thought in mind that naval operations are so highly complex, Till 
modestly hesitates to make any simple generalization about the factors that led 
to naval victory in the four cases at hand; he leaves it up to his readers to reach 
their own conclusions� But he does offer great insight�
While each battle encounter is unique in its own way, two general factors 
must be kept in mind� Technological advantage is important, but faulty strategic 
design clearly can shift the balance and lead to operational and tactical defeat� 
At the level of operational enablers, technological advantage also plays a role, but 
at this level it can also be undercut by faulty command and leadership capacity; 
while styles in leadership may differ, clarity in aim and in relative responsibility 
is essential� There is also a critical need to strike a balance between centralized 
direction and delegated control� In this, modern communications need to ensure 
that subordinates in the thick of a fight can make their needs known to their 
superiors� Furthermore, military success is dependent on effective organization 
and efficient supply, which, in turn, are reflections of national economic strength, 
industrial capacity, and military support systems� Effective training for combat 
operations is always a critical factor, but the historical examples studied here lead 
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one to wonder why training levels can vary so much, even within a fleet� A reader 
may well conclude that this turns on both leadership and the opportunities that 
are made available at the individual ship and unit level�
Till points out that a “commander’s concept of operations translates strategic 
enablers into battle deliverables� To be effective, the concept needs to be consis-
tent with, and supportive of, national aims; realistic in terms of means available 
� � � and effectively implementable by the commander’s subordinates” (p� 194)� 
Battle awareness, he points out, is simply the tactical expression of strategic and 
operational intelligence, but intelligence is the key element in achieving surprise, 
whether it be tactical, operational, or strategic� Thus, an effective concept of op-
erations is an essential precondition to success in naval warfare�
In his final analysis, Till concludes that, among his eleven perspectives, no 
single one is paramount in importance; all contribute to and are affected by the 
others in varying degrees that depend on the situation�
These books by James Whitman and Geoffrey Till look at different issues in their 
examination of the meaning of victory and military success, but both are very fine 
examples of the varying ways in which the study of history can bring enormous 
insight and understanding to the changing nature and character of war while also 
being a corrective to an overreliance on new technology� Both provide us with a 
balanced understanding based on a deeper perspective on what has changed and 
what has not changed in warfare� As Till eloquently concludes his volume, “To be 
useful, history needs to be accurate, objective, dispassionate, and scientific in its 
pursuit of truth, rather than merely a past invented to provide cohesiveness and 
purpose to its inheritors” (p� 199)� This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees�
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BOOK REVIEWS
WHY? AND OTHER THIRTY-FIVE-YEAR QUESTIONS
Pussycats: Why the Rest Keeps Beating the West and What Can Be Done about It, by Martin van  
Creveld� Mevasseret Zion, Isr�: DLVC Enterprises, 2016� 249 pages� $11�95�
Martin van Creveld is one of the 
foremost—and most controversial— 
contemporary students of warfare� He 
has authored over two dozen books 
exploring various facets of strategy, the 
future of warfare, and military opera-
tions and organization, including such 
works as The Rise and Decline of the 
State, The Transformation of War, Tech-
nology and War, Command in War, Sup-
plying War, and The Training of Officers�
In this book, van Creveld notes that, 
despite their overwhelming superiority 
in virtually every facet of military power, 
Western militaries since 1953 deployed 
abroad to fight non-Westerners almost 
always have been defeated and forced to 
withdraw� He poses the question, “How 
did the world’s best and most ferocious 
soldiers, who for centuries fought and 
defeated anybody and everybody until 
they dominated the entire world, turn 
into pussycats?” Van Creveld suggests 
five broad categories of causes that 
individually and collectively over 
time have eroded greatly the basis for 
effective Western military superiority:
• Subduing the young
• Defanging the troops
• Feminizing the forces 
• Constructing post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD)
• Delegitimizing war
The first refers to the ever-growing 
restrictions most Western countries have 
placed on young people, ostensibly on 
grounds of their safety and welfare� The 
author declares that “the move to impose 
more and more restrictions on young 
people is a manifestation, if not to say 
disease, typical of modern life in general 
and Western life in particular�” The entry 
into adulthood becomes ever more ex-
tended, reinforced by phenomena such 
as “helicopter parenting,” “safe spaces” 
and “trigger warnings” on campus, and 
strict limits on work that minors are 
permitted to do� This is complemented 
by an excessive emphasis on unearned 
“self-esteem,” a strong desire to avoid 
“traumatizing” the young by criticizing 
or reprimanding them, a de-emphasis 
on assuming individual responsibility, 
and the devaluation of competition 
for fear of hurting those who do not 
perform as well as others� The cumula-
tive effect, van Creveld argues, is to 
infantilize the young, undercut the 
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motivation to excel, and steadily reduce 
individual and societal willingness to 
take risks—thus, “scant wonder that 
a great many young people no longer 
know how to cope with anything�” Yet 
this is the pool from which Western 
militaries must draw their troops�
Van Creveld asserts that many factors 
have contributed to “defanging the 
troops�” He notes the vast increase since 
Vietnam in the proportion of senior 
officers in the U�S� military� This rank 
inflation has resulted in ever more deci-
sions being pushed to higher levels, with 
a seriously negative impact on the speed 
of decision making and a mounting risk 
aversion at all levels� Another problem 
is the spread of civilian attitudes into 
and imposition of civilian norms on the 
military� War is a deadly business, yet 
Western, especially U�S�, military forces 
have been hobbled by “exquisite” rules of 
engagement that often impede mission 
accomplishment at excessive risk to 
friendly forces� One side cannot play by 
“Marquess of Queensberry rules” alone� 
At the same time, there is a growing 
trend of senior officers “treating their 
troops as if they were rowdies and/or 
babies unable to look after themselves, 
and/or ‘pussycats�’” The recurrent bouts 
of drastic liberty restrictions on U�S� 
forces in Japan are a prime example� The 
author writes that “in today’s politically 
correct world it is no longer enough 
to kill those who would kill you”; the 
enemy must not be disrespected, let 
alone humiliated after his defeat—no 
battlefield souvenirs taken� Male ag-
gressiveness, historically quintessential 
to battlefield success, is now a problem 
for leadership to deal with, particularly 
with regard to matters such as pornog-
raphy and allegedly rampant sexual 
misconduct in the military, which have 
nothing to do with combat effectiveness� 
The proliferation of military lawyers on 
staffs means that commanders or squad 
leaders now must keep potential legal 
ramifications constantly in mind, on top 
of all the other battlefield imperatives�
But even worse, posits van Creveld, is 
the “de-Militarized Military�” While it is 
undeniable that “war is the most terrible 
of all activities we humans engage 
in,” there always has been a sense of 
satisfaction, even enjoyment, in it� But 
“in the prevailing attitude of political 
correctness [to proclaim that] invites at-
tack�” For example, when Marine general 
Jim Mattis noted that shooting some 
people who merited it was “a hell of a 
lot of fun,” he was roundly condemned 
and “counseled” to shut up� Similarly, 
the notions of “hero” and “heroism” that 
traditionally underpinned a military’s 
fighting spirit and its “culture of war” 
have been devalued systematically in 
Western societies as they pertain to 
combat, whereas they once were associ-
ated closely with pride� But the author 
warns that “any attempt to tamper with 
[the culture of war], even if laudable 
in terms of a progressive country’s 
instincts, is dangerous and should only 
be undertaken with the greatest caution� 
What has been demolished can never 
be restored�” Thus, he concludes, “scant 
wonder that � � � the willingness to 
serve has been declining for decades�”
Van Creveld’s third category, “feminiz-
ing the forces,” is no doubt the most 
controversial� He starts by stating flatly 
that “currently Western countries are 
embarked on a social experiment that 
has no precedent in history�” He further 
asserts that “whatever feminists may 
claim and the statute books may say, 
women and men are only equal in 
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certain respects but not in others� Hence 
the attempt to treat them as if they were 
was bound to cause as many problems as 
it solved�” There are two principal physi-
cal differences between the two sexes, 
namely, physical strength/endurance 
and pregnancy/motherhood� The author 
goes into some detail on how these 
impact individual and unit performance�
More importantly, van Creveld notes 
that the sustained, intensive effort to cre-
ate a “unisex” military has had serious 
second-order consequences� Measures 
such as putting men and women 
through separate courses with different 
physical performance requirements 
and “gender norming” are inherently 
suspect from a combat-effectiveness 
perspective� The problem is that fair 
treatment implies equality, meaning 
that unit members essentially must be 
interchangeable, because “cohesion, the 
ability to stick together and stay together 
even when—particularly when—things 
go disastrously wrong, is the most 
important quality any military forma-
tion must have�” Writes van Creveld, 
“since men and women are not identical, 
treating them as if they were is unfair� 
But treating them as if they were not is 
also unfair, though in a different way�”
The contribution to a climate of 
intellectual dishonesty within the U�S� 
military is a more serious second-order 
effect� Van Creveld suggests that female 
service members actually receive 
preferential treatment, including 
higher promotion rates and more lenient 
treatment during disciplinary proceed-
ings, and in connection with pregnancy� 
What is more dishonest is that “service 
personnel are prohibited from saying 
that such privileges exist,” or, for that 
matter, from writing or commenting 
in any way that might suggest there 
are problems or challenges associated 
with full integration of women into all 
military fields� “The accusation of being 
‘hostile to women’ will follow almost 
automatically,” and being branded as 
such “can easily bring about the end 
of one’s career�” One other form of 
dishonesty concerns charges of sexual 
harassment; as one female U�S� pilot 
told the author, “sexual harassment is 
what I decide to report to my superiors�” 
Whether that is an accurate reflection 
of reality or not, it is widely perceived 
that way among many men in the U�S� 
military� As a result, van Creveld notes 
that “to avoid trouble, men, military 
men more than most, are expected 
to believe—or at least conceal their 
disbelief in—two contradictory things� 
The first is that military women can 
serve and fight just as well as men can 
and that they therefore deserve the kind 
of equality they and their supporters are 
demanding� The second is that, being 
equal, they do not enjoy privileges of 
any kind�” These contradictory ideas are 
“precisely the kind of thing that George 
Orwell in 1984 called ‘double-think�’”
The author concludes this discussion 
with one final point� “Feminizing 
the forces and having women take 
an active part in war and combat 
threatens to take away one of the most 
important reasons, sometimes even 
the most important reason, why many 
men enlist and fight: namely, to prove 
their masculinity to themselves and to 
others�” The “end of masculinity” as 
a desideratum for a military force is 
bound to undermine its “culture of war�”
With regard to “constructing PTSD,” 
historically there is little record of it as a 
widespread phenomenon� Van Creveld 
suggests that this was in part because 
war from ancient times had been 
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associated with notions of aretē (excel-
lence) and virtus (prowess), and more 
recently with “honor” and “pride,” all of 
which helped to forestall or suppress it� 
But over the last century, “what changed 
was the way [war] was perceived and un-
derstood� From a revelatory experience 
akin to a religious one, it was turned 
into a thoroughly rotten business [that] 
was without either virtue or honor or 
knowledge of any sort, merely a process 
whereby obtuse generals sent millions 
to be slaughtered� � � � As a result, almost 
anybody who spent enough time 
fighting was bound to suffer psychologi-
cal damage�” Or so it was claimed�
Western militaries in the world wars 
came to accept notions of “shell shock” 
and “combat fatigue�” What is notable, 
however, is that U�S� forces suffered 
proportionately ten times the rate 
of such psychiatric casualties as did 
the German Wehrmacht, which was 
accepted generally as having displayed 
far greater cohesion and fighting 
power than its Western counterparts 
throughout the second war� Interest-
ingly, postwar East Germany saw far 
lower rates of such conditions than West 
Germany, although both were treating 
the same ex-soldiers� This suggests 
that “there can be no doubt that social 
factors—politics, culture, organization, 
leadership, what have you—do much to 
determine the way PTSD is treated� The 
same seems to apply to its frequency 
and, perhaps, even to its very existence�”
Psychiatric cases spiked in Vietnam 
and PTSD claims remain at high levels� 
Various causes are postulated: concus-
sion; “the sheer terror of modern war”; 
guilt feelings from surviving while 
comrades died; guilt feelings from 
killing others, especially in close combat� 
But as van Creveld demonstrates, many 
of those factors were always present in 
war, yet did not manifest themselves 
in large-scale PTSD� In more-recent 
conflicts, van Creveld notes that there 
was a far lower incidence of PTSD 
among North Vietnamese than among 
U�S� veterans, suggesting that “victory 
is the best cure for the soul�” Nor is 
defeat linked to widespread PTSD, as 
evidenced by the German experience 
in two world wars or, more recently, 
that of Serbs after the Yugoslav wars—a 
Serbian attaché informed the author 
that “PTSD is not a hot topic” in Serbia�
So why is the PTSD rate in the United 
States so high today? “Is it really war that 
is generating PTSD? Or is it present-day 
society’s idée fixe that war is bad both 
in itself and for the soul of those who 
participate in it, so that over enough 
time anybody who does so must break 
down,” in which case there is no disgrace 
involved? Van Creveld suggests that 
the cure may be driving the disease; 
there may be perverse incentives to 
overdiagnose PTSD, with the fear of 
liability at the societal level driving 
the process� There are large numbers 
of claims and claimants, and medical 
specialists, mental health workers, and 
lawyers all have strong incentives to 
keep the process going at full speed� Van 
Creveld poses the difficult question: “Is 
it conceivable that the compensations 
and pensions are providing at least some 
soldiers with an incentive to invent or 
exaggerate symptoms and retain them 
for as long as they can?” He concludes 
by quoting a speech by General Mattis: 
“I would just say there is one mispercep-
tion of our veterans and that is they are 
somehow damaged goods� I don’t buy it� 
If we tell our veterans enough that this 
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is what is wrong with them they may 
actually start believing it� While victim-
hood in America is exalted I don’t think 
our veterans should join those ranks�”
Van Creveld then segues to his fifth 
category, “delegitimizing war,” by noting 
that “to wage war two things are indis-
pensable: armed force and legitimacy�” 
He briefly reviews various notions of 
legitimacy, including war as civic duty in 
ancient times, defense of the sovereign 
power of the state, doctrines such as jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello, war as the 
“school of the nation,” and finally the 
linking of war to Darwinian theories 
regarding natural selection, survival of 
the fittest, and nations’ “will to live�”
The rise of powerful antimilitarist 
feelings after the world wars deeply 
eroded the idea of duty to the nation, 
even while “the language of rights now 
dominates political debate in the United 
States�” The post-Vietnam shift to an 
all-volunteer force further diminished 
the sense of individual obligation to the 
whole, while military service often came 
to be seen as being only for those with 
no better prospects� Van Creveld notes 
darkly that “where rights reign supreme 
and duty has become an object of ne-
glect, suspicion, and even derision—as it 
has in most Western societies—whether, 
if and when the test comes, they will 
be sufficient is anybody’s guess�”
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
initiated the idea that there were, 
or should be, better ways to settle 
international disputes than by war� 
This trend was reinforced strongly after 
the ruinous world wars by numerous 
subsequent conventions and treaties 
and the establishment of the United 
Nations� In parallel, concepts of “war 
guilt” and rejections of the national use 
of force except strictly in self-defense 
supplanted older notions of “the right of 
conquest” and have tended increasingly 
to delegitimize war, at least in the West� 
Thus, for many Western thinkers, the 
search for a replacement for war ought 
to favor nonmilitary alternatives, such 
as police training teams, mediators, and 
“dialogs�” In van Creveld’s view, “both 
intellectuals and politicians keep prom-
ising their audiences security without 
sacrifice, privilege without responsibil-
ity� But what if terrorists/guerrillas/
insurgents/freedom fighters refuse to 
answer empathy with empathy?”
In van Creveld’s view, these five trends 
collectively have deeply undermined 
Western military effectiveness and 
societal resilience, aggravated by the 
inability or unwillingness to examine 
the underlying causal factors rigorously 
and honestly� He closes by asserting 
that the bedrock cause is that “large 
parts of both European and American 
societies, each in its own way, have come 
to see war not simply as an evil that is 
sometimes made absolutely necessary 
by circumstances but as the ultimate 
one that almost nothing can justify� 
This will have to change� Or else�”
Many readers will reject various of the 
author’s arguments as anachronistic 
or, in any event, “overcome by events,” 
hence not of interest or worthy of fur-
ther debate or assessment� However, that 
at least some of them represent signifi-
cant threats to contemporary policies or 
agendas is suggested by the ruthless de 
facto suppression of vigorous debate on 
sensitive topics by senior officers and top 
civilian leaders (which invariably leads 
to self-censorship, particularly among 
ambitious officers)� Such intimidation is 
pure intellectual thuggery, which in itself 
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is a great institutional danger, especially 
in the military profession, where free 
thinking, combined with robust debate, 
is the essential prerequisite for not being 
out thought and outfought by future foes�
Almost as dangerous as intellectual 
thuggery is willful ignorance of “un-
pleasant truths” or empirical evidence� 
This was illustrated most notoriously 
by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’s 
recent a priori policy decision, made 
in the fashion of Alice in Wonderland’s 
Red Queen (“Sentence first, verdict 
afterwards!”), to open all ground combat 
positions to women regardless of any 
data that might result subsequently 
from the Marine Corps’s rigorous 
yearlong study regarding the perfor-
mance of mixed-gender units� That 
sort of thing corrosively undermines 
the institutional trust essential to the 
success of any military organization�
Pussycats doubtless is controversial� 
However, van Creveld’s arguments are 
coherent and intellectually substantive, 
even if one may disagree with some of 
the assumptions he makes to support 
them� Because they explicitly address 
the most fundamental criterion for 
assessing military forces—their combat 
effectiveness—they are very worth 
pondering by serving military officers 
and civilian policy makers, especially 
those more senior� Certainly the ques-
tion of why Western military might, in 
conjunction with the other elements 
of state power, has not been more 
effective during the past half-century 
is a crucial one, given the multiple 
dangerous challenges the West confronts 
both today and over the longer term�
JAN VAN TOL
Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological In-
novation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Im-
plications, by Sarah Kirchberger� Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 2015� 318 pages� $129�
Few recent works on the Chinese navy 
have arrived with a more intrigu-
ing pedigree than this volume� It is 
unusual to find any in-depth work on 
the Chinese military being done by 
European researchers� Assessing China’s 
Naval Power, the product of a German 
academic and released by a respected 
European publisher, is essentially unique 
in the field� Further, the author comes 
at the problem with a diverse résumé, 
having applied her academic training 
in East Asian politics as an analyst with 
the German shipbuilder Blohm + Voss� 
Despite these selling points, the work 
fails to deliver an original or compelling 
view of the fast-changing Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)�
Dr� Kirchberger sets out to create 
an objective and largely materialist 
yardstick by which to measure Chinese 
naval development� While dealing 
briefly with issues of policy and strategy, 
she notes that matériel “defines the up-
per limit of what is achievable through 
naval strategy�” As she seeks objective 
comparisons, Kirchberger uses other 
Asian and the so-called BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) navies as the 
benchmark for “normal” naval develop-
ment� While interesting, this effort to 
quantify the analysis results in a strained 
attempt to extract meaning from what 
is quantifiable from available sources�
As an example, in one vignette Kirch-
berger compares Asian naval forces 
with the total areas of the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) their nations 
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claim� The result suggests that China has 
an average level of patrol-capable vessels, 
but that the PLAN submarine force, at 
one submarine per 35,716�75 square 
kilometers of EEZ, is comparatively 
large� It is tempting to critique such an 
approach on the details: the figure used 
for China’s EEZ is smaller than the scope 
of its expansive maritime claims; and 
administration of maritime claims in 
China is a function of its rapidly growing 
coast guard and maritime militia (not 
explicitly included), whereas for many 
of the other nations analyzed the navy 
performs law-enforcement functions� 
More significant is the irrelevance of the 
figures themselves� By that yardstick, 
the U�S� Navy (not included in this 
analysis) defends one of the world’s 
largest EEZs with a paltry one subma-
rine per 210,000 square kilometers of 
EEZ� Navies are developed for strategic 
purposes, which vary from case to case�
Additionally, the focus on comparing 
the PLAN with developing nations’ 
navies ignores the fact that one of the 
driving combat tasks for the PLAN 
is countering USN presence in Asia� 
Taking the U�S� Navy as a yardstick for 
Chinese naval development matters 
because it is the yardstick the Chinese 
themselves have set� That does not mean 
the PLAN needs or desires to emulate 
USN force structure in detail, but 
considering both sides of a two-sided 
interaction is critical to understanding�
More interesting is Kirchberger’s analysis 
of China’s shipbuilding capabilities� 
Drawing on her experience in the 
shipbuilding industry, Kirchberger 
assesses that the Chinese civil shipbuild-
ing industry, though massive, offers few 
advantages in the production of naval 
combatants� In the critical maritime 
electronic sector, the book argues 
that the European arms embargo and 
centralized Chinese state control have 
stymied most meaningful innovation� 
Chinese combatants are presented as 
collections of imported and copied 
systems, with the assumption that the 
systems-integration problems such a 
model implies significantly hamper 
their combat performance� The Chinese 
decision to purchase the Russian-made 
Sovremenny-class destroyer and 
Kilo-class submarine in the middle of 
the previous decade is seen as a tacit 
admission of systemic deficiencies in 
Chinese maritime systems develop-
ment� However, Kirchberger arguably 
underestimates China’s success at both 
systems integration and adaptation 
of foreign technologies� For example, 
China received limited numbers of 
Russian-manufactured MINERAL 
ME radars and reverse engineered 
them with enough success that they 
now are deployed on every Jiangkai 
II frigate produced� Kirchberger 
dismisses these systems as poor copies�
While an earnest effort, at its heart this 
volume fails on its sources� Dependent 
on other secondary, primarily English-
language, works, it contains few if any 
references to Chinese-language sources� 
As the volume was published in 2015, 
most of these sources are from 2013 
and prior� For example, Kirchberger’s 
most consequential conclusions about 
the PLAN submarine force hinge on a 
2007 analysis of PLAN patrol activity 
during the prior decade� The result 
is a view of the Chinese navy that 
arguably is accurate as of about 2010, 
but that does not account for the rapid 
changes in the scope and complexity 
of PLAN platforms, capabilities, and 
operations in the intervening years�
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Given the relatively small number of 
academics doing serious analysis of the 
PLAN, the introduction of a new point 
of view is always to be welcomed. In 
this case, however, naval professionals 
interested in Chinese naval development 
would be served better by going directly 
to the sources behind this volume.
DALE C. RIELAGE
Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Con-
flict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991, by 
Xiaoming Zhang. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North 
Carolina Press, 2015. 296 pages. $34.95 (e-book 
$33.99).
This book will be welcomed equally 
by historians, political scientists, and 
international relations specialists. It is 
a worthy addition to existing literature 
and belongs on any bookshelf dedicated 
to understanding modern China and 
Southeast Asia. Xiaoming Zhang, an 
associate professor in the Department 
of Strategy at the Air War College, has 
provided valuable additional informa-
tion and analysis concerning the People’s 
Republic of China’s invasion of Vietnam 
in 1979. The Chinese invasion was 
planned deliberately and analytically, 
then for nearly a month the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) fought fiercely 
against China’s neighbor and former 
ally. At the end of this period, the two 
countries settled into a continuing active 
and deadly border dispute that lasted 
a decade. Taking advantage of recently 
declassified Chinese documents and an 
impressive number of interviews, Dr. 
Zhang has advanced significantly our 
understanding of why the Chinese chose 
to initiate the somewhat Orwellian-
sounding “counterattack in self-defense 
against Vietnam,” how the war was 
conducted, and why the subsequent 
conflict along the Vietnamese-
Chinese border lasted so long.
As the history of the conflict unfolds, 
Deng Xiaoping becomes more and 
more the central figure and key Chinese 
decision maker. By the conclusion of the 
book, Dr. Zhang presents a convincing 
case that the war of 1979 was indeed 
Deng’s war—a war into which he entered 
as much to preserve and promote his 
plans for economic modernization as to 
affect the balance of power in the inter-
national political system, while simulta-
neously aiming to rehabilitate and start 
the process of modernizing the PLA.
The book explains how the recent North 
Vietnamese victory over the Americans 
and the South Vietnamese had a surpris-
ingly deleterious effect on Vietnam’s 
previously amiable and long-term alli-
ance with China. Flushed with victory 
and boasting a hardened and well-
equipped army, the Vietnamese became, 
to Chinese eyes, increasingly arrogant 
and unfriendly. Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia and its deepening friendship 
with the Soviet Union led Deng to see 
China’s position as potentially imperiled, 
threatened by the USSR to the north 
and the Vietnamese to the south. In 
particular, the invasion of Cambodia 
in December 1978 was viewed as proof 
of Hanoi’s ambition to make Vietnam a 
hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, and 
added significantly to Deng’s concerns.
Deng, who already had determined that 
economic and industrial modernization 
was the way ahead for China, arrived 
at an apparently counterintuitive 
conclusion. Significant combat opera-
tions conducted against Vietnam, the 
Soviet Union’s most important regional 
ally, would signal to the United States 
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and other Western powers that China 
was a reliable partner that could be 
counted on to do what was needed� 
In return, the West would be more 
likely to continue to support Chinese 
efforts to modernize, and the perceived 
Soviet threat would be reduced�
However, as Zhang explains, the 
Chinese army had not fought a major 
war in three decades� Its tactics were 
outdated and its logistics support was 
inferior, and no officer below the rank 
of battalion commander was battle 
tested� Furthermore, the PLA did not 
enjoy a positive reputation within 
China’s general population� In contrast, 
the Vietnamese army had decades of 
recent combat experience, large stores 
of modern Soviet and captured U�S� 
military equipment, and the intangible 
benefits that come with victory�
A massive propaganda campaign to 
improve the image of the PLA was 
launched� Significant amounts of 
military stores were moved into the 
Guangzhou and Kunming military 
districts� Army planners prepared for 
a massive offensive designed to seize 
several major northern Vietnamese cit-
ies and wreck two Vietnamese divisions 
in the process� The whole campaign was 
designed to “teach Vietnam a lesson�”
Zhang provides a detailed account of 
the fighting that followed� The Chinese 
executed their plan successfully, albeit 
at a much higher cost than anticipated� 
Zhang debunks common claims by 
Vietnamese that the majority of their 
combatants were local militia fight-
ers� While it is true that several elite 
Vietnamese divisions were engaged in 
Cambodia, far more regular army units 
fought in the north than the Vietnamese 
indicated� The war was almost exclu-
sively a ground war, although both the 
Vietnamese and Chinese air forces car-
ried out many reconnaissance missions�
After nearly thirty days of fairly hard 
fighting, Chinese forces withdrew to the 
border, having achieved their geographic 
objectives and inflicted significant ca-
sualties on enemy forces� The operation 
had been calibrated skillfully to “punish” 
Vietnam, without going so far as to bring 
the Soviets into the fray� Deng then 
directed the army to continue to fight 
along the border until the Vietnamese 
withdrew from Cambodia� It would take 
a decade—and the visible decline of the  
Soviet Union—but in the end 
Vietnamese leaders acquiesced and 
Deng got what he wanted� During this 
period Vietnam’s economy suffered� 
China’s southernmost provinces 
also suffered, but the nation reaped 
the benefits of modernization 
and Western engagement�
Chinese military leaders deliberately 
used the ensuing chronic border conflict 
to “blood” much of their army and 
local militias� The war also provided 
new heroes to place in the public eye� 
However, in one of the more poignant 
portions of the book, Zhang describes 
how China’s Vietnam experience 
affected many of the participants in 
much the same manner as it had their 
earlier U�S� equivalents� Strategically, the 
war also saw the Chinese army embrace 
combined operations and a turn to mod-
ernization as a requirement for victory�
Zhang makes a convincing argument 
that Deng Xiaoping calculatingly 
used the Chinese military instrument 
to achieve strategic, domestic, and 
personal goals� His war was one of 
deliberate choice� Potential Vietnamese 
hegemonic ambitions were thwarted; 
Vietnam would be forced to leave 
Cambodia� China’s ties to the West 
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were strengthened; Soviet influence 
in the region was weakened�
China reaped other benefits, although 
some were perhaps mixed� Vietnam 
would—and still does—view China 
with suspicion� Other countries in 
the region now know that China did, 
and could once again, wage offensive 
war, if seen to be in the interest of the 
state� The Chinese military, once so 
abysmally behind technologically, has 
transformed itself� Combined arms 
operations, performed haltingly at 
best in 1979, are now common�
Zhang frequently and conscientiously  
reminds the reader that, although 
knowledge of the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict has increased greatly, it is  
important not to embrace any conclu-
sions, even the most apparently 
convincing, as definitive� This is because 
some Chinese and all the Vietnamese 
records have yet to be declassified� The 
warning is appropriate, but should 
not detract from Zhang’s analysis, nor 
from a deep appreciation of his work�
RICHARD J� NORTON
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College� He is a retired 
naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University� 
His most recent publications include articles in the Naval War College Review and Marine Corps 
University Journal.
Dale C. Rielage serves as director for intelligence and information operations for the U�S� Pacific 
Fleet� He has served as 3rd Fleet N2, 7th Fleet Deputy N2, senior intelligence officer for China at 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, and director of the Navy Asia-Pacific advisory group� He is the 
author of Russian Supply Efforts in America during the First World War�
Prior to his retirement from the U�S� Navy in 2007, Captain Jan van Tol served as special adviser in 
the office of the vice president� He was a military assistant to the Secretary of Defense’s principal 
adviser for net assessment from 1993 to 1996 and again from 2001 to 2003� At sea, he commanded 
three warships, two of which, USS O’Brien (DD 975) and USS Essex (LHD 2), were part of the U�S� 
Navy’s forward-deployed naval forces based in Japan� Captain van Tol’s analytic work has focused 
mainly on long-range strategic planning, naval warfare, military innovation, and war gaming�
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson is a strong supporter of reading books of consequence as a way for all members of the Navy team to 
develop as leaders and citizens� He recently said, “I realize that it takes dedica-
tion to devote time to reading, but it is fundamental to growth as a naval profes-
sional�” He has directed his reading program planning team at the Naval War 
College to expand the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program 
(CNO-PRP) to include a larger selection of titles, and to augment the books with 
other learning tools such as reading guides, videos, and related articles� Final 
steps toward launching the new program are being taken now, but the general 
outline of the changes is highlighted below:
• The recommended book titles will be arranged in groups that align with 
the tenets of the “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority”; these are 
“Strengthening Naval Power at and from the Sea”; “Achieving High-Velocity 
Learning at Every Level”; “Strengthening Our Navy Team for the Future”; 
and “Expanding and Strengthening Our Network of Partners�” The books 
also will be cross-referenced and linked to subjects related to the four core at-
tributes of the Navy’s professional identity: integrity, accountability, initiative, 
and toughness�
• Recognizing that the Navy is a war-fighting entity that nonetheless shares 
some of the characteristics of a large corporate enterprise, the books will be 
categorized as primarily operational in nature or more corporate in focus�
• The new CNO-PRP will recommend books that form the basis of the Navy’s 
cultural and historical legacy� These dozen books form a canon of fundamen-
tal reading that can be of value to all sailors�
• The majority of the books that will comprise the new program fall into 
broad categories associated with the Design’s “lines of effort” and its “core 
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
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attributes�” The approximately forty titles in these categories build on the 
foundation the canon establishes�
• A list of history and fiction books will be identified for consideration, as well 
as a group of titles of a more casual nature (a sort of informal “Navy book 
club”)�
• A final list of titles will identify books that will challenge the conventional 
wisdom, getting readers to think from different perspectives�
The intent of the various lists and categorizations is to help sailors find books 
of professional value among the millions in publication at any time� Many of the 
books identified in the CNO-PRP will be available for free loan from the MWR 
Digital Library�
The next article in the Reflections on Reading series will discuss specific titles, 
authors, and subjects of interest� The motto of the new CNO-PRP is “Read, Write, 
Win!,” and we believe that any investment in time spent reading the outstanding 
books in the program will pay great dividends in enhancing your professionalism�
JOHN E� JACKSON
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